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Abstract 
The paradigm of social epistemic rhetoric, established by James Berlin, is a 
rhetoricized and historicized approach to textual analysis and production which takes as 
its purpose the education of students for democratic engagement. However, a number of 
scholars such as Taylor and Terranova argue that a new historical period, marked by the 
rapid globalization and informatization of society, may now be emerging. As such, social 
epistemic rhetoric may not offer an adequate response to the emerging conditions of a 
globalized, network culture. 
This project will begin with an examination of social epistemic rhetoric in relation 
to the scholarship of computers and composition, complexity theory and the post-process 
movement. Next, the critical methodology suggested by Berlin, as well as the theoretical 
work of Debord, Foucault and Hardt and Negri, will be drawn upon to analyze forms of 
power, subjectivity, and resistance in the digital discourses of online social networks and 
personal weblogs. The project will then turn to an examination of the importance of 
student-centered pedagogy to composition in the digital age, and conclude with a 
discussion of “network epistemic rhetoric”— a refiguration of social epistemic rhetoric 
for the 21st century— and its pedagogical application within the context of a composition 
course focused on globalization and the university.
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 I was first drawn to the field of composition and rhetoric because of the 
discipline’s emphasis on pedagogy and its commitment to the practical 
application of research and theory in the classroom; however, as my studies 
progressed, rhetorical theory and the history of the field itself began to interest 
me.  As someone with a background in literature and an interest in literary theory 
(but who wondered, “What on earth one might do with that theory?”), I became 
particularly interested in James Berlin’s work, which helped me understand the 
relationship between English studies and composition, between rhetoric and the 
poetic. Further, his writings elucidated the relationship between poststructuralist 
theory and composition/ rhetoric theory, pointing to ways that postmodern 
thought might have a very tangible, practical application in the composition 
classroom. 
Meanwhile, I was introduced to and profoundly influenced by Guy 
Debord’s Society of the Spectacle (1967). Debord’s dystopian assessment of what 
is now known as the late capitalist mode of production and the social and cultural 
conditions that have arisen from it greatly impacted my understanding of culture 
and economics. He argues that in societies “in which the modern conditions of 
production prevail,” life “presents itself as an immense accumulation of 
spectacles. The images detached from every aspect of life merge into a common 
stream, and the former unity of life is lost forever” (p. 12). In the society of the 
spectacle, all human interaction is mediated by technology and individuals can 
find unity and understanding only through the common stream of images, sounds 
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and words upon which all society gazes. This unity, however, is false because it 
can only be found in a stream of technological representations that mediates and 
therefore prevents actual human connection. But the spectacle is not simply the 
perpetuation of images in the media—it is “both the result and goal of the 
dominant mode of production…it represents the dominant model of life” (Debord, 
1967, p. 12). In other words, the spectacle describes both economic production 
and the social and cultural manifestations which serve to further reify and 
perpetuate the current economic conditions.  
 Debord described the society of the spectacle forty years ago, but his 
observations still ring true in many ways today. If fact, if his analysis of the 
cultural state of 1967 falls short in comparison to that of 2007, it is only in his 
assessment of the intensity and totality of the spectacle—if anything, our society 
has become all the more spectacular. We live in a world of surveillance, control, 
and spectacle, wherein the globalized free market increases daily the gap between 
the rich and the poor (on both the national and international level), and this 
process is facilitated, validated, and normalized by a media consolidated under the 
control of an ever-diminishing number of corporate powers. Further, the reach 
and speed of electronic media has been exponentially increased by the rise of the 
Internet. Spectacles become ever more dazzling, and access to them is ever more 
available, as the 21st century is marked by proliferation of wireless portable 
devices1 that, on one hand, allow individuals constant access to media sources that 
provide spectacular entertainment, and on the other hand, allow corporate and 
                                                 
1 See Castells, 2004, 7. 
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government powers access to the individual, blurring the boundaries between 
work and leisure and providing the means for constant surveillance.2 
 Since 1967, we have seen the rise of what Douglas Kellner calls “media 
culture.” Kellner (2003) writes: 
During the past decades, the culture industries have multiplied media 
spectacles in novel spaces and sites, and spectacle itself is becoming one 
of the organizing principles of the economy, polity, society, and everyday 
life. An Internet-based economy has been developing hi-tech spectacle as 
a means of promotion, reproduction, and the circulation and selling of 
commodities, using multi- media and increasingly sophisticated 
technology to dazzle consumers.  
 
Political and social life is also shaped more and more by media 
spectacle…Media culture not only takes up expanding moments of 
contemporary experience, but also provides ever more material for 
fantasy, dreaming, modeling thought and behavior, and constructing 
identities (p. 1). 
 
We now live in a society that is structured on every level by spectacular media, as 
our economy, culture, politics are all shaped by the circulation of images, and 
identity itself is constructed by knowledge/power that flows through rhizomatic 
electronic networks. While many saw the Internet initially as a space in which 
democracy, freedom, and equality could flourish, I will demonstrate throughout 
this book that this promise has largely remained unfulfilled. It is true that the Web 
has opened up new avenues of resistance and new ways by which one can gain a 
voice, and it still offers some potential as a site for counter-hegemonic discourse 
and action. But I will argue that, on balance, the Internet has done more to 
strengthen hegemonic power while at the same time dispersing and decentralizing 
it. The Internet, as it emerged from the late capitalist mode of production, could 
                                                 
2 See D.N. Rodowick, 2003. 
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not be a space free from and untainted by this inherently oppressive system. 
Instead, it helped intensify late capitalism: the spectacle became interactive and 
privacy became non-existent. As I will argue in detail in later chapters, electronic 
discourses such as social networking and blogs encourage identification with 
spectacular culture, identity representation as spectacle, and self-enrollment in 
networks of surveillance.  
 The Internet alone was not responsible for the rise of media culture. As 
Kellner points out, the news media, under ever-increasing corporate influence, 
become inseparable from the entertainment industry: the political power of the 
elite is perpetuated and reinforced as political discourse is reduced to name-
calling, advertising slogans, and endless debate over hot-button issues, and 
international conflict is framed as a battle between good and evil and then 
broadcast as just another form of dazzling entertainment. Thus, the possibility of 
political action is foreclosed, and one’s “freedom” is reduced to choice over 
which product/image to buy: Ford or Chevy, Fox or CNN, Republican or 
Democrat?   
 Berlin recognized that our world was becoming increasingly mediated by 
images and technology and knew that the field of composition and rhetoric would 
have a vital role to play in this rapidly evolving society and culture: we must 
enable our students to critique, as well as produce, the electronic and visual texts 
that saturate their experience and shape their everyday lives. As Berlin (1996) 
writes, “In this age of spectacle, democracy will rise or fall on our ability to offer 
a critical response to these daily experiences” (p. 57). In a society in which the 
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passive contemplation of digital media has all but replaced direct action and most 
action only serves to perpetuate the current mode of production, in order for the 
people to have any chance of gaining agency and power they must have critical 
awareness of and proficiency in the production of electronic media. 
 Tragically, Berlin was not able to apply his important work in rhetoric and 
composition to the network cultures that rapidly began to emerge in the early 
1990’s. He died suddenly in 1994, before he could bring his systematic, 
historicized theorization of rhetoric, composition and literacy—what he called 
“social epistemic rhetoric”—fully to bear on the discourse and culture of the 
digital age. Although much has happened since 1994, Berlin’s ideas still provide a 
largely effective heuristic by which to engage critically with electronic discourse. 
However, our network society has evolved to such an extent that some of the 
assumptions and conclusions that underlie social epistemic rhetoric have not been 
borne out as neatly in electronic discourse as many in the field would have liked. 
In other words, it initially appeared, according to early scholarship on computers 
and composition, that utopian, poststructuralist theories of discourse would be 
made manifest in the digital realm. Digital discourse, however, has not been as 
empowering as many would have liked. In fact, I argue that in many ways, 
advances in electronic networked communications have more often resulted in the 
intensification and reach of hegemonic power.  
On the other hand, the emergence of a globalized, network society has 
opened up the possibility of the development of a new kind of democracy. 
Creating and fostering a democratic society is a central goal of social epistemic 
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rhetoric. Berlin (1996) criticizes progressive educators of the early 20th century 
for their assumption that a democratic government in fact existed in America, and 
argues that democracy remains limited and endangered in the postmodern period. 
He offers a model of postmodern democracy that may be more viable now, 
because of rapidly changing technological and societal conditions, than it was at 
the time of Berlin’s work. Drawing on the model of democracy offered by Iris 
Marion Young (1990), Berlin (1996) offers a definition of democracy “based on 
the recognition of difference” (100). He writes:   
Traditional notions of civic discourse have constructed fictional political 
agents that leave behind their differences to assume a persona that is 
rational and universal in thought and language. In a postmodern world, no 
such subject exists. Democracy, then, becomes radically participatory, as 
the heterogeneous voices that constitute any historical moment are 
allowed a hearing (p.100). 
 
Such an understanding of democracy continues to be a useful conception of  what 
democracy should look like in the digital age. In fact, as Micheal Hardt and 
Antonio Negri argue, the emerging conditions of our increasingly globally 
connected and mediated world make the attainment of this kind of democracy all 
the more possible.  
They assert that the emergence of “network power,” while further 
consolidating and strengthening the hegemonic order, has also opened up the 
possibility of a new kind of collective resistance and democracy: the multitude. 
They write: 
You might say…that there are two faces to globalization. On one face, 
Empire spreads globally its network of hierarchies and divisions that 
maintain order through new mechanisms of control and constant conflict. 
Globalization, however, is also the creation of new circuits of cooperation 
and collaboration that stretch across nations and continents and allow an 
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unlimited number of encounters…[I]t provides the possibility that, while 
remaining different, we discover the commonality that enables us to 
communicate and act together 
 (p. xiii). 
 
As I will examine in greater depth over the course of this book, the rapid advance 
of globalization and digital technology, while creating new forms of power and 
control, has also opened up new avenues of communication and connection. 
Communication, knowledge and power are now organized rhizomatic networks 
that allow for the emergence of the multitude, a new kind of democratic social 
organization that maintains difference while enabling (global!) connection and 
action. The network society that has arisen since Berlin’s death now perhaps 
offers the means to realize his vision of democracy. 
If we in the field of composition and rhetoric hope to encourage and 
contribute to the project of the multitude, we must examine and critique—always 
within the context of the material and cultural conditions of the historical 
moment— newly emerging discursive networks, and the forms of social 
organization these networks bring about. I hope to demonstrate that social 
epistemic rhetoric, while it is still an immensely useful conception of rhetoric, 
must be revised and supplemented if we are to effectively respond to the cultural, 
economic and social conditions of our networked society. 
Social Epistemic Rhetoric and the Refiguration of English Studies 
Before continuing, we must establish what exactly is meant by the term 
“social epistemic rhetoric.” The paradigm of rhetoric and literacy that James 
Berlin labels social epistemic rhetoric emerges from both institutional and 
disciplinary critiques within the field of composition and rhetoric. Berlin 
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establishes social epistemic rhetoric as a paradigm of rhetoric, composition, and 
literacy that, in the mid-eighties, arises out of critiques of English studies as a 
whole, as well as of the newly formed discipline of composition and rhetoric. 
Berlin uses the term “paradigm” as defined by Williams (1983): “a characteristic 
mental hypothesis” (p. 307). In other words, Berlin uses the term “paradigm” to 
denote particular lines of thought in English studies as well as composition and 
rhetoric. From Berlin’s point of view, the paradigm of social epistemic rhetoric 
characterizes a general theory of writing and rhetoric that a number of scholars 
tend to work from, although they may not agree on everything. The paradigms 
that Berlin describes are tied to particular historical periods, although they may 
overlap and compete. (For example, the paradigm of social epistemic rhetoric 
emerges after and in response to the process paradigm of composition, while 
nonetheless maintaining many of the insights of the process movement.) 
Therefore, Berlin does not use “paradigm” in the Kuhnian sense, as a new period 
of scientific (or scholarly) thought that is completely incommensurable with the 
preceding period. Finally, social epistemic rhetoric can most specifically be 
understood as denoting Berlin’s characteristic mental hypothesis regarding 
composition and rhetoric. That is, we can consider (as we will most often in this 
book) social epistemic rhetoric as Berlin’s own specific, systematic theorization 
of composition and rhetoric. In order to proceed, however, we must consider 
Berlin’s historicized account of English studies and composition and rhetoric, so 
as to understand both Berlin’s method of historicization—which will be a focus of 
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critique in a later chapter— and the circumstances (according to Berlin) from 
which social epistemic rhetoric arose. 
On the institutional level, social epistemic rhetoric is a response to the 
dominant paradigms of literacy established in (the U.S. university curriculum) 
English studies in the early 20th century (Berlin, 1996). On a disciplinary level, 
social epistemic rhetoric (according to Berlin) emerges in response to the 
cognitivist and expressivist movements within the field of composition and 
rhetoric (Berlin, 1992). Berlin (1996) asserts that, on an institutional level, social 
epistemic rhetoric develops as a progressive response to three major paradigms of 
literacy that emerged in the university at the turn of the 20th century: two of the 
three paradigms, the “literacy of the scientific meritocracy” and the “literacy of 
liberal-culture,” reinforced the status quo, reproducing current economic and 
cultural relations, while the third paradigm, “democratic literacy,” although truly 
committed to the advancement of democratic values, was limited by its faith in 
the egalitarianism of American society and the progress that would result from 
scientific inquiry (p. 38).  
English studies in the literacy of the meritocracy provided practice in 
reading and writing, the communication skills necessary in business and science. 
Composition in this curriculum is now known as current-traditional rhetoric, in 
which heavy emphasis is placed on following formulae and the end product, 
rather than the process, of writing. Invention is not necessary, as the truth to any 
matter can be obtained through scientific investigation (Berlin, 1996, p. 30). 
Language is a set of arbitrary signs that match exactly the external reality that it is 
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used to communicate (p. 31). Writing is viewed as a transparent medium through 
which to convey objective fact; knowledge exists apart from the writer; his3 job is 
to find the knowledge and transfer it onto the page.  
English also played an important, although different, role in the literacy of 
liberal culture. English studies in this curriculum existed chiefly to preserve the 
cultural heritage of the elite. As Berlin writes, 
The literacy of liberal culture is based on a conservative ideology that 
treasures continuity… Only a small minority can achieve the realm of 
higher truth, and it is this group that must be trusted for leadership in 
politics and culture. Education ought to be limited to this small group, a 
natural aristocracy with the potential for genius (1996, p. 35). 
 
The job of English studies was to canonize works deemed worthy by those with 
taste and a sense of the truth, in order to ensure the continued ascendance of a 
particular set of values and the individuals who held them. Instruction in 
composition in this paradigm is unnecessary, as writing is the product of 
individual genius; those attending the university should naturally possess the 
ability to write. 
Advocates of the third paradigm, democratic literacy, recognized the 
limitations of the other two literacies, noting that they both served narrow class 
interests. Those with the third position did agree that universities should train 
experts to solve cultural and economic problems; however, they believed that 
higher education existed expressly to reinforce democracy and improve all of 
society. Those who supported this literacy believed that rhetoric should be taught 
as a means to prepare citizens for taking action in society; thus, in this paradigm, 
                                                 
3 University students in this period were overwhelmingly white males. 
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“Students learn to write in a manner that prepares them for participation in the 
political life of a democratic society” (p. 36). Writing must take into account the 
entire rhetorical context: writer, audience and topic as well as the social 
environment (Berlin, 1996, p. 36). Discourse is not simply for scientific or 
economic purposes; it is essential to a truly democratic society in which all 
citizens are given a voice.  However, Berlin notes that this view of literacy is 
limited by its failure to take into account the effects of economic and social 
arrangements on the political system. It naively assumes a democratic government 
is in place, when in reality the existing system inherently favors those of a certain 
class, gender, and race (p. 37). In addition, this understanding of literacy is limited 
by its trust in power of instrumental reason (and therefore objective knowledge) 
and a faith that scientific progress would improve the lives of all. 
All three of these conceptions of literacy are limited in their attempt to 
improve society. While the first of these two paradigms, in theory, shifted the 
purpose of higher education from the preparation of elite men for leadership 
positions to a concern for the betterment of all society, both forms of literacy 
maintained and strengthened the power of the highest class.4 The third paradigm, 
while truly committed to the advancement of democratic values, was limited by 
its faith in the egalitarianism of American society and the progress that would 
result from scientific inquiry. Social epistemic rhetoric, on an institutional level, 
                                                 
4 Meritocratic literacy may have widened the bourgeoisie, but this was a result of the creation of 
managers for corporations, which generated wealth primarily for the elite.  While those who 
advocated the literacy of liberal culture may have shifted the core college curriculum from its 
focus on the languages and literatures of Greek and Latin to works in more widely accessible 
vernacular, they still believed that culture and politics should be left in the hands of the select few 
(35). 
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can perhaps be seen as a return to the era of progressive education, but without the 
accompanying faith in the objectivity of science, the current state of democracy, 
and the notion of “progress” itself. 
The Social Turn 
More specifically, within the field of composition and rhetoric, social 
epistemic rhetoric emerged out of the disciplinary critiques of the cognitivist and 
expressivist approaches of the process movement (Berlin, 1988) that marked the 
“social turn” in composition. Patricia Bizzell (1982) in “Cognition, Convention 
and Certainty: What We Need to Know  About Writing” and Berlin (1988)  in 
“Rhetoric and Ideology” criticize the cognitivist approach exemplified in Britton 
(1975), Emig (1971)  and most prominently, Flower and Hayes’ (1981) “A 
Cognitive Process Theory of Writing.” Bizzell and Berlin criticize such research 
(which attempts to map the cognitive processes of writers through such methods 
as writing sample analysis and talk aloud protocols) for using a positivist 
approach that neglects to address the social, cultural, and political contexts that 
always surround the writing act. On the other hand, Berlin criticizes the 
expressivist approach of theorists such as Peter Elbow (1973) which, although it 
recognizes the writing act as occurring within cultural and material contexts, 
focuses too heavily on individual expression, thus preventing writing instruction 
from teaching the value of collective social action. 
From the mid-eighties onward, there emerged a number of composition 
and rhetoric scholars, influenced by postmodern and Marxist theory as well as 
theories of critical pedagogy, who could be considered social epistemic 
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rhetoricians. As such, social epistemic rhetoric denotes a wide range of rhetorical 
and pedagogical practices, although Berlin (1988, 1992) establishes general 
epistemological and theoretical assumptions from which the paradigm operates. 
Social epistemic rhetoric is informed by a poststructuralist understanding of 
signification and subjectivity that emerges from postmodern theorists such as 
Derrida, Althusser, and Foucault. Discourse does not exist as an independent 
container apart from objective facts and the individual who wishes to express 
them; instead, discourse constructs both the knowledge it communicates and the 
subject who deploys it. Further, the subject is not stable or coherent but is instead 
formed by numerous competing discourses. The ultimate goals of social epistemic 
rhetorical thought are political; its pedagogy aims to enable civic engagement and 
democratic practice. Kenneth Bruffee (1984), in articles such as “Collaborative 
Learning and the ‘Conversation of Mankind’” is perhaps the earliest advocate in 
the field of composition and rhetoric for a social constructionist approach to 
writing pedagogy and theory, although this pedagogical approach can be traced as 
far back to progressivists such as Dewey (Berlin, 1996). A social constructionist 
approach can also be seen in such works as Lunsford and Ede’s (1990) Single 
Text, Plural Authors, James Porter’s (1992) Audience and Rhetoric, and Deborah 
Brandt’s (1990) Literacy as Involvement, in which she argues that literacy can be 
seen as “a growing metacommunicative ability— an increasing awareness of the 
control over the social means by which people sustain discourse, knowledge, and 
reality…” (p. 32). Burke (1969) is perhaps the first scholar of composition and 
rhetoric to note the role discourse plays in constructing individuals that occupy 
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various subject positions simultaneously, noting that the study of rhetoric is the 
consideration of the “ways in which individuals are at odds with each other, or 
become identified with groups more or less at odds with another” (p. 22). This 
external process is mirrored internally: identifications with a variety of motives 
are made within, and “you get a complex person with many voices” (Burke, 1969, 
p. 38). An understanding of the individual as fragmented and heterogeneous, 
inhabiting multiple subject positions at once, is endorsed by a wide range of 
composition and rhetoric scholars including Bizzell (1981), Bartholomae (1985), 
and Faigley (1992). Such scholars argue that the multi-perspectival construction 
of the subject is essential to the encouragement of a diverse and tolerant society, 
for a myopic acknowledgement of particular subject positions silences diverse 
voices and limits political agency. Further, the acknowledgment that rhetoric, and 
therefore knowledge and subject positions, are always already ideological (Berlin, 
1992) links social epistemic rhetoric to the theories and practices of Marxist 
cultural studies and critical pedagogy. The political commitment that underlies the 
theory and pedagogy of social epistemic rhetoric, exemplified in Berlin’s (1996) 
call for historicization and semiotic critique, emerges out of the cultural studies of 
Barthes’ (1972) Mythologies and Hall (1980), and the critical pedagogy of Freire 
(1970) and Giroux (1988).  
Computers, Writing and Social Epistemic Rhetoric 
Of course, as the rise of computer technology generally coincides with the 
social turn in composition, much of the field’s scholarship concerning technology 
has been informed by the theory and practice of social epistemic rhetoric, which is 
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in turn informed by postmodern theory and critical pedagogy. In fact, many of the 
central tenets   of social epistemic rhetoric have been confirmed by or manifested 
in digital discourse. Further, much of the early research on computers and writing 
was celebratory of the potential offered by technology to help writing teachers 
accomplish the goals of social epistemic rhetoric. For example, Lester Faigley 
(1992) asserts in “The Achieved Utopia of the Networked Classroom” that the 
computer-mediated classroom offers a hypertextual space in which disciplinary 
power can be disrupted and formerly silenced marginalized (female, non-white) 
people can find voice. More theoretically, Richard Lanham (1993) writes of the 
reorganization of knowledge and the reevaluation of social decorum (which 
includes oppressive cultural norms) that will result as computers make us more 
aware of the ways in which discourse shapes knowledge and reality. While these 
early notions of the egalitarian power of the Web were and continue to be 
affirmed in some instances, it cannot be said that these ideals have been generally 
achieved.  
Nevertheless, social epistemic rhetoric offers a powerful heuristic for the 
critique of digital discourse and technology. Hawisher and Selfe (1991) offer one 
of the earliest critiques of the utopian assessment of technology in the writing 
classroom. They argue that, since computers are artifacts that are imbued with the 
ideologies of the dominant culture, they often exacerbate rather than solve 
problems found in traditional writing classes because they encourage teacher 
lecture and limit student involvement and interaction.  Laura Gurak (1997, 2001) 
shifts this critique outside of the classroom, analyzing the ways in which the 
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discourse of the Web perpetuates oppressive representations of women and 
consumer capitalist ideologies.5 Most recently, Stuart Selber (2004) establishes a 
systematic pedagogical, curricular, and institutional response to our students’ 
need for multiliteracies: the ability to use, critique, and create within electronic 
spaces. Gregory Ulmer’s (2003) Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy 
also establishes a curriculum that will enable students to both critique and create 
electronic discourse. 
All of this scholarship recognizes the (at least partial) construction of 
knowledge and subjectivity by discourse and a need for a theoretical and 
pedagogical response that resists the perpetuation of hegemonic values within 
electronic environments, while engendering civic engagement and democratic 
practices within those spaces. However, scholarship on computers and writing 
based on social epistemic rhetoric, or that which doesn’t at least explicitly 
recognize its limitations, may no longer provide an adequate response to the 
rapidly changing social and economic conditions of the emerging globalized 
network culture. The emergence of digital discourse confirmed for many the 
validity of poststructuralist theory (thereby confirming social epistemic rhetorical 
thought, based as it is on poststructuralism), as it seemed to be the tangible 
realization of a number of common postmodern observations regarding discourse. 
Thus, early scholarship on electronic discourse tends to take on a utopian tone, 
and while a number of optimistic assertions on this topic retain some validity, 
they are certainly not without their limitations. At first glance, digital discourse 
                                                 
5 See also Blair and Takayoshi (1999), as well as Nakamura (2002), for analyses of the Web in 
relation to issues of gender and race, respectively. 
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seems to confirm some of the central tenets of social epistemic rhetoric in an 
overwhelmingly positive fashion; a closer look, however, reveals the need to 
temper one’s optimism. 
Utopia Achieved? 
Berlin suggests that a central practice of social epistemic rhetoric is the 
analysis of cultural codes. In other words, Berlin advocated the critical analysis of 
a range of the signifying practices—oral, written, visual and digital—that 
constitute our experience and society. Just as discourse determines what counts as 
knowledge, it normalizes particular kinds of cultural practices, thereby 
reproducing current social and material relations. Berlin argues that it is essential 
that we acknowledge and critique codes that normalize dominant values and 
perpetuate the current mode of production. However, as I will illustrate below, 
digital technology does not call more attention to naturalized discursive codes; 
instead, electronic discourse now naturalizes the dominant codes. Thus, it is 
crucial, as Selfe argues, that those in the field of composition and rhetoric pay 
attention to and critique the ways in which dominant values are privileged and 
normalized in electronic discourse.  
Initially, the emergence of the Web appeared to have made this kind of 
awareness and critique easier. Richard Lanham noted that the digital technology 
of the Web profoundly affects the creation, expression, and distribution of 
humanistic knowledge. This shift is consistent with the view of knowledge 
presented by social epistemic rhetoric, as this position emphasizes the idea that 
discourse communities create knowledge through rhetorical acts. According to 
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Lanham, we are more self-conscious of this construction because communication 
technology calls attention to the fact that our understanding of “reality” is 
constituted by discourse (p. 459). Under current-traditional rhetoric language is 
treated as a transparent medium through which to transmit facts. But as Lanham 
writes: 
The computer screen constitutes a much more opaque surface 
altogether…This new self-consciousness affects the organization of 
humanistic knowledge at the most fundamental level. Both author and 
audience, citizen and society…become… more self-conscious about 
themselves, about writing, about how social decorum is constructed (459). 
 
From this point of view, because discourse is mediated by technology in the 
digital environment of the World Wide Web, the individual has more awareness 
of his/her language use, as well as the discursive practices of others; such 
consciousness leads to a greater awareness of the ways in which our 
understanding of the world or “reality” is shaped by discourse. Social epistemic 
rhetoric emphasizes this construction, providing a model for the study of the 
rhetorical creation of knowledge. 
 It would appear, then, that the digital environment of the Web can help to 
foster the practice of social epistemic rhetoric, calling attention to the rhetoricity 
of knowledge and illuminating the processes through which cultural codes, or as 
Lanham puts it, social decorum, is normalized. Technology supposedly calls 
attention to the codes themselves, for, as Lanham notes, it makes us self-
conscious of discourse itself and more aware of the importance of signifying 
practices. Thus, the Web offers an environment which enables students to 
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recognize the ways in which discourse conditions knowledge as well as their own 
behaviors and identities. 
But not so fast. Cynthia Selfe (1999) argues that the technological 
mediation of discourse has become increasingly naturalized to the point of 
invisibility in our classrooms and society. In other words, the extra attention 
Lanham argues that computers bring to the role discourse plays in the 
construction of cultural, social and economic norms may have only been a passing 
result of the initial novelty of computer technology. Lanham made the above 
observations in the early nineties when widespread use the personal computer 
(and particularly the Internet) was still a relatively new phenomenon. Anyone 
who has recently taught in a computer-mediated classroom can tell you that 
computers are not a new or novel phenomenon to the current college student. Like 
the air they breathe, technology is invisible to our students.  
Agency is another central issue of social epistemic rhetoric that must be 
reexamined in relation to digital technology. Berlin (1996) supports a 
poststructuralist conception of the self and argues that agency is to be found in the 
exploration and movement among varying subject positions. Digital technology 
seems to offer a means to achieve this kind of agency through the creation of 
alternative subject positions. I argue, over the course of this book, that technology 
does not necessarily provide this means to achieve agency and that our conception 
of rhetoric and composition in the digital age must proceed from this 
understanding. The idea that technology enables the individual to create his or her 
subject or construct multiple identities and that through their creation these 
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identities can somehow challenge or resist hegemonic power is problematic from 
a Foucauldian viewpoint. This notion is further complicated as we move further 
into what Deleuze (working from Foucault) calls the “control society”—a world 
that becomes more and more mediated by technology each day.  
The belief that the Web provides the ability for one construct his or her 
own subjectivity has led theorists to argue that the Web also enables individuals 
to challenge the dominant power by providing a site for the construction of 
subjectivities that correct or challenge the oppressive identities constituted by the 
discursive practices of the dominant society. Snyder and McConaghy in 
“Working the Web in Post-Colonial Australia” note the successful use of the Web 
by indigenous peoples to create resistant identities and gain voice and agency in 
post-colonial Australia. The authors discuss the ways in which the Web is used by 
native peoples not only as a site for straightforward activism—through websites 
that provide information and forums on native activist groups and resistant 
actions—but also as a site for the construction of resistant subjectivities. 
Communications scholars have argued— following the poststructuralist critique 
of the unified, autonomous subject— that digital technology fosters a conception 
of the self as comprising multiple and varying subject positions. The fluidity of 
the self in cyberspace, according to theorists such as Turkle and Bolter, offers the 
possibility of agency and freedom. An online user enters a new forum and creates 
a new screen name and a new identity to go with it —sometimes breaking the 
boundaries of gender or race. Thus, the individual creates multiple subject 
positions and assumes them according to the online context.  
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.  However, the idea that an individual can construct a subject position runs 
counter to Foucault’s conception of subjectivity. He makes clear that subject 
positions are created by the discursive formations of institutions and disciplines at 
a given historical moment and that such positions “can be filled in certain 
conditions by various individuals” (p. 76). Thus, the argument that the 
individual—in cyberspace or otherwise— can be the autonomous author of a text, 
much less a subject position, contradicts Foucault’s poststructuralist conception of 
the subject. Foucault (1982) writes, “[D]iscourse is not the majestically unfolding 
manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a 
totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself 
may be determined” (p. 74).  Discourse—and discursively constructed 
identities—are not generated by the will of an autonomous, unified subject; 
instead, discourse itself constructs the positions that the subject may occupy, 
thereby determining the manner in which he or she will be fragmented or 
“dispersed.” 
The subject becomes even more deeply intertwined with power the further 
the Digital Age advances. One of the defining characteristics of the period of 
networked globalization, as Deleuze as well as Hardt and Negri (2000) note, is the 
aforementioned shift (begun in the postmodern period) from the discipline society 
to the control society, where power is maintained not only by disciplining 
individuals but by shaping them from within and without. Foucault asserts (1980) 
that, in the discipline society (which he argues existed from the 18th century to the 
early 20th century), the status quo is maintained chiefly by discipline implemented 
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by various institutions such as jails, the police, and military. However, he also 
notes that power no longer exists in a hierarchical structure. Instead, power is now 
biopolitical, and it encompasses and penetrates all life itself (Foucault, 1978; 
Hardt and Negri, 2000). All social and cultural interactions serve to create and 
reinforce hegemony. We are not only conditioned by state institutions such as 
schools (Althusser, 1971) but also shaped and surveilled by our routines at work 
as well as our interactions with technologies like television during our leisure time 
(Deleuze, 1990). In these ways, electronic discourse plays a central role in the 
control society. As Hardt and Negri (2000) suggest, the communications 
industries “not only organize production on a new scale…but also make its 
justification immanent…. The communications industries integrate the imaginary 
and the symbolic within the biopolitical fabric, not merely putting them at the 
service of power, but integrating them into its very functioning” (p. 33). 
Communications serve to reify the discourse of the state and the corporation, 
forcing us to make meaning with the images and language of the only culture: 
consumer culture.  
 Composition and rhetoric must play a central role in the analysis and 
exposure of the ways that digital discourse is shaped by capital and the ways that 
electronic communications networks naturalize and perpetuate capitalist values. 
M.J. Braun (2001) argues that the lack of a rigorous analysis of the foundational 
role of capital in all technology by those in the field of rhetoric and composition 
has led to an ungrounded hope in the ability of technology to enable and 
encourage social change. Further, she notes correctly that Berlin (and therefore 
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social epistemic rhetoric) perpetuates what she calls “democracy hope” by 
operating on the assumption that networked technology inherently encourages 
egalitarianism and democracy. Unfortunately, the field’s most prominent 
engagement with network theory up to this point—a JAC issue devoted to the 
work of Mark Taylor—parallels or repeats the mistake against which Braun 
cautions. In an interview that prefaces the issue, Taylor argues that the continued 
critique of capitalism within the academy is no longer fruitful—that, for better or 
worse, we must accept the current economic system. Further, he supports the 
corporatization of higher education, briefly addressing his own for-profit 
educational enterprise. The articles that follow, for the most part, fail to critique 
Taylor’s assertions and the role of capitalism in relation to network culture is 
largely ignored. However, as Terranova’s work makes clear, capital plays an 
essential role in not only the emergence of the Internet, but in all of the 
manifestations of network culture, from communication systems to political 
organizations. 
 Terranova’s work problematizes much of the utopian rhetoric found in 
both composition studies and the popular press regarding the Internet’s potential 
to offer a space for resistance to the power of corporate capitalism. As I have 
noted, much of the early scholarship in composition and computers, including 
work by Faigley, Lanham and, most importantly for our purposes, Berlin, extolled 
the democratizing effects of networked technology. Popular discourse concerning 
the Internet echoed this sentiment, albeit from a neoliberal perspective. The 
founders of Wired, for example, celebrated the libertarian potential of the Internet, 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 24
seeing it as a space that encouraged individual freedom and entrepreneurship. A 
common narrative found both in the scholarship of composition and computers 
and the discourse of the Wired group, although respectively from progressive and 
neoliberal perspectives, is the shift of the World Wide Web from a utopian, 
democratic space to a thoroughly commercialized and corporatized space. Gurak 
(2003), for example, explores the increasing commodification of the Web as it 
becomes, more than anything else, a place to shop (p. 10). In 1999, Wired, decried 
the shift of the Web from a space for free access to information and individual 
entrepreneurship to a site for corporately owned content, declaring that the old, 
exciting Web was dead, and had been replaced by the new Web which was 
increasingly little more than a platform for corporate media (Terranova, 2004, p. 
94).  
Terranova’s work challenges both versions of this narrative., calling into 
question both the progressive and neoliberal celebration of the “collective 
intelligence” facilitated by the Web, which supposedly leads to a non-hierarchical, 
collaborative restructuring of work and business itself as well as a new gift 
economy (p. 84-85). From the neoliberal perspective, this gift economy was an 
expression of the free market that enabled creative, visionary individuals to 
operate outside the restraints of corporate and governmental norms. On the other 
hand, critics of neoliberalism praised this new gift economy as an alternative to 
late capitalism. Terranova argues that networks like the Internet do offer the 
possibility of resistance to cultural and political norms. Such networks are by 
definition open and dynamic because they are emergent systems: organizations in 
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which individual behavior cannot be predicted and is liable to change and 
divergence while connections between individual nodes in the network are 
maintained (Terranova, 2004, p. 28).6 Therefore, the possibility of radical 
divergence, the occurrence of the highly improbable (what Terranova calls the 
virtual), is always present within a network (p. 20). However, as she argues, these 
emergent systems, whether the Web or a multitude of people, are nonetheless 
subsumed and conditioned by the “artificial environment” of capitalism in which 
they emerge (p. 86). In fact, “collective intelligence,” according to Terranova is 
synonymous with what the Italian Autonomists, following Marx, call the “general 
intellect”: the articulation of humans and machines at the heart of the current 
mode of production (p. 87).  Terranova challenges the belief, from whatever 
ideological perspective it might come, that there once existed a utopian 
cyberspace that has been recouped by corporate capitalism. As she writes, “Late 
capitalism does not appropriate anything: it nurtures, exploits, and exhausts its 
labor force and its cultural and affective production” (p. 94). Further, Terranova 
makes clear the limits of any exploration of network theory within the field of 
rhetoric and composition that does not acknowledge the central role of capital in 
the emergence of network cultures. 
Composition studies that remain tied to the assumptions of social 
epistemic rhetorical thought— that digital networked technology itself will lead 
naturally toward a more democratic society, that agency and freedom can be 
found in the construction and exploration of online identities—can no longer offer 
                                                 
6 Blakesley and Rickert (2004) use the analogy of a flock of birds to describe emergent systems: 
“the individual actions of a particular bird are not sufficient to explain the overall behavioral 
characteristics of the flock” (p. 823). 
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an adequate response to our networked control society. What is now needed is a 
historicized account of the emergence of digital network cultures from the 
perspective of the field of composition and rhetoric. Social epistemic rhetoric can 
indeed provide a heuristic for examining the rhetorical features of digital 
discourse and the culture that is emerging from that discourse. It can also help us 
prescribe pedagogical responses to network cultures, providing us with strategies 
for teaching students to critique and interact within electronic spaces. However, 
we must also move beyond social epistemic rhetoric and begin to revise it. 
In Chapter Two, I will refigure rhetorical history as an emergent and 
interconnected carnivalesque narrative rather than a progression of distinct 
paradigms. Although rhetorical inquiry into digital discourse should be informed 
by emerging theories surrounding network culture, the insights and critical tools 
provided by social epistemic rhetoric (and its postmodern theoretical bases) 
should not be abandoned. Categories leak: just as a stable line cannot be 
established between the modern and postmodern periods or between the discipline 
and control societies, a clear demarcation cannot be made between the globalized, 
network culture and the postmodern period from which it is emerging. I will 
therefore suggest a method of historicization that differs from that of Berlin, who 
has been critiqued for his reliance on a modern of notion of progress in his 
histories of the field, as he represents history as a progression of distinct 
paradigms.7 Following Mark Taylor (2001), and Hardt and Negri (2004), I will 
argue for a representation of history that depicts the present and past as always 
                                                 
7 See Joseph Harris and Louise Phelps for similar critiques of Berlin’s histories. 
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intertwined—history understood as a growing web of connections between past 
and present discourses, concepts, and occurrences. I will argue that this historical 
network does perhaps have a direction: it moves towards greater interconnection 
and complexity. I will therefore examine post-process theory as indicative of this 
move towards a greater concern for the social, touching on the overlaps between 
post-process theory and complexity theory. 
Next, though Berlin theoretically problematizes the modern notion of 
subjectivity, agency, and power, he could not explore how these phenomena have 
changed as we entered this digital, networked age. In the early nineties Berlin 
made clear that we cannot base composition studies on a modern model of 
community as consensus, or a model of agency that conceives of students as 
rational, autonomous rhetors; I will apply these conclusions to the current 
historical moment. On the other hand, I argue— contrary to the conclusions of 
many in composition who are influenced by or identify with social epistemic 
rhetoric— that we must move beyond a model of agency that assumes freedom 
can be found through the creation and manipulation of virtual identities. The 
dispersal of power—and democratic resistance— from the margins to throughout 
the network of the control society, noted by Hardt and Negri (2000), should now 
be taken into account in our field’s rhetorical and pedagogical response to the 
Web.  
In Chapters Three and Four, I will argue that we should base our 
theorization of rhetoric on an understanding of power, agency, and democracy 
that draws on Hardt and Negri’s conception of networked, rhizomatic power and 
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its antidote, multitude. I illustrate this model of power and resistance with, in 
Chapter Three, a rhetorical analysis of online social networks such as Facebook 
and MySpace, and, in Chapter Four, an analysis of personal blogs. More 
specifically, in Chapter Three, I establish with an analysis of social networking 
sites the fact that, contrary to Berlin’s assumptions, technology itself does not 
inherently promote democracy. I extend this argument in Chapter Four, 
examining the ways in which personal blogging contributes to, and reinforces, 
Debord’s spectacle. Further, I argue in Chapter Four that digital discourse does 
not necessarily provide the means to achieve agency in the manner suggested by 
Berlin (1996)—through the exploration and movement between varying subject 
positions. Using an analysis of blogging practices and the institutional contexts 
that surround them as support, I argue that electronic discourse does not 
inherently offer freedom and agency through subject exploration, as claimed by 
many new media theorists. 
However, in both Chapters Three and Four I will also offer possible 
pedagogical responses to these emerging forms of electronic discourse. I suggest 
activities and assignments that encourage students to critically engage with the 
rhetorics of social networking sites and personal weblogs; I also provide 
pedagogical suggestions for the use of electronic discourse in the composition 
classroom in ways that encourage the kinds of rhizomatic community necessary to 
democracy in the network society. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I will 
examine psychoanalytic critiques of cultural studies oriented composition and 
argue that these critiques take on particular urgency in relation to the affect-driven 
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rhetorics of networked culture. Further, I will offer a description of my own 
cultural studies pedagogy on globalization as a response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 30
Chapter Two: 
Towards Complexity: Narratives of Rhetoric in the Network Society 
 
In A Teaching Subject: Composition since 1966, Joseph Harris (1996) 
criticizes what he sees as a reliance on the modern narrative of progress in 
Berlin’s historical accounts of the field. Berlin, according to Harris, establishes 
static paradigms of rhetorical thought and then suggests “that a new and more 
complex epistemic rhetoric has superseded” those historical theories (p. 41). 
Louise Phelps (1999) makes a similar argument, asserting that Berlin constructs 
his historical narratives to support a particular leftist ideology, casting his view of 
composition as the result of historical progress and ignoring contradictory voices 
on the grounds that they are holding onto an outdated and irrelevant conception of 
rhetoric and writing. Both Harris and Phelps point to the contradiction between 
the underlying narrative of progress that appears to propel much of Berlin’s 
historical work and the postmodern assumptions that underlie his rhetorical and 
pedagogical theories. Berlin’s conception of social epistemic rhetoric, for 
example, is developed in part as a reaction to an earlier progressive paradigm of 
literacy that was based on naïve Enlightenment notions of progress. The critique 
of rationalist progress (also seen in Lyotard’s critique of meta-narratives) inherent 
in social epistemic rhetoric is perhaps undermined by Berlin’s seeming adherence 
to a notion of epistemological progress in his histories of English studies. 
Harris and Phelps are right to criticize Berlin for theoretical inconsistency, 
but this inconsistency points toward a fresh perspective on historical change and 
meta-narratives. I suggest an alternative model of historicization for rhetoric and 
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composition: one based not on the linear, rational narrative of Enlightenment 
progress, but on the carnivalesque narrative that may have a pattern or even 
direction but isn’t totalizing. The model for this understanding of history is the 
network. In this understanding, history is not a linear movement through time or a 
progression of static paradigms. Instead, history is an emerging web of 
connections. After all, historical movements are never completely new, as they 
always connect back and incorporate the past. Networks change and grow—as per 
their nature as emergent systems. Thus, history can be seen as a carnivalesque 
narrative as described by Hardt and Negri (2004) via Bakhtin: if history is an open 
network, it can incorporate difference while remaining interconnected.  
Ironically, Harris’ description of Berlin’s folly is also an apt description of 
the direction in which history—and rhetoric—is moving: towards complexity. 
Insights from the emerging discourse on network cultures point us toward this 
conclusion. Mark Taylor (2004) argues that the “critique of meta-narratives is 
wrong… there is a direction of history”— as things become more interconnected 
in the network society, they become more complex (p. 816). Taylor’s argument 
suggests that perhaps Berlin is correct in establishing an historical direction for 
the field of rhetoric and composition in which older theories of literacy are, as 
Harris writes, superseded by theories that are more complex. That is, rhetoric is 
increasingly informed by and arises from the increasing interconnection of all 
society. 
Change has occurred in the field, albeit in a non-linear fashion—in which 
each new development is connected by many threads to the past—towards an 
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increasingly complex understanding of rhetoric, an understanding that is marked 
by a growing emphasis on the composition classroom as a site of social action. In 
the following sections, I will trace this non-linear development, first briefly 
considering the influences of the progressive movement in composition on social 
epistemic rhetoric. I will then examine social epistemic rhetoric’s development in 
response to the process movement—a development that nonetheless incorporates 
some of the central insights of the process movement to create a more complex 
and socially-oriented paradigm of rhetoric and literacy. Finally, I will consider the 
ways in which post-process theory confirms the field’s trend towards complexity, 
touching on ways rhetorical theory is beginning to look like complexity theory.8 
The process movement questioned earlier paradigms of composition by focusing 
attention on the process of writing, rather than the finished product. Post-process 
questions whether a single, generalizable process of writing could, or even should, 
be determined. Thus, post-process theory moves towards an even greater concern 
for the social as it asserts that each act of writing is contingent and completely 
bound to the cultural context of the moment.  
Narratives of Progress? 
I will begin by considering Berlin’s paradigms of literacy in relation to the 
development of the process movement and the subsequent shift to social 
epistemic rhetoric (which has been called the social turn in composition). The 
                                                 
8 By complexity theory, I mean the study of self-organizing, and emergent, systems: dynamic 
networks that are made up of diversely behaving elements that nonetheless in some way cohere. 
As note above, Blakesley (2004) illustrates this with a description of a flock of birds, and, of 
course, the WWW is the most obvious example of an open, self-organizing system. The behavior 
of self-organizing systems, such as a flock of birds or a group of fireflies that light in unison (to 
use expert Steven Strogatz’s (2003) example) emerges and changes spontaneously, and though the 
behavior of such a system is dependent upon the initial conditions from which it arises, the course 
of the development and behavior of the system is not predictable. 
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origins of the process movement can be traced back to the progressive movement 
in education during the early 20th century, which operated under what Berlin calls 
the democratic paradigm of literacy.9 As noted in the previous chapter, 
democratic literacy arose in response to what Berlin calls the literacy of the 
meritocracy and the literacy of liberal culture. 
Practitioners of democratic literacy responded to current-traditional 
rhetoric as well as the elitism of liberal culture literacy. Scholars such as Fredrick 
Newton Scott and Gertrude Buck rejected the formalistic focus on mechanics of 
current-traditional rhetoric, focusing instead on invention; such scholars also 
rejected the liberal culture literacy exemplified by elitist placement tests based on 
lists of canonical literary works (Berlin, 1987; Crowley, 1998). Further, their 
progressive view of education, influenced by Dewey, emphasized writing in 
response to experience and context, as well as writing as the social construction of 
knowledge (Berlin, 1987). This emphasis reflects an early turn in the field toward 
the social, as well as toward an anti-foundational conception of rhetoric in which 
language and communication is context-bound and constitutive of knowledge and 
reality, rather than representational of it. 
The influence of the progressives was short-lived, however, as current-
traditionalism dominated the field for much of the remainder of the twentieth 
century. It was in response to current-traditionalism’s static formalism, extreme 
                                                 
9 Though the process movement could in fact possibly be traced back to Isocrates, with his 
emphasis on invention in response to the usual practice of teaching rhetoric through the imitation 
of static models.  Further, social-epistemic rhetoric could in fact also be traced back to Isocrates 
with his emphasis on contingent truths over Platonic or Aristotlean Truth, and his assertion that 
rhetoric should teach individuals to respond to the culture and historical moment in which they 
exist.  
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attention to “correct” mechanics, and most of all its exclusive focus on the 
product of writing, that the process movement arose. Two major strands of the 
process movement emerged. The first strand, exemplified by the work of Flower 
and Hayes, focuses on the cognitive processes of the writer; it examines the 
manner in which the individual writer works through the various tasks identified 
as parts of the writing process, such as invention, pre-writing, revising, etc. The 
second strand of the process movement, exemplified by the work of Elbow and 
Macorie, focused instead on the creative ability of the individual writer, 
emphasizing the employment of techniques such as free-writing that shifted 
attention away from the product of writing and onto the processes by which a text 
can be shaped, through a series of revisions, from the pure expression of the 
writer.  
Of course, Berlin (1988) criticizes these two approaches to process, 
labeling those in the camp of Flower and Hayes cognitivists and those in Elbow’s 
camp expressivists. Berlin rejects the foundational epistemologies of both strands. 
He was not alone in this critique; many composition theorists rejected an inner-
directed, foundational approach to writing theory and pedagogy. (Berlin himself 
grouped these scholars loosely under the paradigm of social epistemic rhetoric.) 
For example, Patricia Bizzell (1982), in her important essay Cognition, 
Convention and Certainty: What We Need to Know About Writing, published 
early in the theoretical battle between the foundationalists and anti-
foundationalists in composition, writes of the contrast between inner-directed 
theories of composition (exemplified by the cognitivists and expressivists) and 
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outer-directed theories (exemplified by advocates of social epistemic rhetoric) (p. 
366). She argues persuasively that, in contrast to the work of the cognitivists, 
universal structures of writing cannot be found or taught. Further, her emphasis on 
the role played by the discourse community in the construction of knowledge 
points to the weakness of the cognitivists' suggestion that the writing process is 
generalizable across contexts as well as the expressivists' problematic focus on 
individual expression. 
Berlin criticizes both strands of the process movement on grounds similar 
to Bizzell’s, critiquing their foundational epistemologies and their focus on the 
individual over society and community. He further attacks these two strands of 
composition for their lack of attention to ideology. On the one hand, the 
cognitivists propose to examine with objective, scientific methods a writing 
process that is similarly objective—a process that can be teased out of individual 
writing and then applied to all across boundaries of gender and culture and class. 
Flower and Hayes (1981) detailed a groundbreaking study that used talk-aloud 
protocols to demonstrate that the writing process is not linear. That is, the study 
examined student writers as they wrote, by asking them to articulate (talk-aloud) 
their thinking process as they worked through a particular writing task. The 
evidence from this study suggested that writers do not follow a linear path 
through the steps of the writing process, progressing from pre-writing, to 
composing, to revising; instead, the authors argued, the transcripts from these 
talk-aloud sessions demonstrated that the writing process is recursive. Flower and 
Hayes argued that this study proved that writers move between stages in the 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 36
writing process in a circular fashion: composing, planning, writing more, revising, 
planning again, writing more, revising again, and so forth. This is a useful 
observation regarding how many individuals write. The problem comes when this 
observation is generalized to all writers; when Flower and Hayes assert that what 
they have observed should be understood as the writing process. As Bizzell makes 
clear, writing practices (and conventions) are determined not just by individual 
writers, but by the discourse community to which a given writer responds. In 
other words, for example, a scholar writes according to the conventions and 
expectations of the academic discourse community. These expectations vary 
among fields; further, the writer will (or at least should) revise his or her writing 
according to level of specialization of the intended audience. In another example, 
an individual employed in an office will compose according to the conventions of 
that particular discourse community; the conventions for “office communications” 
will vary according to many factors, including the type of business (say, 
engineering vs. marketing) and the power relations among the writer and various 
audience members. Writing practices and processes will vary widely depending 
upon social, cultural, and economic contexts as well as specific rhetorical 
situations. 
Berlin further criticizes Flower and Hayes for failing to address the role of 
ideology, both in the execution and presentation of their study as well as in their 
conclusions regarding the writing process. Berlin notes that cognitivists are 
perhaps the most direct heirs of current-traditional rhetoric, which viewed writing 
as a rational act of information transfer and assumed that the purpose of writing is 
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foremost to advance capitalist interests. Flower and Hayes likewise see their 
research as scientific study, and present the writing process as an act of problem 
solving that mirrors the model of rational problem solving privileged in science 
and business (Berlin, 1988, p. 483). Flower and Hayes, Berlin argues, refuse the 
question of ideology altogether, by presenting their work as scientific and 
therefore neutral. Berlin dismisses the neutrality of their work, as he asserts that 
their model of the writing process inherently reinforces an instrumentalist 
understanding of knowledge and communication, which in turn suggests a writing 
pedagogy that takes as its primary purpose the preparation of students for 
participation in the capitalist market. The cognitivist approach to writing is not 
only ideological in its conception, but it also inherently privileges and reproduces 
particular (capitalist and individualist) ideologies. 
On the other hand, the expressivists rely upon the Platonic conception of 
Truth as that which lies within each individual and that which the writing teacher 
encourages the student to express. On the surface, as Berlin (1987) notes, 
expressivists seem to encourage writing as means for the critique of power and 
authority and resistance to the status quo. However, expressivists privilege the 
individual above all else and suggest that political power can only be gained by 
individual acts of resistance to convention and the dominant culture. In other 
words, political change can only be understood and accomplished one individual 
at a time. Collective resistance can be dangerous, as it can threaten the “integrity 
of the individual,” thereby distorting one’s view of the personal Truth which can 
only be found within (Berlin, 1987, p. 487). Though one can gain access to this 
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Truth only through personal reflection and inquiry (which can be accomplished 
through writing), it is nonetheless universal: as Berlin puts it “[M]y best and 
deepest vision supports the same universal and external laws as everyone else’s 
best and deepest vision” (1987, p. 488). 
Berlin argues that while expressivism appears to advocate resistance and 
encourage ideological critique, it ends up simply reinforcing and reproducing the 
capitalistic and oppressive status quo. Because of its exclusive focus on the 
individual and its insistence that change can only be defined and accomplished via 
the individual, expressivist pedagogy can easily be co-opted by the dominant 
forces it supposedly opposes. The rhetoric of expressivism closely resembles and 
therefore reinforces the capitalist values of individualism, entrepreneurialism, and 
consumerism.  
Further, the Platonic, idealist notion of truth suggested by expressivism 
can also serve to reproduce the current social order by establishing a single set of 
values (usually those of the elite) as absolute and universal. The epistemological 
assumption that there exists a single, essential Truth to which one does or does 
not gain access results in the marginalization of all those who cannot “find” that 
Truth, as well as those who simply do not agree with it. (Those who disagree with 
the idea that such a Truth exists at all are also, of course, marginalized.) The roots 
of expressivism then, can be traced to what Berlin calls the “literacy of liberal 
culture” (mentioned in the previous chapter), an approach to English studies that 
viewed the act of writing as an act of individual genius and saw the ability to 
write well as available only to those who had knowledge of the great values and 
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ideas of “mankind” (that is, the universal Truth). The values and ideas with which 
one must be acquainted were, of course, those held by the elite class. Thus, 
expressivism, although attempting to break from current-traditionalism and 
provide a means for resistance to the dominant culture and ideologies, ends up 
reinforcing those ideologies. 
In response, Berlin (1988, 1994) proposes a more complex anti-
foundational alternative, social- epistemic rhetoric that views language and 
rhetoric as inherently social as well as ideological. Berlin argues that rhetoric is 
always historically situated, located within specific cultural contexts that change 
over time. Further, for social epistemic rhetoric, language is constitutive of 
subjectivity, experience, and knowledge, rather than representational of it. Berlin 
(1988) argues from a poststructuralist viewpoint that knowledge is created 
through the dialectical interaction between the individual, the discourse 
community, and material conditions; however, he carefully notes that all three 
aspects of this dialectic are verbal constructs (pp. 730-731). This is because 
knowledge and experience cannot be understood (or even exist) outside of 
language. Rhetoric is thus always ideological, as it is discourse situated within 
particular historical circumstances that create the material and political conditions 
as well the subjects and communities that perceive those conditions. Hegemony is 
maintained by the normalization of dominant codes that privilege and perpetuate 
the interests and values of the elite. Discourse is then generated from naturalized, 
invisible ideologies. As Berlin (1988) writes, “We are lodged within a 
hermeneutic circle…. The material, the social and the subjective are at once both 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 40
the producers and products of ideology” (p. 732). Social epistemic rhetoric’s 
goals are explicitly political. Berlin argues that students must learn to analyze and 
question the political and economic consequences of ideologies (e.g. students 
should learn to consider how particular versions of truth that are naturalized by 
dominant discourse lead to the perpetuation of the status quo and a sense of 
powerlessness in the individual). 
It is easy to view Berlin’s paradigm of literacy, social epistemic rhetoric, 
as indeed more complex and therefore more advanced than the two major strands 
of the process movement from which it proceeded. Both the cognitivists and 
expressivists rely on a foundational conception of rhetoric and reality that 
privileges the individual over the social and assumes the existence of truth that 
lies, respectively, in the objectivity of science or in the truth that can be found 
within the individual. Most problematically, both approaches fail to address issues 
of difference. The cognitivist approach takes as a given the “neutral writing 
subject” and assumes that the writing process of an individual or small group of 
individuals can be generalized across the entire population of writers, regardless 
of race, gender, class, or other factors. On the other hand, expressivists confirm 
and advocate a romantic notion of writing that perpetuates an elitist conception of 
truth, culture and ability.   
Models of History, Knowledge, and Power 
Harris, however, takes issue with the narrative of progress that underlies 
Berlin’s history of the field, arguing that Berlin’s paradigms operate on the 
assumption that previous movements no longer influence or overlap the newest 
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theory. This critique appears problematic, as it is clear from Berlin’s own work 
that social epistemic rhetoric does connect to paradigms of literacy that came 
before—it is clearly connected to and influenced by the progressivists and still 
holds onto insights gained by those who led the process movement while rejecting 
the current traditional focus on the written product, for example. But what of the 
deeper level of the critique—the implication that Berlin has constructed the 
history of composition as a “metanarrative”? Or the idea that Berlin clings to a 
now-defunct model of history reliant on Enlightenment notions of progress? In 
order to fully explore this question, we must first consider the postmodern critique 
of the metanarrative and the key role (despite this critique) that metanarratives 
still play in the production of hegemonic power in the network society. We can 
then consider the role of metanarrative in Berlin’s histories of the field and 
suggest a model of historical narrative that maintains coherence and direction but 
is at the same time non-totalizing.  
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Jean-Francois 
Lyotard (1984) famously writes, “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern 
as the incredulity toward metanarrative” (p. xxiv). Lyotard argues that the modern 
is marked by the rise of science, which rejected the legitimation of knowledge in 
traditional cultures through reference to cultural narratives. Science discounts 
those narratives as myth or fiction and legitimates its own knowledge through 
reference to the scientific method—that is, knowledge is legitimated through the 
observation of repeatable experiments. This leads to the question of epistemology: 
how is the process by which knowledge is arrived upon legitimated? In traditional 
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cultures, this process did not need to be defended or examined; the authoritative 
narrator was the legitimate source of the metanarrative. On the other hand, the 
epistemological foundation of science could only be legitimated through recourse 
to metanarratives, such as the Enlightenment metanarrative of progress towards 
the consensus understanding of the good society. Of course, this reliance on 
metanarrative for epistemological legitimation is problematic and self-
contradictory; science by definition rejects the idea that truth can be proved 
through narrative. Science therefore turns away from the metanarrative in favor of 
performativity, legitimating its practices with a rubric of efficiency. Scientific 
knowledge and narrative knowledge are no longer legitimated by common 
narratives; they are separate language games, each with their own rules. Thus 
arises the postmodern condition: “The social subject seems to dissolve in this 
dissemination of language games. The social bond is linguistic, but it is not 
woven with a single thread” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 40). The metanarrative disappears, 
and little narratives—numerous, varying language games—abound.  
Overall, Lyotard views this as a positive development that allows for the 
existence of varying, diverse viewpoints not subject to the homogenizing “terror” 
of the metanarrative (p. 66). Further, the increasing mediation of society by 
technology, what Lyotard calls “computerization,” could allow local groups the 
ability to make decisions based on widely available information that in the past 
they would have lacked. In order for this to occur, Lyotard notes, the public need 
simply be given free access to the computerized information (p. 67). On the other 
hand, he also notes the fact that science is legitimated by the performativity 
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principle—a principle unconcerned with what is true or just—can lead to 
undesirable consequences (p. xxv, p. 67). Lyotard writes, “The computerization of 
society could become the ‘dream’ instrument for controlling and regulating the 
market system, extended to include knowledge itself and governed exclusively by 
the performativity principle. In that case it would inevitably involve the use of 
terror” (p. 67). Lyotard predicts that, in the hyper-mediated society, technology 
could be used to create and perpetuate a mode of production in which knowledge 
is determined and defined by the market system, a system organized by the quest 
for greater efficiency without regard to ethics. Society would thus be subject to 
the terror of totalization according to the normalized logic of the market. 
Unfortunately, this is exactly what has happened. 
We indeed find ourselves in a global society that is structured and 
articulated by the multinational corporation according to the free market. Hardt 
and Negri (2000) write, “The complex apparatus that selects investments and 
directs financial and monetary maneuvers determines the new geography of the 
world market, or really the new biopolitical structuring of the world” (p. 32). 
Instead of simply encouraging and taking advantage of unequal trade conditions, 
corporations now produce and organize society not only on the global level, but 
also at the level of individual subjectivity. As noted in Chapter One, in such a 
society, power is biopolitical, that is, power is expressed as a control over 
individual consciousness as well as all social relations that each individual 
embraces of his or her own accord (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Foucault, 1978). As 
Hardt and Negri suggest, “The great industrial and financial powers thus produce 
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not only commodities but also subjectivities. They produce agentic subjectivities 
within the biopolitical context: they produce needs, social relations, bodies, and 
minds—which is to say, they produce producers” (p. 32). 
Hardt and Negri note that technology—and its use by the communications 
industry—makes possible the production of biopower and the creation of a 
“society of control.” As I noted in the previous chapter, the control society, as 
discussed by Deleuze (1990) as well as Hardt and Negri, is a historical and 
societal condition that contrasts the disciplinary society (although it still maintains 
its practices in certain contexts). In the disciplinary society— examined by 
Foucault in a number of works including Discipline and Punish (1977) and Birth 
of a Clinic (1973)—power is produced through the institutional construction of 
social norms and is ordered hierarchically. The control society is made possible 
by technologies that organize consciousness and allow for self-enrollment in 
biopolitical order (Deleuze, 1990). Control is no longer only applied by societal 
institutions (as in the disciplinary society) but extends by way of digital networks 
into every facet of life. 
 And so the computerization of society has led to that which Lyotard 
feared: the governing of the market and the production of knowledge according to 
the performativity principle. Knowledge—and therefore subjectivity and social 
relations—are all defined and valued according to their benefit to the market, and 
the (free) market is organized to operate with maximum efficiency. Lyotard 
warned that terror would be inevitable in such a case—the terror of the 
totalization and homogenization of diverse societies made to conform to the 
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hegemonic order. During modernity, this terror was imposed through 
metanarratives, and in our computerized postmodern society this continues to be 
the case. 
 In the computerized society, metanarratives are produced to legitimize the 
current relations of production and perpetuate current power structures. As noted 
earlier, Hardt and Negri make clear that the communications industry plays an 
essential role not only in the structuring of global production but also in the 
legitimization of it. The discourse of the communications industry, as it creates 
subjectivities and orders social relations, makes the justification of the current 
mode of production immanent (p. 33). Hardt and Negri (2000) write: 
Contrary to the way many postmodernist accounts would have it…the 
imperial machine, far from eliminating master narratives, actually 
produces and reproduces them (ideological master narratives in particular) 
in order to validate and celebrate its own power (p. 34). 
 
The “imperial machine” is the mode of production that is made possible and 
structured by the communications industry, which also distributes the 
metanarratives by which it is legitimized. That is, metanarratives did not 
disappear because of the emergence of the mode of production that defines 
postmodernity. Instead, they are produced and distributed throughout media 
networks in order to legitimate the mode of production. But these metanarratives 
are perhaps different than those used to legitimate traditional and scientific 
knowledge during modernity. They are produced by that which they legitimize. 
As Hardt and Negri assert, the imperial machine “is a subject that produces its 
own authority. This is a form of legitimation that rests on nothing outside itself 
and is reproposed ceaselessly by developing its own languages of self-validation” 
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(2000, p. 33). The modern metanarrative imposed its order from without—as 
power in a disciplinary society is imposed by institutions and does not reach 
entirely inside the consciousness of the individual—legitimatizing traditional 
knowledge or science. Metanarratives are now produced within by the imperial 
machine itself in order to self-legitimize. (The most obvious example of such a 
metanarrative is the great cultural battle between Islamo-fascism and American 
freedom, fabricated by the U.S. administration and reinforced by the news media.) 
In the network society, the field of composition and rhetoric must take as a key 
purpose the rhetorical analysis of these metanarratives, paying attention to the 
construction of metanarratives in various mediated contexts. 
But what about the historical and ideological metanarrative of composition 
and rhetoric? The field must be attentive to its own master narratives. Harris and 
Phelps essentially argue that Berlin constructs the history of composition as an 
inexorable progression towards Berlin’s own leftist ideal. In other words, Berlin 
presents social epistemic rhetoric as a new historical paradigm for the field so as 
to more soundly reject, from an ideological point of view, scholarship and 
pedagogy that is focused on the individual and therefore in line with capitalism. 
From the perspective of Harris and Phelps, the various strands of the process 
movement and social epistemic rhetoric are simultaneously existing practices and 
theories, each with their own ideology, and Berlin is simply arguing for his own 
ideology by presenting the movement towards it as historical progress. This 
critique is indeed helpful as it underlines the danger that Berlin’s approach to 
history entails—that the history of the field will be understood as a linear 
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progression from one paradigm to the next. Further, it alerts us to the danger that 
Berlin’s history, in spite of his leftist political commitment to the celebration of 
difference, could, like the Marxist metanarrative critiqued by Lyotard, totalize and 
essentialize. Berlin, in his effort to present a coherent representation of the field’s 
history that conforms to his own notion of ideological progress, manufactures 
distinct and internally homogenous paradigms of rhetorical thought that arise in 
succession, displacing the paradigm which came before. In order to construct 
social epistemic rhetoric as an historical movement in composition, for example, 
Berlin must include in that movement scholars with widely divergent theories and 
values, thereby erasing differences between varying although loosely like-minded 
compositionists.  
There is another model of historical narrative that responds to the critique 
of Harris and Phelps and offers an alternative to the potentially totalizing narrative 
offered by Berlin. Taylor (2001) bases his rejection of the postmodern critique of 
the metanarrative on the failure of poststructuralist theory to conceive “of a 
nontotalizing structure that nonetheless acts as a whole” (p. 11). Complexity 
theory provides this structure by allowing historical narratives to be understood as 
emergent systems,  or, as Hardt and Negri (2004) put it (referencing Bakhtin) a 
carnivalesque narrative—in a way that resolve’s Lyotard’s famous critique. A 
historical narrative from this perspective connects various peoples and cultures, 
incorporating them into the whole without eliminating individual differences or 
distinctions; the story grows because of this connection and interaction, and thus, 
it moves toward greater and greater complexity rather than becoming more and 
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more homogenous. The historical narrative in this case is a dynamic, growing 
network that is created from the interactions of diverse and distinct events, 
individuals and concepts instead of a linear progression towards an ideal. From 
this perspective, the historical narrative of composition can be understood as a 
story that maintains coherence and direction while still allowing for the 
preservation of distinct voices and diverse opinions. As society becomes more 
complex and interconnected, so does composition.  
Harris and Phelps are right to argue that categories slip and that practices 
and theories are interwoven between and across historical moments in field. 
However, how is the field to address the fact that the interweaving of ideas and 
ideologies over time leads to an ever-more complex interconnection of cultures, 
peoples, and humankind in general? There is perhaps good reason that Berlin’s 
theories move toward greater complexity—the field, just like the rapidly 
globalizing world in which it exists, is becoming increasingly more 
interconnected. As Taylor (2004) argues, greater connection leads toward greater 
complexity. The narratives of the field seem to have reflected this increasing 
interconnection during the social turn in composition, initiated and documented 
by Berlin and his contemporaries (e.g. Bizzell, Faigley, and Barthalomae) and 
reflected in the more recent emergence of post-process theory, which continues 
and intensifies the concern for the social and more explicitly parallels 
developments in complexity and network theory. But this social turn need not be 
totalizing or framed as progress towards an ideal. Diverse and contradictory 
voices need not be viewed as an impediment to “progress” but as necessary 
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contributors to the ongoing dynamic growth of the field. Further, this growth need 
not be understood as linear progress but instead could be viewed as the result of 
increasing interconnection; if history is an open network, it is necessarily self-
emergent (that is, it grows on its own). The field’s turn toward the social, 
however, has in many cases carried with it a political commitment that may be the 
real target of Harris and Phelps’ critique. But as Taylor points out, greater 
interconnection should suggest a sense of greater social responsibility.  
Post Process and Complexity 
Taylor (2001) suggests that critical theory must move beyond concepts of 
postmodernism towards network theory, and rhetoric and composition must 
similarly move beyond a theoretical framework grounded in post-structuralism 
and begin to incorporate network and complexity theory into its understanding 
and study of writing. This is not to say that postmodernist theory should be 
rejected by compositionists (or anyone else). Instead, the field must augment its 
use of post-structuralism with an engagement with network and complexity 
theory. There have been brief attempts at such an engagement as I will note 
below, and JAC’s issue (2004) on the work of Taylor is a very useful recent step 
towards the incorporation of network theory into the discourse of the field. I 
believe that we must now consider the strong parallels between the work of 
theorists such as Taylor and the characteristics of the emerging post-process 
movement. In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine the historical and 
theoretical relationship between social epistemic rhetoric and post-process theory, 
considering the dynamic network of relations between the two overlapping 
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models of rhetorical thought. Further, I will consider the parallels between 
complexity and post-process theory, detailing the ways in which our 
understanding of writing can perhaps best be represented by the model of the 
complex network. 
 However, I must first note that complexity theory is not entirely new to 
rhetoric and composition. There were early, notable engagements with complexity 
theory in the discourse of the field. In the Electronic Word (1993), Richard 
Lanham briefly suggested that, as digital discourse becomes more and more 
central to the study of rhetoric, complexity theory will become increasingly useful 
as a means of analyzing communication. Further, he draws parallels between 
Sophistic, anti-foundational rhetoric and complexity in contrast to foundational, 
static rhetoric. He argues that the Sophists correctly saw rhetoric as a dynamic, 
open system, while philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle perceived rhetoric to 
be a closed, unchanging system. Lanham claims that, as rhetoric becomes 
increasingly digital, this Sophistic, open view of communication will be most 
useful.10 Thus far, post-process theorists, unlike proponents of social epistemic 
rhetoric such as Lanham and Porter, have not engaged directly with complexity 
theory. It is essential that the discourse of post-process engage explicitly with 
complexity, as the parallels between the two areas of thought are too great to not 
be met head-on. Post-process theory is attempting to address the need for even 
greater attention to the social in composition and the need for attention to the 
                                                 
10 James Porter (1992) also engages briefly with complexity theory in Audience and Rhetoric. 
Porter argues that complexity and network theory, via Foucault, can help describe the structure 
and development of discourse communities. 
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varying contexts that surround each act of writing. Further, I would argue, it is 
beginning, at least tacitly, to analyze writing as a complex emergent system.  
Post-process theory, although it cannot be said to encompass a single set 
of beliefs or concepts, is generally concerned with critique of various assumptions 
of the process movement. One of its central critiques concerns the attempt to 
determine a generalizable process of writing that, once it is formulated on the 
basis of empirical research, can be applied to all writers in all circumstances 
(Kent, 1999, pp. 2-3). Aside from noting the problems of such an approach from 
the standpoints of race, class and gender (problems already noted, by some extent, 
by those who advocated social epistemic rhetoric), post-process theorists also 
argue that an act of writing is entirely dependent upon the context that surrounds 
it in the moment in which it occurs. As such, no two acts of writing are ever alike, 
and therefore a single writing process extrapolated from research (such as the one 
suggested by Flower and Hayes) will not apply for any two cases, much less to all 
acts of writing. In this way, post-process theory emphasizes the need for rhetorical 
theory and pedagogy that addresses difference and attends to the ways that writing 
is always a contextual act influenced by the political and economic circumstances 
that surround it.  
Such an approach to writing, of course, is not radically different from the 
approach advocated by those in favor of social epistemic rhetoric. Berlin et al. 
argued vehemently against the cognitivist and expressivist approaches to writing 
for much the same reasons: both models failed to take into the account historical, 
cultural, and social contexts surrounding each act of writing. Both social 
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epistemic rhetoric and post-process theory reject the idea that the writing process 
can be generalized across varying and dynamic writers and rhetorical situations. 
So, in fact, there have actually been two post-process movements or perhaps two 
phases in the post-process movement: the first phase was the initial turn away 
from cognitivism and expressivism, and the second phase is the complete turn 
away from the use of the concept of “process” to describe the writing act.  It may 
be most accurate to say that what has been called the post-process movement is 
really an intensification of the social turn in composition. 
Most generally, post-process theorists reject the use of the word “process” 
in the description of the writing act because the term denotes a set of actions that 
are repeatable and generalizable. The leading proponent of the movement, Kent 
(1999), argues that every writing act is utterly contingent and singular—the act of 
writing can never be replicated because the conditions surrounding the act are 
always variant and dynamic. Kent suggests three assumptions upon which most in 
the post-process movement generally agree: 1) writing is public, 2) writing is 
interpretive, and 3) writing is situational. He argues that writing is done in order 
to communicate with others; therefore, it is always a public act that occurs in 
dynamic historical moments and in shifting relations to a range of other 
individuals (p. 2). This web of dynamic relations cannot be replicated, and so the 
writing act cannot be generalized into a repeatable process. Further, he argues that 
writing is not simply an attempt to communicate but also a means for 
understanding the world— an act of interpretation. Kent writes, “Interpretation 
constitutes the uncodifiable moves we make when we attempt to align our 
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utterances with the utterances of others, and these moves—I have called them 
‘hermeneutic guesswork’—do not constitute a process…except perhaps in 
retrospect” (p. 3). When writing one is always attempting to understand other 
utterances, making guesses about his/ her audience and what strategies might be 
most useful to the task of communicating to that audience—none of these 
questions can be determined conclusively. Thus, writing is always an open-ended 
act of interpretation that cannot be turned into a process. Finally, Kent asserts that 
writing is always situated—that is, writers always work from a particular position 
or rhetorical situation. As Kent acknowledges, this is a claim often made by those 
in the process movement. However, he argues that post-process theorists take this 
assumption further, arguing that writing is only possible because individuals hold 
a set of beliefs “about what other language users know and about how our beliefs 
cohere with theirs” (p. 3). In other words, we must have previous beliefs that will 
help us begin the hermeneutic guesswork of writing. Following Donald Davidson, 
Kent calls these beliefs “prior theories” and suggests that writing requires the 
development of a “passing theory”—one’s actual guess as to the meaning of the 
other utterances to which one is responding and how to best communicate in that 
given situation (4). To summarize, each act of communication differs according to 
the ever-dynamic variables that surround it. Further, writing is a open, ongoing 
act of interpretation; a true, definitive understanding of that to which one responds 
is impossible—all one can do is create a “passing theory.”  
 Kent’s description of writing corresponds in interesting and useful ways to 
the characteristics and behaviors of open, emergent networks. An understanding 
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of those correspondences can help us to better understand the relationship 
between the post-process movement and the theories of complexity that are so 
helpful for analyzing network culture. Further, I would like to suggest that these 
correspondences point to a need to understand the most current paradigm of 
writing theory as having a basis in anti-foundationalism and postmodern theory as 
well as network theory.  
 The consequences of Kent’s first observation (that writing is public) can 
be productively represented with the model of the network. Each writing act 
occurs within a web of dynamic relations—to other people, as well as to 
historical, economic and cultural contexts. In other words, the writing act occurs 
within a shifting open network. This act is not repeatable or generalizable because 
the network of relations that surrounds it is always changing. As Taylor (2001) 
points out, as soon as a single new piece of information is added to the network, 
the structure of the entire network is changed, and the way one responds to this 
new situation must also change. The web of relations to which writing always 
responds never stays constant, and a single writing process cannot be generalized 
beyond a single historical moment. 
 Kent’s assertion that writing is always interpretive can also be helpfully 
elucidated through the model of the open network. Kent argues that writing 
should never be understood as an attempt to express or find a correspondence in 
language to a single or absolute truth. Writing it is always interpretive of 
experience and observation—never definitive. Thus, writing can be usefully 
represented, as Lanham (1993) suggests, as an open system. In other words, 
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instead of a foundational model of communication in which the relationship 
between meaning and discourse is static, post-process theory suggests a model of 
writing understood as an open, ever-changing network of relations between 
signification and ideas, opinions, knowledge, and subjectivities.  
 Finally, Kent argues that the fact that writing always responds to a specific 
rhetorical situation means that the writing act is not repeatable. This observation 
finds its parallel in the relation between the initial conditions from which a 
network emerges and the subsequent development of that network. For Kent, the 
act of writing is a spontaneous reaction to a specific rhetorical situation; that is, 
what occurs in the writing act (and what results, in the form of a written trace) is 
contingent upon the initial specific motivation for writing. The writer cannot 
control or repeat the act, as each new situation will result in a different act and a 
different end product. Likewise, the development of a complex emergent network 
is also a spontaneous, unpredictable reaction to the initial conditions from which 
the network arises. Terranova (2004) uses biological computing to explain how 
such a network develops and to illustrate the limited amount of control that can be 
exerted over that development. She notes that computational experiments called 
“cellular automata”11 demonstrate that only “soft control” can be exerted over the 
behavior of emergent systems—that is, the systems can only be minimally 
controlled or determined by the carefully engineered initial conditions of the 
experiment. She contrasts this “soft control” of emergent computer models to the 
rigid control of step-by-step computer programming. In any case, the 
                                                 
11 Cellular automata are computer models that attempt to “formalize the characteristics of life.” 
By following a set of mechanical and global rules these models are able to mimic a central feature 
of life: self-reproduction (Terranova, 2004, pp. 109-110). 
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development of a specific emergent system (or network) is completely dependent 
upon the specific situation from which it arises, and it is impossible to predict 
what will result—exactly how a given network will behave. A similar model of 
the writing act can perhaps better understand the contingency and unpredictability 
of written communication and move beyond problematic or even harmful 
representations of what goes on when we write. 
 The representation of the writing act and the product that results as similar 
to the development of an emergent network can help us to better understand the 
weaknesses of the process models of both the cognitivists and expressivists. 
Insofar as the cognitivist model is concerned, it becomes clear that Flower and 
Hayes are fundamentally incorrect to frame the success of student writers as a 
question of “control” over a problem that can be solved rationally. Not only is this 
kind of understanding of writing ideologically fraught, as Berlin argues, it totally 
misrepresents writing as an act which can be removed from a specific historical 
moment and generalized across time, place, and circumstance. The model of the 
emergent network can help illustrate how questions of time, place, and 
circumstance determine how an individual (or group) organizes a system of signs 
and the traces that are eventually left behind, committed to paper or screen. This 
system is always, like a network, open to revision. The dependence on the writing 
act (as well as what results from that act) on a specific situation, and the network 
of relations that surround that situation also suggests that perhaps Elbow (1973) 
should rethink having no problems with “making universal generalizations upon a 
sample of one” (p. 16). Further, if we understand the writing act as spontaneous 
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and unrepeatable, Elbow’s (1973) goal of giving students “control over words” is 
problematic indeed (p. vii). 
Emergent Trends 
 In the concluding section of this chapter, I touch on questions that have 
arisen in response to post-process theory and the usefulness that complexity 
theory might have in helping us resolve those questions. In doing so, I hope to 
suggest areas for further inquiry—issues in post-process theory that should be 
brought into greater dialogue with developments in the field’s engagement with 
network culture. Both of the issues I would like to address briefly relate to 
questions of pedagogy. Questions about genre in composition pedagogy as well as 
the viability of pedagogy itself within a post-process model of composition can be 
usefully informed by a consideration of networks and complexity. 
 Genre theory has become a major element of the post-process movement. 
While literary theorists as early as Bakhtin have long since developed a flexible 
and dynamic understanding of genre, the field of composition has only relatively 
recently embraced this kind of conception of genre in a widespread manner. A 
consideration of the description of the relationship between discourse 
communities and genres by post-process theorist David Russell (1999) makes 
clear the overlap between current theories of composition and the discourse of 
complexity and networks: 
I have used the term activity system to mean collectives…of people who 
share…common purposes (objects and motives) and certain tools used in 
certain ways—among these tools in use certain kinds of writing done in 
certain ways or processes. These kinds of writing used in certain ways for 
certain recurring purposes I have called genres…  Within an organization 
(activity systems) and among organizations (activity systems) there are a 
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range of genres that form a complex system of genres, mediating the 
interactions of people and facilitating their collaborative and competitive 
work (pp. 81-82). 
In this model of society and discourse, groups of people (discourse communities 
or activity systems) and the forms of writing that mediate relations within and 
among these groups are understood as complex systems. That is, the network of 
relations that composes a group of people is never static, although the group does 
share a common purpose that maintains its coherence. A genre itself is a complex 
system that can be connected to other genres to form a complex system of genres 
that mediates interactions between individuals and groups. A genre is often 
thought of as a “static category of texts that share certain formal features” (p. 81). 
Instead, a genre responds to a specific purpose, situation or use. Therefore, the 
unique initial conditions that motivated the use of a particular genre will have a 
large influence over how a given piece of discourse will turn out. Genre can be 
thought of a system of conventions that cohere around a specific kind of purpose 
or rhetorical situation. No rhetorical situation is ever exactly the same as another; 
therefore, each piece of discourse, although it may correspond to a particular 
genre, will develop in a different and unique manner. As Russell writes, “Genres 
and the social (writing) processes they enact are dynamic, always capable of 
changing” (p. 82). In other words, genres do cohere around certain characteristics 
and purposes, but they are always flexible and dynamic. 
 This is a useful and exciting way for composition studies to approach 
genre, as it moves beyond thinking of genre as a certain unchanging form or type 
of writing. However, such a sophisticated conception of genre does not always 
translate easily from theory to practice. A static understanding of genre has a 
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tendency to resurface when such theory is brought into the writing classroom. 
Students are eager for formula to follow and teachers (especially inexperienced 
teachers) are often happy to oblige.  One need only glance through a few of the 
writing textbooks that have been apparently informed by the field’s embrace of 
genre theory to confirm that simplification is difficult to resist. Treatment of genre 
often becomes limited to a list of conventions particular to the given genre. (These 
are presented in easy to read, quick-reference formats, of course.) The danger here 
is that, in the rush to embrace an exciting new theoretical understanding of genre 
and bring that understanding into the classroom, we end up simply replicating the 
pedagogy of current-traditionalism with its focus on modes and forms. Instead of 
requiring students to write a “compare and contrast essay” or an “expository 
essay,” we now require that students write a “literacy narrative” or “discourse 
analysis.” Each genre should be composed according to the characteristics of the 
form, or now, according to the assessment criteria established by the teacher (or 
institution). 
 How are we to avoid this? I believe that a more explicit embrace of the 
discourse of complexity and network theory can perhaps help us more clearly 
illustrate our current understanding of the dynamic nature of genre to the benefit 
of theorists, teachers, and even students. I would like to suggest that the field 
engage in further research into the overlap between genre theory and complexity 
theory. The model of the complex system or network may perhaps provide a way 
to conceptually, even visually, represent how genres behave. A genre is a system 
or network that is coherent yet dynamic, organized around a particular purpose 
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and conditioned by the situation from which it arose yet fluid and open. Genres, 
like networks that are articulated to other networks, connect to other genres to 
create even more complex systems. Keeping the model of the open network in 
mind while discussing genre and attempting to teach our students to recognize and 
employ various genres may help us avoid the trap of representing genre as type or 
form. 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric? 
 In this chapter, I have suggested ways that theories of complexity and 
network behavior can offer a basis for new models of rhetorical history and 
theory. An understanding of how networks work helps us revise a linear, 
progress-oriented history of composition and historicize the field’s current “post-
process” moment in relation to our digital, networked culture as well as to 
theories of social epistemic rhetoric refigured in order to adequately respond to 
that culture. I believe that the field should begin to consider ways that social 
epistemic rhetoric, a theory of composition and rhetoric based largely on 
postmodern epistemological assumptions, can be supplemented—not replaced—
by models of composition and rhetoric informed by the emerging discourses of 
complexity and network theory. The model of the network can perhaps help us to 
re-envision more vividly how history is represented (as carnivalesque narrative 
rather than metanarrative), how power circulates (rhizomatically rather than 
hierarchically), and how the writing act occurs (as a spontaneous, unpredictable 
response to a complex web of dynamic relations rather than an act of rational 
problem solving). 
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Chapter Three: 
It isn’t OurSpace: Exposing the Logic of Online Social Networks 
While some online discourse communities, such as those in the computer-
mediated classroom or on academic listservs, have been widely critiqued from a 
rhetorical perspective, 12 online social networks have not. The need for this 
critique is particularly urgent, as so many college students participate in such 
social networks, frequenting such sites as MySpace, Friendster, and most 
prevalently, Facebook. Such sites provide users a homepage on which they can 
post profiles and pictures as well as blog entries; a network of pages is created by 
users who have agreed online to be “friends.” These networks, particularly 
Facebook and MySpace, are rapidly becoming a major part of college students’ 
everyday lives, as well as an increasingly important part of the network culture. 
Facebook registers more than 5,800 new users a day13; MySpace, which places no 
restrictions on membership, now has approximately 27 million members—a 
400% growth in 2005 (Williams, 2005). The online social network is one of the 
most important manifestations of the emerging network culture for study within 
the field of rhetoric and composition.  
While a great deal of attention has recently been paid to these networks by 
the popular press, they have received little scholarly attention. Such consideration 
is particularly needed in the field of rhetoric and composition, as we must pay 
attention to the electronic spaces in which college students communicate and are 
discursively shaped. While most of the attention to online social networks in the 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Gurak’s (1997) Persuasion and Privacy in Cyberspace, or Hawisher and 
Sullivan (1998), “Women on Networks.” 
13 See McDonald (2005), “Finding Friends with Facebook.” 
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news media has focused on the potential dangers of the sites as spaces for sexual 
predators or drug sales, a rhetorical critique of such sites reveals more subtle 
dangers: such networks perpetuate dominant values and enroll members primarily 
as targets of marketing and surveillance. Further, an analysis of online social 
networks yields insights that apply beyond these particular online spaces 
themselves; such networks are sites where the field can engage with and better 
theorize network cultures.  As this essay will demonstrate, an analysis of these 
networks can help the field re-conceptualize agency and “community” in the 
information society. Neither the discipline at large nor Berlin (chiefly because of 
his early death) has adequately analyzed the fundamental role played by capital in 
networked, rhizomatic forms of organization, communication, and culture.  I will 
examine online social networks as an example of the ways that electronic 
networks are conditioned by the milieu of late capitalism from which they 
emerge, making them sites subject to control and surveillance that thereby 
manufacture and perpetuate hegemony. Moreover, this analysis both offers 
insights into the commodified nature of community in the network culture and 
points to the need— in order to enable resistance to this commodification—to 
move towards an understanding of community as multitude. Further, I will argue 
that the concept of multitude can help us move beyond models of community that 
are either based on consensus or challenged by “dissensus” to the more balanced 
understanding of community suggested by social epistemic rhetoric. In addition, 
online social networks are examined as examples of sites in our society in which, 
contrary to Foucault, spectacle and surveillance coexist— in a mutually 
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reinforcing relationship. However, because online social networks are (like all 
networks) open systems, they always offer the possibility of divergence and 
change; we must therefore explore the ways in which such networks are open to 
(or even enable) resistance.  
I will first critically analyze the rhetorical features of these digital social 
networks, noting how the discourse of these networks helps construct the 
knowledge and subjectivity of participants in ways that perpetuate the dominant 
ideology of late capitalism as well as gendered and raced values.14 My analysis 
will then lead to a reconsideration of the concept of community and an 
examination of the “invitational” rhetoric of social networking sites, as I will 
argue that such networks exemplify a re-articulation of “community” as a target 
of capitalistic surveillance and marketing as well as a forum for individualist self-
expression and competition rather than a network or space that exists for mutual 
support. On the other hand, I suggest that social networking sites point to 
possibility of future online communities in which Berlin’s as well as Hardt and 
Negri’s vision of democracy can be supported and encouraged. Finally, I will 
suggest ways that current online social networks can be reshaped to offer spaces 
for communal engagement and action and will briefly suggest possible 
pedagogical responses that can enable students to become aware of the ways in 
which they are shaped by and can shape these social networks.  
                                                 
14 It is very important to note that both Facebook and MySpace are gendered and raced spaces: 
their discourse privileges and perpetuates not only the ideology of capitalism, but also the 
dominant values of the patriarchal and white culture as well. Although this paper will point to 
some examples of the privileging of gendered and raced values, a more fully developed critique of 
these networks in relation to the issues of both gender and race is very much needed.  
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Social Networking Rhetoric 
As discussed above, the paradigm of social epistemic rhetoric offers a 
useful theoretical framework for the rhetorical analysis of the discursive practices 
of the digital age. However, as I’ve also discussed, social epistemic rhetoric is 
limited by Berlin’s failure to perceive the central role of capital in the emergence 
of network technology. Instead, as noted in Chapter One, Berlin (1996) 
perpetuated what Braun (2001) calls “democracy hope,” arguing that technology 
itself inherently encourages democratic political and economic practices (p. 131). 
Again, as Terranova (2004) makes clear, network technology is not inherently 
democratic but is subsumed by late capitalism. Braun notes that the foundational 
role of capital in technological development and the emergence of electronic 
networks rules out the possibility that technology, by its nature, is democratic and 
conducive to egalitarian practices. However, Berlin’s work is still actually quite 
helpful for exposing the role played by capital in the development of online 
networks as well as the ways in which these networks normalize the inequitable 
conditions of late capitalism.  
Berlin’s work does lay a theoretical framework within which we can 
critique and expose the ways in which the discourse of online social networks 
naturalize and perpetuate hegemonic values. As noted earlier, under the paradigm 
of social-epistemic rhetoric text production is not simply a means for transmitting 
information; it is a means for constructing knowledge. The paradigm also offers 
alternatives to dominant conceptions of signification and subjectivity; it 
recognizes the rhetoricity of discourse as well as the subject. As Berlin (1996) 
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asserts, one of the primary practices of social-epistemic rhetoric must be the study 
of codes—the signifying practices that constitute society. Just as knowledge is 
constructed and normalized by rhetorical acts, so are our culture and our way of 
life. Those codes (which include oral and literate practices as well as a wide range 
of social behaviors such as dress, body language, and the arrangement of personal 
space) that serve to reproduce the existing social and material relations under the 
current mode of production are privileged and naturalized under the condition of 
hegemony. Berlin advocates a kind of rhetorical analysis that focuses on the 
critique of these codes—recognizing them and examining how they function to 
privilege and perpetuate particular economic, ethnic, and gendered values as well 
as construct certain kinds of subjectivity. Further, we must also critically examine 
the ways in which codes construct subjectivity. As Berlin writes, we are “formed 
by the various discourses and sign systems that surround us… The result is that 
each of us is heterogeneously made up of competing discourses” (p. 66). 
Language is not simply a means for the transmission of knowledge; rather, the 
multitude of discourses we encounter composes us: the subject is formed by those 
discourses and practices with which he or she identifies.   
Technology is becoming increasingly transparent,15 and online spaces 
such as Facebook and MySpace may seem neutral to many users (particularly our 
students). However, because these complex, self-organizing networks have 
emerged within the milieu of late capitalism, they are structured by its ideology. 
The discourse of online social networks manufactures hegemony, perpetuating a 
                                                 
15 As noted in Chapter One, Cynthia Selfe argues (1999), that technology often remains in the 
background, seen simply as a tool, rather than a subject of study and critique. Thus, technology is 
made invisible (or, at least neutral) by our lack of attention. 
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late capitalist economy that is dependent on the exploitation of the world’s lower 
classes (and the continued obfuscation of that exploitation). Its discourse 
normalizes capitalist values and encourages the construction of identities that 
align with capitalistic ideologies as well as the patriarchal and raced values of the 
elite class.16 It is therefore essential to examine the rhetorical practices of both the 
sponsors17 and members of these networks to understand how those practices 
shape the values and subjectivities of all those involved; it is also necessary to 
consider how these practices shape the networks themselves. Both Facebook and 
MySpace construct and perpetuate the values and subjectivities of members 
through a variety of discursive means. The subjectivities of members are shaped 
through the construction of the member profile and the identification (and 
interaction) with groups. Further, dominant values are perpetuated through the 
representation of relationships within the networks as well as communication 
between members. As we will see, the result is an electronically linked network of 
people that challenges our notion of community: replacing the local group 
organized for mutual interest and civic action with a rhizomatic, decentralized 
collection of people focused on individualistic self-expression and micro-targeted 
by corporate capitalism. 
                                                 
16 If Facebook is indeed a book of faces, it is important to note the face that originally graced the 
banner of its homepage: a graphic representation of a face that is clearly white and male. Thus, 
Facebook, via its visual logo, established the standard for faces within its network. 
17 While the term “sponsor” is here used in a conventional sense, it also is intended to invoke 
Deborah Brandt’s use of the term in Literacy in American Lives.  Brandt refers, in the book, to the 
“sponsors” of literacy: the corporate, governmental and private entities that sponsor literacy 
education for their own benefit. The sponsors of online social networks support forums for 
particular discursive practices that ultimately benefit the sponsors. 
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Emerging Social Networks 
Online communities of various types have existed since the emergence of 
Internet, taking the form of listservs, discussion boards, and chat rooms; 
“cybercommunities” have been focused around various purposes such as online 
dating, business interests and activism. The recent emergence of online social 
networks is a new and very important step in the evolution of online communities: 
these are different in form from the kinds of virtual communities that have come 
before, and they have had a much bigger impact on the general culture. These 
networks are a very new phenomenon: it wasn’t until 2003 that sites such as 
Friendster and MySpace became widely popular. Such networks begin and grow 
when founders invite their personal network of friends to join the site, who in turn 
invite their friends, and so on. Online social networks differ from other online 
communities not only by the way in which they are formed but also by the range 
of communication media they offer. These networks are made up of linked 
homepages from which members can blog, send personal emails, comment 
publicly on other homepages, instant message, and share files. They also differ 
from other topic or service driven online communities in that they are not held 
together by a central theme or consumer need. 
There can be little doubt that Facebook and MySpace have become an 
increasingly important part of the network culture. Facebook now has almost 4 
million members at 1,500 participating colleges of a network—numbers that are 
particularly impressive when one considers that the network began in February 
2004 (Twohey, 2005, par. 4). Of the 85% of students at participating colleges who 
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use Facebook, 60% log in daily and over 90% log in once a week (Arrington, 
2005, par. 9). While the numbers are impressive, they do not adequately express 
the great impact that the social network has had on college life in its short history. 
As one college student says, “It becomes part of your daily routine. It’s email, the 
news, the weather, Facebook” (McDonald, 2005, par. 4). Students report spending 
hours a day on the network; some call it an addiction (Copeland, 2004, par. 34). 
Its impact extends beyond cyberspace onto the campus, changing the way people 
meet. Students can “pre-meet” on Facebook, or if they’ve met someone only 
briefly and would like to stay in touch or learn more, they just “facebook” the new 
acquaintance. “Facebook” is now a commonly used verb on college campuses; 
browsing the network is known as facebooking (McDonald, 2005, par. 8).18  
As big an impact Facebook has had on college campuses, MySpace has 
had a wider impact on the general culture of those under thirty. It began in 2003 
and since then, as noted above, it has attracted a membership of approximately 27 
million people (Williams, 2005, par. 7). Membership in MySpace is open to 
anyone with the means to acquire a PC and the time to spend online. The growth 
of MySpace has been phenomenal—it has become so popular that in April 2005 it 
passed Google in number of hits (Williams, 2005, par. 7). And like Facebook, 
perhaps even like Google, the impact of MySpace is not limited to the online 
world. David Card, a cyberbusiness analyst interviewed by the New York Times, 
                                                 
18 Facebook has thus joined the growing list of technological terms and brands that have become 
verbs: a technologically savvy individual emails, blogs, IM’s, and now, facebooks. It is important 
to note that more recent terms like blogging not only denote an action, they also help establish a 
group identity: one who writes a blog may identify as a “blogger,” part of an online network, with 
whom he or she directly interacts, as well as the wide and diverse network of those who keep 
weblogs. 
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cites MySpace’s early identification with music as well as the creators’ 
incorporation of blogging into the network as instrumental to its growth and 
impact (qtd. by Williams, 2005, par. 8). Further, Card notes that, while blogging 
has really been around since the Internet began (in the form of personal 
homepages), MySpace was one of the first social networks to incorporate it into 
its format (Williams, 2005, par. 8). While blogging itself has become a major part 
of cyberculture, much of the scholarly attention on blogs has been focused on 
those concerned with political issues, which make up only a small percentage of 
those on the Internet. Many more weblogs are personal, and online interactive 
diaries are an increasingly popular form of digital self-expression which MySpace 
has very successfully tapped into. 
In fact, MySpace became so successful that it came to be seen as a model 
for a new kind of information, and advertising, outlet. Instead of attempting to 
copy the MySpace model, corporate media simply bought the network. In July 
2005, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation bought Intermix, the parent company 
of MySpace, for $580 million. News Corporation executives explained that the 
investment was a way for the company to reach young people who are difficult to 
reach through traditional media like newspapers and television (Williams, 2005, 
par. 11). And so what began as an online “community” for artists, musicians, and 
various other counter-culture types became the basis for the conservative News 
Corporation’s claim to a larger stake in the new media market. This move is 
emblematic of the questionable and tenuous nature of cyberspace “communities.” 
We will return to the issue of community later in the essay when we consider the 
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online “community” as a target for advertising and surveillance and address the 
potential of online social networks as sites for resistance and counter-hegemonic 
practice. We must first examine the rhetorical features of online social networks, 
as the signifying practices of members and sponsors create the network and shape 
the community that arises from it.  
Menu-Driven Identities on Facebook 
On both Facebook and MySpace we see what Lisa Nakamura (2002) calls 
menu-driven identities: the member quite literally constructs his/her identity 
through the creation of an online profile that is constructed by the member’s 
response to a series of questions. However, this construction isn’t simply the 
result of the autonomous choices of the subject. While an examination of identity 
construction on social networking sites does confirm that language practices 
create and shape subjectivity, a concept central to social epistemic rhetoric, it may 
call into question whether Berlin’s (1996) insistence that agency can be attained 
through the exploration of multiple and varying subject positions can be applied 
to the virtual world. (This issue will be dealt with in a more in-depth manner in 
the following chapter on blogging.)  As Nakamura points out, the narrowness of 
options available on an online menu leads to a process of identity construction 
that challenges the assumptions of those like Turkle (1995) who argue that Web 
frees one to create and explore new identities apart from societal or physical 
constraints. The creation of the profile is dictated by the questions posed, and 
often the user may only choose from a small set of options within a “clickable 
box.” This results in profiles – and online subjectivities—that conform to 
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dominant political, raced, and gendered labels and roles. Again, as Foucault 
(1982) argues, subject positions are constructed and made available by the 
institution (in this case the corporately owned social networking site) and can be 
filled by various subjects. The subject does not move freely among various 
subject positions—he or she occupies positions made available and regulated by 
the discourse of the institution. 
In a clear example of the menu-driven nature of identity on Facebook, the 
member’s political identity is limited to five labels from the dominant political 
discourse: “very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative” and “very conservative.” 
The member must either choose one of these labels or leave the question blank. 
Such labels frame political identity as a choice between two opposite terms 
(although one can choose a greater or lesser allegiance to each of these identities) 
enforcing a simplistic, dualistic representation of political identity. One cannot 
choose to identify as radical, anarchist, libertarian, or neoconservative. Political 
identity is thus framed within the rhetoric of the two dominant parties in the U.S. 
and the acceptable ideological framework established by corporate media, all of 
which are complicit in maintaining the status quo. Interrogation within the 
network of the limited nature of the current party system is foreclosed by the 
profile’s menu of terms.  
Gender relations are also proscribed by the menus of online social 
networks. On Facebook, when one adds a friend to their homepage or clicks on a 
friend’s profile, members can go to a menu that asks “How do you know?” the 
given friend.  Among choices such as “Went to school together,” “Lived 
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together,” and “In my family,” is the choice, “We hooked up.” Thus, the menu 
allows for the representation of relationships in a manner that privileges the male 
perspective: “hooking up,” or engaging in a casual sexual relationship with 
another person, because of well-established double standards ever present in 
campus cultures and beyond, is likely to be reflect positively on a man and 
negatively on a woman. Further, information on relationships is displayed 
publicly, allowing for this menu and the information it prompts the member to 
disclose to be used against other members, providing the means for the public 
disclosure or even fabrication of a sexual encounter. While these are but two 
examples of the way in which the construction of identity and power relations are 
conditioned through profile creation within online social networks, they provide a 
clear illustration of the potential for the perpetuation of hegemony within such 
networks, and hint towards how “community” might be developed and manifested 
within social networking sites. 
Virtual Communities? 
During the development of computers and composition as a field, the 
Internet has often been viewed as a potential space for community and social 
change. As Tharon Howard (1997) writes: 
If it could be shown that electronic communities do exist and that they 
represent radical new sites that enable the formation of resisting subjects, 
of agencies capable of critiquing old, corrupt, and exclusionary discursive 
practices found in other media, then those activists and theorists who have 
called for the increased use of NT [Network Text] to bring about social, 
political, economic and educational reforms will have a strong foundation 
on which to base their arguments (p. 115). 
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However, in order to argue that online social networks are ultimately little more 
than nodes in a virtual marketplace (or instead, that such sites can provide spaces 
for collective resistance and reform), we must first establish how exactly, or even 
if, they function as communities. Further, as J. MacGregor Wise (2003) notes, 
“One problem in such debates is that the term ‘community’ is presented as a 
given, as if we know what that means and we all share the same meaning and 
ideals” (p. 114). That is, before anyone can begin exploring whether the Web is 
essentially a medium for the perpetuation of late-capitalist consumer society or if 
it instead still offers real hope for the development of civic discourse and 
communal change, the term community must be specifically defined. Likewise, 
because online social networks are often conceived of as communities, we must 
first interrogate the term “community” itself in order to offer a critical and 
pedagogical response to these networks and to determine if (and if so, how) it 
should be applied. 
 Wise points to Lee Komito’s 1998 article, “The Net as a Foraging Society: 
Flexible Communities,” which clarifies the term community in relation to 
cyberspace; Wise’s and Komito’s explorations of the concept of community are 
not only useful to the general discussion of cyberspace, but they can also help us 
define more specifically what we mean by community within the context of 
online social networks. Komito delineates four types of community, relating each 
type to cyberspace; he makes the distinction between moral, normative,19 
proximate and fluid, foraging communities (Wise, 2003, pp. 114-117). Komito 
                                                 
19 The normative definition is not essential to this study: it simply refers to the general use of the 
term community to describe a group of people with common interests or identifications: the 
community of English teachers or stamp collectors, for example. 
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argues that while online communities are often idealized as moral or proximate 
communities, or a combination of both, they can often more accurately be 
conceived of as fluid, foraging communities.  
Moral community is closest to the ideal, utopian notion of community. In 
such a community “individuals share a common ethical system that constrains 
interactions among members, emphasizing mutual benefit above self 
interest…This is community as social solidarity” (Komito qtd. by Wise, 2003, p. 
114). This understanding of community is perhaps the general social and political 
ideal; as such, it is often deployed as the given meaning of the term. The notion of 
moral communities is often incorporated into the conception of proximate 
communities on the Web. Proximate communities are based on the conception of 
community as a space in which people can interact voluntarily or otherwise 
(Wise, 2003, p. 115). In cyberspace such communities are those that are 
conceived of as a public space, such as MUDs and MOOs, or even virtual cities 
(Wise, 2003, p. 115). The utopian cybercommunity, then, is both proximate and 
moral. Such communities provide an alternative space that enhances “real” social 
space and in which people can come together for mutual benefit and perhaps even 
to engage in civic change. However, proximate communities take on the 
characteristics of offline space in the late-capitalist period: often Web forums and 
virtual cities are little more than spaces in which corporations can execute 
advertising strategies and gather personal information (marketing practices that 
are often tied together). 
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 However, as Komito asserts, the moral and proximate conceptions of 
cybercommunities may not adequately describe the manifestation of communities 
on the Web. He asserts that often cybercommunities are best described as fluid or 
foraging societies based on a nomadic model of community rather than industrial 
or agrarian models (2003, p. 117). In such a model, communities are not tied to a 
particular space or “larger macrosocial structures on which they depend” (Wise, 
2003, p. 117) Komito argues that online communities more closely match this 
model: membership in online groups is unstable, members can easily leave online 
communities and often hold membership in multiple groups (Wise, 2003, p. 117). 
 Wise points out that, while the existence of proximate, moral communities 
are most often idealized as a great social benefit of the Web, “what are most often 
produced are foraging communities and commercialized virtual cities” (2003, p. 
117) Indeed, it is clear that commercialized communities on the Web, which can 
either be proximate or fluid, far outnumber those which exist for the purpose of 
community support, civic discourse, and collective action. It should come as no 
surprise that online social networks such as Facebook and MySpace are in fact 
highly commercialized spaces. We are faced with the question of whether these 
networks are little more than commodified virtual cities or if they hold the 
potential to become moral communities that offer space for support and social 
change. 
 We must first attempt to define online social networks as communities 
according to the terms above. We could describe both Facebook and MySpace as 
proximate virtual communities, as both networks seek to represent a stable 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 76
“space” in which individuals can gather. These social networks are indeed 
represented as a public space in which individuals choose to enter and interact 
voluntarily as well as involuntarily; however, on both networks great emphasis is 
placed on the individual. Although the network may be open to the “public,” it is 
a space for the representation of the individual: Facebook is foremost a book of 
faces, and MySpace is exactly that—a personal, although online, space. 
Therefore, online social networks could not be described as “moral” communities 
as members are not bound by a particular ethical system, or ethos. Members do 
not join for a particular shared purpose or share set of common values. Further, as 
established above in the analysis, Facebook and MySpace certainly do not meet a 
central criterion of moral communities: the emphasis of “mutual benefit above 
self interest.” In fact, as noted above, the discursive construction of social 
networks like Facebook and MySpace privileges self-interest over mutual benefit 
or the communal exchange of support.  
We might best describe the online social networks Facebook and MySpace 
as a new kind of online community not described by Wise or Komito: proximate 
yet fluid commercialized communities. Although the networks are represented as 
stable social spaces (members can always return to their homepage, or space, on 
the network), membership within them is unstable and overlapping—members of 
one network may belong to others and may shift between various networks over 
time. A member might also participate in groups within the networks, again on an 
unstable and overlapping basis; as a member’s interests change so will his/her 
participation in a given group. A member can easily leave a network quickly, and 
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there is little in the way of social decorum or pressure that would prevent this. 
Joining a network is also easy—provided one has the technological means (which 
certainly cannot be assumed). As such, though these networks can be described 
and proximate, fluid and commercialized communities, they also reflect the 
characteristics of the networked multitude as established by Terranova, as well as 
Hardt and Negri (2000): they are open, self-organizing, emergent systems (Hardt 
and Negri 103). They thus offer the possibility for the kind of community Hardt 
and Negri argue is essential to democracy and activism in the globalized digital 
age: a community that preserves differences while connecting and collaborating 
on the basis of commonality. They write (2004) that multitude can be understood 
as an “open and expansive network in which all differences can be expressed 
freely and equally” (pp. xiv). As I will examine in greater detail below, because 
they are open and fluid, online social networks are possible sites from which 
multitude can emerge. 
 However, as established above, regardless of the fact that they offer the 
potential for resistance, these networks are certainly commodified sites; not only 
does their discourse privilege and normalize capitalist ideologies, they are sites 
for advertising as well as marketing surveillance. As we will see, the 
commodification of online “community” is further enforced by the invitational 
rhetoric of the networks—a rhetoric that appears to be based on goodwill and 
friendship but is actually propelled by competition and individualism.  
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Invitational Rhetoric: Ideology and Identity 
The manner in which online social networks are formed is one of the most 
important features of these new networks that distinguish them from other virtual 
communities. In the case of most previous cybercommunities members are drawn 
to the network because of a particular interest or to fulfill a particular need or 
want. Members are drawn to newsgroups and listservs because of a specific 
common interest, whether professional or cultural; online dating services and 
activist sites draw in members who want to find companionship or take political 
action. In the case of online social networks, invitational rhetoric deploying 
hierarchical appeals is used to form and expand the network as well as perpetuate 
hegemonic, capitalistic values. Invitational rhetoric was originally conceived as 
an alternative to rhetorics of persuasion (Foss and Griffin, 1995). Because it is 
based on the assumption of equality between rhetor and audience, the listener is 
not compelled to act or change but is invited to and allowed to react however he 
or she so chooses (Foss and Griffin, 1995, p. 8). Although such a rhetoric was 
conceived as a more egalitarian, feminist alternative to rhetorics of persuasion and 
conquest (which force or manipulate the audience into change), it can nonetheless 
be used as a tool of power. 
Barbara Warnick (2001) describes the deployment of this rhetoric in her 
analysis of print and online appeals in the mid- 1990’s urging women to become 
participants in cyberspace. Much like Berlin, Warnick asserts that the rhetorical 
critic must study texts as systems, “noting recurrent patterns of appeal, 
construction of ethos in texts, who can speak, who is silenced, and how identities 
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are discursively constructed” (2001, p. 6). By examining the patterns of 
hierarchical appeals in the invitational discourse directed towards women in the 
mid-1990’s with the purpose of attracting them to come online, Warnick uncovers 
the ideologies embedded in these texts. She notes that such invitational rhetoric 
privileges terms such as “activity, aggression, currency, technology and wealth,” 
while devaluing their opposites “passivity, hesitancy, convention and poverty” (p. 
71).Warnick’s recognition and analysis of these hierarchies is based upon Burke’s 
assertion that people are “goaded by the spirit of hierarchy” (Burke qtd. by 
Warnick, 2001, p. 68). As Warnick writes:  
Burke gave a form or structure to human action that implies that all 
humans are intrinsically motivated by the principle of perfection, the need 
to move upward…in the many hierarchies that shape their social, political, 
and spiritual lives (p. 69). 
 
Invitational rhetoric then plays on this intrinsic motivation by presenting 
hierarchies of terms and values and appealing to the desire of the audience to 
identify with the privileged values. As Warnick’s analysis makes clear, such 
hierarchical appeals normalize particular values and silence those who do not 
conform to or identify with those values.20  
In the case of online social networks such invitational discourse plays a 
central role in the construction of the networks themselves: social networks such 
as Facebook and MySpace are formed and expand through invitational discourse 
                                                 
20 The appeals that invited women to participate in cyberspace privilege masculine values such as 
aggressiveness and individualism, while devaluing passivity and collaboration, thus constructing 
an “‘ideal’ woman—one who [is] career oriented, opportunistic and prepared to try new things” 
(86). These hierarchical appeals privilege and normalize masculine values and persuade women to 
conform to a masculinized identity. The invitational rhetoric used to convince women to 
participate in cyberspace contributed to the gendering of Web and the construction of a 
masculinized identity for female Internet users. 
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that deploys hierarchical appeals which privilege and normalize capitalist values. 
The growth and structure of the social network is dependent on who members 
choose to invite into the network or, out of those who are already members, into 
their “friend” list. Thus, the network is shaped by the acceptance and refusal of 
invitations. The invitational rhetoric of these online social networks is not only 
generally hierarchical; it relies on appeals based on the privileging of certain 
values over others. Both Facebook and MySpace place great emphasis on the 
acquisition of friends. The manner in which friends are acquired, counted, and 
displayed, as well as the rhetoric concerning friends on both networks, places 
great value on the quantity of friends a member has, as well as the visual and 
discursive quality of those friends. The emphasis on attaining great numbers of 
friends tends to perpetuate a competitive, capitalist ideology. 
Before continuing, further attention must be given to the rhetoric of 
friendship on online social networks. The labeling of members as “friends” seems 
to contradict the argument that these networks privilege competitive, 
individualistic values over values of sharing and support. However, it is important 
to note the ways in which friendships are formed on such networks. Most often, 
groups of friends appear to form around particular patterns of cultural 
consumption: networks of friends tend to form around shared appreciation and 
consumption of types of television, movies, and particularly music. That is, 
groups of friends correspond to, and no doubt help to create, particular market 
niches. Consumerism is, of course, based not on communal support, but 
individualistic desire.  
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It would also be useful to examine the ways in which relationships on 
social networking sites are “negativity friendships” that form around shared 
consumption patterns. Research conducted by Jennifer Bosson (2006) has shown 
that friendships based on exclusion, on a shared dislike for another individual or 
group, are often stronger than friendships formed around common affinities. 
Friendship on social networks may follow this pattern: friends are formed around 
exclusive tastes in music, fashion, films, etc. These friendships are based not on 
the shared appreciation for such cultural products, but around the idea that by 
consuming such exclusive products one is setting him/herself apart from those he/ 
she doesn’t like (i.e. the “mainstream). A network of friends is formed in 
opposition to those who are disliked for their quotidian consumption patterns. 
The invitational discourse of online social networks appeals to the 
member’s desire to move up the social hierarchy—to be a member with many (or 
even the most) of the “most exclusive” friends. The number of friends a member 
has is also essential to establishing the ethos or credibility of a member. Those 
with a higher number of friends are more likely to be accepted and respected by 
other members. Thus the attainment and display of friends plays a central role in 
the discourse of online social networks. On the member homepages of both 
Facebook and MySpace the number of a member’s friends is prominently 
displayed, as is the number of hits (or views) a given homepage or profile has 
received. Images of the friends themselves are also prominently displayed—
pictures from each friend’s own profile appear on the homepage. Other features of 
social networks also repeat and reinforce this hierarchical appeal. A page from 
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MySpace on “promotion” asks, “Do you want to explode your friend list?” and 
then offers a way to have individuals automatically added as friends whenever 
they log on to MySpace from a member’s personal website (not affiliated with the 
network). Such an appeal persuades members that “exploding” or rapidly growing 
one’s friend list is a desirable thing—that it is, of course, better to have more 
friends than fewer friends.  
The manner in which “friends” are displayed is also part of the pattern of 
hierarchical appeals deployed within social networks. On both Facebook and 
MySpace, a limited number of friends are actually displayed on a member’s 
profile—the rest can be viewed by going to another page that displays all of a 
member’s friends. If a member wants to display on his/her profile the “coolest”21 
or even closest friends, s/he will have different options depending on the network. 
On MySpace, the hierarchical nature of online friendship is most apparent. 
Members can actually edit their friend lists, picking their “Top 8” friends for 
display. The member can also determine the order in which these “favorite” 
friends are displayed, further reflecting the hierarchy inherent in the discourse of 
the network. Members of Facebook, on the other hand, cannot choose which 
friends are displayed on their profile. Instead, friends are randomly chosen from 
the list for display each time the profiled is viewed. Facebook members, then, 
must be self-selecting—if they wish their profile to display only certain “cool” 
people, they must only invite and accept invitations from such people. 
                                                 
21 Jeff Rice’s (2004) observation that the word “cool” has been commercialized within the Web is 
indeed confirmed by another way one can get friends in MySpace: each time one logs in, pictures 
of “cool new people” are displayed on the network’s homepage. One can then check out the 
profiles of these cool people, and if they like what they see, invite these strangers to be friends. 
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Both sites make clear to their members, or audience, that getting as many 
friends as possible, as quickly as possible, is a desirable goal. The process of 
inviting and accepting friends becomes competitive, as members attempt to attain 
as many friends as possible. Interviews with members confirm this. Freshman Ali 
Scotti, who has 156 friends on Facebook, told the Washington Post about his 
attitude toward Facebook: “I’m not competitive…Well, okay, that’s a lie. [I’m] a 
little bit competitive.” (Copland, 2004, par. 16). Thus, a binary between the values 
of competition and collaboration is established by the invitational rhetoric of 
online social networks, with competitiveness being the privileged value. 
Ironically (although not surprising for anyone who has ever attended junior high), 
the process of gaining friends and connecting to others within the network 
becomes identified with the value of competition, a value ultimately associated 
with individualism.  
Of course, the value of competition in the discourse of these social 
networks (in other words, the codes that construct such networks) corresponds 
with and reinforces the hegemonic ideology of capitalism, which privileges 
personal material gain over all else. Social interaction within these networks 
constructs members foremost as individuals with something to gain, as codes that 
reinforce competitiveness are normalized; it also establishes a worldview based 
on competition rather than communal sharing and support. While online social 
networks are often thought of as “communities,” the kind of community found in 
these networks most often ultimately represents little more than a space for 
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individualist action and expression. MySpace is not known as “OurSpace” for 
good reason.  
Network Sponsors: An Electronic Market 
The discourse of online social networks such as Facebook and MySpace 
not only perpetuates the hegemony of late capitalism through the normalization of 
dominant cultural codes. Such networks are also used explicitly as sites for the 
discourse of marketing and consumer surveillance. The extent and depth to which 
these networks are used this end forces those in computers and composition to 
interrogate our notion of community and in fact suggests a model of electronic 
“community” based on a dystopic feedback loop: members who express their 
individuality on networked homepages according to carefully cultivated 
demographic norms enroll themselves in corporate surveillance, and this leads to 
increasingly focused targeted marketing.  
This cycle of individual electronic expression, surveillance and advertising 
on social networking sites suggests an important intersection between Guy 
Debord’s society of spectacle and Foucault’s surveillance society. Foucault 
(1987) dismissed the argument that society and its mode of production are based 
upon and perpetuated by the exchange and circulation of spectacular images, 
arguing that “Our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the 
surface of images, one invests bodies in depth…” (p. 217). As noted in earlier 
chapters, for Foucault, power is biopolitical (i.e. power is produced by careful 
institutional administration of the body from life to death). The introduction of 
digital technology, however, has accelerated and decentralized the production of 
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biopower, leading to, as noted in the previous chapters, a “control society” in 
which power shifts from its primary production in a hierarchical disciplinary 
system to a system of control that is dispersed and applied through rhizomatic 
global digital networks (Deleuze, 1990). Power is no longer only produced in 
disciplinary institutions; digital technology allows for the continual surveillance 
of individuals at every moment of the waking day. 
Debord’s theorization of the rise of the image in the society of the 
spectacle plays an important role in the development of control societies, a role 
that can be examined clearly within the online social networks. Social networking 
sites provide the perfect platform by which spectacular culture can be 
incorporated into what D. N. Rodowick (2001) calls one’s “data image”— the 
image of the individual constructed by various corporate and government data-
gathering institutions—as well as the ideal electronic site for the voluntary display 
of that data image. (p. 216). MySpace and Facebook encourage members to 
construct their online identity through the identification with popular, spectacular 
culture: in response to menus, members list favorite music, movies and television, 
add images from these media (favorite bands, video game characters, etc.) to their 
profiles, and add music tracks that play while their homepage is viewed. Rather 
than passively gazing upon it, the member can now interact with the spectacle, 
further increasing their identification with it. The social network member 
constructs his/her identity (using digital technology) from the material of 
spectacle, adding to his/her profile spectacular images and sounds as well as 
listing preferences for cultural commodities. The member than displays this data 
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image for all to see—self-enrolling in networks of surveillance, allowing 
corporations and the government free access to personal information: their likes 
and dislikes regarding all things (pop) cultural, their connections to other 
members, even political affiliations.22  The distinction between the surveillance/ 
control society and the spectacular society is more than the difference between 
being watched and watching, although online social networks do allow the 
member both to become an image to be viewed and a viewer of other images. In 
Foucault’s control society, the living body is the site at which power is produced; 
in Debord’s spectacular society, the real and living has been superseded by the 
image: the image gains ascendancy over that which it represents, collective action 
is foreclosed, and the current mode of production is maintained. Both models of 
power now operate simultaneously in contemporary network society.  The 
outward, spectacular display of one’s virtual data image corresponds to the 
internal production of biopower. Spectacle and surveillance thus both exist in the 
new media age in a mutually reinforcing relationship. 
Social networking sites are not only sites of corporate surveillance but also 
sites of marketing. These online marketing practices both sell products and 
construct members as consumers. Traditional online advertising practices as well 
as new practices specific to social networks are used. Both sites use the standard 
banner ads seen on most websites, and such advertisements are targeted toward 
the general demographics of network members. Facebook banner ads, however, 
can be targeted even more specifically, with different ads for each participating 
                                                 
22 Further, any original music posted to MySpace becomes, per the site’s privacy policy, the 
property of the News Corporation. 
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school. Students and local businesses can also advertise on Facebook, narrowing 
the targeted audience even further. MySpace also uses banner advertisements; it is 
worth noting that while members can use HTML code to personalize their 
homepages, members are instructed specifically not to write over any of the site’s 
advertisements.  
 Some of the new marketing strategies used in social networks have 
perhaps a greater and more insidious effect as such strategies both sell products, 
construct consumer identities and enable corporate surveillance, as they are 
integrated more seamlessly into the general discourse of the network. Facebook 
is, for example, now allowing corporations to create customized sponsored 
groups, or forums, on the network. Student-created groups have been part of the 
network from its beginning—online groups are created based on offline groups 
such as fraternities, sororities, political parties, fan clubs, etc. Clearly, such online 
“communities” have become targets of advertising and surveillance. Now, 
corporations such as Master Card, Apple, and Victoria’s Secret sponsor groups.23 
A brand logo appears in their personal profile of members who sign up for such a 
group; they also have access to the company’s Facebook message board, and 
receive monthly email newsletters from the company. The message boards 
become free consumer focus groups for the company. "‘I frankly didn't expect 
people would want to use the boards, but they do,’” says Matt Cohler, Facebook’s 
                                                 
23 The creation of groups by members can also lead to the perpetuation of oppressive 
representations of women and non-white peoples. Mythili Rao, in “Facing Up Facebook Racism,” 
reports on the creation of a group entitled: “People for the Propagation of the Asian Flesh.” 
According to the Facebook group, its purpose was to “bang out Asians” (n.d., para. 2). Clearly this 
represents the construction of a group identity that is both sexist and racist. While there may only 
be a relatively small number of such groups on Facebook and MySpace, their existence points to 
the truly oppressive potential of this electronic medium. 
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V.P. of corporate development. “‘Every day, there are women on the Victoria's 
Secret board talking about which products are the most comfortable’” (Newcomb 
2005). Members willingly enroll themselves, and their participation not only 
increases their consumer interest in the product, the company monitors their 
communication about the product. Such groups become not only targets for 
marketing, but also surveillance tools. Further, students who join such groups 
identify not only with the product (as members literally display brand logos on 
their profiles), but also as consumers, thus perpetuating the consumer culture of 
the late-capitalist mode of production. 
 As evidenced by the purchase of MySpace by Murdoch’s News 
Corporation, online social networks are clearly viewed by the corporate world as 
an important new digital medium for commerce. MySpace is viewed by Murdoch 
as a major hub of the News Corporation’s new media network (Scott-Joynt, 2005, 
par. 2). Already, Fox television episodes are premiering on MySpace.24 It is clear 
that online social networks, like much of the Web, are thoroughly commodified 
spaces. As such, opportunity for such networks to provide sites for democratic 
practice and civic engagement is limited. However, as the web has been the site of 
successful civic discourse, organization and action, it would seem that online 
social networks should offer some potential as sites for resistance and agency. In 
order to realize this potential, we must ask if it is possible for online social 
networks to become communities defined by sharing, support, and collective 
                                                 
24 Profiles have been created by marketers for the characters of movies on a number of online 
social networks: Darth Vader appears on Facebook and Ron Burgundy appears on Friendster. One 
would not be surprised to find profiles of Fox television and movie characters on MySpace. 
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action rather than sites where “community” is merely a shared space for the 
display of individualism and convenient target for niche marketers. 
Online Social Networks: Sites of Divergence? 
Facebook and MySpace are therefore certainly not ideal or utopian cyber-
communities. However, because they are emergent systems they do offer the 
potential for resistance. Although online networks are conditioned by the 
capitalist environment in which they emerge and can be used as tools of control, 
they can never themselves be totally controlled. As Terranova (2004) makes clear, 
while a network may remain stable on a macro level, the behavior of individual 
nodes within the network, whether people or information, is unpredictable and 
prone to divergence. As such, as Taylor notes, networks are always dynamic and 
in flux, changing and adapting as nodes within the network interact and as new 
information is introduced into the network from the outside (2001, p. 206). Such 
networks can become examples of what Hardt and Negri call a multitude: a 
collective that is decentralized, rhizomatic and dynamic. As they write (2004), the 
Internet is a good image of the multitude “[B]ecause first, the various nodes 
remain different but are all connected to the Web, and second, the external 
boundaries of the network are open such that new nodes and new relationships 
can always be added” (pp. xv). “Smaller” open networks such as Facebook and 
MySpace can becomes sites of multitude: communities that are held together by 
commonality, but in which differences are preserved, and can be expressed. 
Further, because they always offer the potential for radical divergence from the 
norm, for utterly unpredictable behavior, online social networks cannot be 
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totalized, and therefore can never be absolutely or totally sites of hegemonic 
oppression. Online social networks point us towards the kind of virtual sites from 
which the form of democracy suggested by Berlin (1996) and Hardt and Negri 
(2000, 2004) can emerge. They provide a model of a sprawling, open network in 
which individual differences are maintained and celebrated, and from which 
collaboration and collective action could occur.  Though sites such as Facebook 
and MySpace, because of their commercialization, may not themselves be 
appropriate spaces for the kind of inclusive participatory democratic action 
envisioned by Berlin as well as Hardt and Negri, they do offer a model of what 
such an online space might look like. And spaces for agency and resistance will 
therefore always exist within currently existent online social networks; if we wish 
to change these networks, to make them more equitable and shape them into the 
kind of virtual community that helps to foster progressive social change, we must 
develop and enable our students to use rhetorical tactics for creating sites of 
resistance and civic engagement within these networks. 
The unstable, dynamic nature of the multitude always leaves open the 
possibility for change, but we need to recognize the limitations of such social 
formations. We must base our actions on the recognition that just as networks 
cannot exist in their totality as absolute, unified expressions of dominant 
economic and cultural powers, they also cannot be remade entirely as sites for 
resistance and social change. That is, networks like Facebook and MySpace can 
never be shaped into sites that exclusively enable communal action and the 
expression of progressive values—hegemonic and oppressive values which 
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engender individualism and alienation will always remain in some form. We 
cannot hope to shape a fluid, proximate, and commercialized community that is 
subsumed by the late capitalist mode of production entirely into a fluid, 
proximate, and moral community. We cannot hope to change the entire 
network—its character as a network prevents that. We can, however, establish 
new spaces with the network that are fluid and moral—spaces which exist for the 
mutual benefit of all members, based on egalitarian values—and force the 
network to adapt and change. As Hardt and Negri (2000) make clear, just as 
power and control in a network is decentralized and fluid, so must our resistance 
be (pp. 24-25).  
At the time of this writing, we have just recently seen an example of 
successful resistance on Facebook. A new feature appeared on the site that 
catalogued and displayed all of a member’s actions—from how many friends one 
accepted and rejected to how many messages one wrote to others. The response 
from members was swift: a number of groups were immediately set up to protest 
this feature on the grounds that it violated members’ privacy. In a matter of days 
the owners of the site posted a letter of apology and changed the privacy settings 
on the site to give users control over what actions other members could view. This 
event points to the fact that members can exert some, albeit limited, influence 
over the development of such networks. 
But if we wish to change the kinds of communities that have thus far been 
established within existing online social networks or even generally within our 
emerging network culture, we must begin in the classroom: those in the field of 
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composition must shift from an understanding of community based on stable 
consensus, to an understanding of community as multitude. The critique of the 
ideal of consensus is not new to composition; as early as 1989, John Trimbur 
introduced the concept of “dissensus” in order to problematize the work of those 
such as Bruffee, who established consensus as the commonly perceived purpose 
of collaboration in the classroom. Berlin follows Trimbur in that both represent 
the classroom as a modern democratic arena in which collective decisions or 
conclusions are arrived upon through rational critique and debate, but also 
acknowledges that this debate will always be messy and that it must insist upon 
the inclusion (and critique) of every position or voice in the classroom (1996, p. 
140). However, if we always leave space for contradictory views, how do we keep 
the collaborative process or classroom discussion from spinning out of control? 
And on the other hand, if the classroom is to be a site in which collective 
conclusions are reached, how can we be sure that difference is recognized and 
preserved? The concept of multitude provides a model of community that allows 
for difference within a social formation that nonetheless coheres; the network 
remains connected while individual nodes operate on their own, although in 
relation to the rest of the network. In the following chapter, I will explore how 
this networked model of community can be realized in the classroom through the 
student production of blogs. 
In order to realize the potential of online social networks as sites of 
resistance, those in the field of rhetoric and composition must theorize a 
pedagogical response focused specifically on these networks. This pedagogy must 
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address how we can enable students to understand and critique the ways in which 
the discourse of such networks shape their subjectivity as individuals and as 
members of groups, as well as understand how their networked data image is used 
by corporations and government powers. Further, our pedagogy must foster a 
rhetoric of divergence that points to ways our students can act in resistance to 
hegemonic norms and shape existing networks or create new networks in 
accordance to a model of cybercommunity that enables civic discourse, support 
and action. 
Such pedagogies are already beginning to be implemented. In a first-year 
composition unit I teach on global media, I encourage students to research the 
connections between corporate media and online social networks and ask them to 
write arguments addressing the sites and the cultural and economic issues by 
which they are surrounded. In order to prepare to for writing this argumentative 
paper, students critically analyze social networking sites in the classroom. The 
strategies that Berlin suggests for the rhetorical analysis of cultural codes in the 
composition classroom are particularly useful for the construction of a curriculum 
focused on critical engagement with the discourse of social networking sites.  
In Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures (1996), Berlin provides a narrative 
account of the process of guiding a class through the critique of the cultural codes 
embedded in a particular text; this account can be used as framework for teaching 
students to analyze a wide range of artifacts including digital texts. Berlin’s 
students analyze a Wall Street Journal article on cowboys that draws comparisons 
between the American businessman and the ideal of the western cowboy; his 
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students pick out key signifiers and discuss how these signifiers are defined by 
their hierarchical binary relationship to other terms. For example, the cowboy is 
defined by his relationship to the cowboss, and the cowboss is defined both by the 
cowboys who work for him and the owners for whom he works (p. 125). Further, 
working off of Barthes’ Mythologies, Berlin guides his students through the 
recognition and analysis of the cultural codes naturalized by the article by placing 
these terms within the narrative structural forms suggested by the article; students 
can discuss for example how cowboy narratives construct the ideal American as a 
lone, tough, and hardworking man (p. 126).  
In my classroom, the analysis of a social networking site begins with 
placing it in a historical, political, and economic context, and students read 
articles on the purchase of MySpace by the News Corporation and discuss this 
issue in relation to the ongoing debate over corporate media convergence. From 
there, the class can examine social networking sites for the binaries they establish: 
surface over depth, image over real, coolness over friendship, individualism over 
collaboration. Further, students can consider how the clickable menus of these 
sites encourage members to construct their online identity through the 
identification with terms within a binary relationship such as conservative/ liberal. 
Students can then explore the cultural values that online social networks 
perpetuate and naturalize by answering critical inquiry questions that consider 
audience and rhetorical purpose:  
? Who has access to Facebook/ MySpace? 
? Who does this site target? 
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? Does the site target or privilege any particular race, gender, 
class, or age? 
 
? How is the targeting of this audience reflected visually in 
the language used on the site and in the features offered on 
the site? 
 
? What is the purpose of the site for owners and for 
members? 
 
? How are these purposes reflected on the site? 
? Who benefits the most from the site: members, advertisers, 
or owners? 
 
After thoroughly analyzing these sites, students are prepared to develop 
argumentative essays focused on online social networks and the issues that 
surround them. My students have written on a wide range of social networking-
related topics and used various argumentative strategies in these essays. Prompts 
that I provide my students: 
1) You can argue that a specific online social network should (or should not) 
be defined as community.  
 
2) You can address ties between corporate media and online social networks. 
You could, for example, investigate the effects of the purchase of 
MySpace by the News Corporation (Fox) and/or argue whether it is a good 
or bad thing for the members of MySpace. You might use the strategies of 
causal argument and/or evaluative argument. 
 
3) You can do a rhetorical analysis of a specific online social network or 
website. If you take this approach you should attempt to answer questions 
like: Who is the audience for this network/ website, and what kind of 
people join? How are potential members convinced to join (for example: 
through logos, pathos, and ethos)? Who benefits from the networks? Who 
benefits the most? Whose values do the networks reinforce? [This last 
prompt is a continuation of the analysis done in class.] 
 
To be sure, I am not alone in encouraging students to analyze and write 
about online social networks. Other instructors at my institution have asked 
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students to do discourse community analyses of online networks. Further, and 
perhaps most interestingly, instructors have also encouraged the creation of sites 
of divergence within Facebook, leading to the student establishment of first-year 
composition related groups like “I Love Knoblauch,” devoted to C.H. Knoblauch, 
whose essay “Literacy and the Politics of Education,” is one of the required 
readings in our freshman writing course. In this chapter we have seen the ways 
that social epistemic rhetoric can used as a theoretical framework by both scholars 
and teachers for the analysis of social networking sites. This analysis has 
hopefully further demonstrated the need for compositionists to engage with the 
question of community in the network society, to consider how online 
communities can be co-opted by capitalist interests, and to develop a counter-
hegemonic conception of community that resists this co-optation. I argue that the 
concept of multitude can help us more clearly theorize the kind of classroom 
community suggested by Berlin in which difference is preserved while common 
goals are established and worked toward through collaboration. As my next 
chapter demonstrates, the introduction of blogs into the classroom can help make 
this theoretical necessity a pedagogical reality. There is much more work to be 
done, including the systematic development of a more comprehensive first-year 
composition curriculum related to online social networks. However, divergent and 
counter-hegemonic rhetorics and pedagogies are already beginning to emerge 
from our dynamic and open network culture. 
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Chapter Four: 
Life on the Spectacular Screen: Corporate Vs. Cooperative Blogging 
Guy Debord (1967) argues in The Society of the Spectacle that the 
spectacle—a stream of images that mediates all existence—becomes the focus of 
and basis for all life: lived experience recedes into representation, image becomes 
preeminent over reality, and a system of power is created against which collective 
action is all but impossible. As noted in Chapter One, we have entered a new 
stage of spectacle with the advent of the network society. In the stage of spectacle 
analyzed by Debord, spectators are generally conceived of as entirely passive 
consumers of media: the spectator sits and watches television or movies, and 
action is replaced with contemplation (Best and Kellner, 1999). The new media is 
more interactive: the Web user is able to choose his/her own hypertextual reading 
path, create websites, and comment instantly on articles, video, and music. On the 
surface level, this increased interactivity appears to empower the user, offering 
the possibility of enabling individual and collective resistance.  
In this chapter, within the context of my ongoing discussion of network 
epistemic rhetoric, I provide a more extensive examination of Debord’s theory of 
the spectacle, relating that theory to the electronic discourse of blogs. The rhetoric 
of the Web, blogs included, is most often seen as more empowering than the 
discourse of the traditional media; I argue that, although it can in some cases 
empower the user, the interactive space of the Web also perpetuates and 
intensifies the spectacle. This chapter therefore, like Chapter Three, challenges 
the assumption, made by Berlin and other adherents of social epistemic rhetoric, 
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that technology is somehow inherently democratic. Further, a Debordian critique 
of blogs can be more productive than such a critique of social networking sites, 
because of the even greater individualism personal blogs encourage. Alienation is 
one of the key features and results of the spectacularization of society; this 
alienation is clearly reflected, and encouraged, within the Web by the discourse of 
blogs. Further, blog discourse illustrates the ways in which the subject is 
constructed and shaped by hegemonic forces, even within an electronic space that 
seems—on the surface— to encourage freedom through individualistic 
performance and subject exploration. On the other hand, I believe that blogs do 
offer the potential to become spaces for resistance, and if employed critically, 
could be a very potent tool in the composition classroom for empowering students 
and increasing community. Thus, I will consider the ways blogs may still offer the 
means for resistance and agency. Finally, I provide an extensive discussion of the 
possible benefits of deploying blogs in the classroom, continuing the discussion of 
multitude begun in the previous chapter by suggesting specific pedagogical 
strategies and uses for weblogs that can help create the kinds of rhizomatic 
communities essential to the radical, heterogeneous democracy advocated by 
Berlin. 
Spectacular Economy, Spectacular Society 
Debord (1967) makes clear that the spectacle is not simply another term 
for the media culture. As human life becomes ever more mediated by technology, 
electronic representations of existence become central to experience. But, as noted 
in Chapter One, the spectacle is not only a perpetual stream of media images: it is 
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“both the result and goal of the dominant mode of production…it represents the 
dominant model of life” (Debord, 1967, p. 12). In other words, the spectacle is 
both the base and the superstructure: economic production and cultural and social 
activity become inseperable. The individual spends time at work constructing and 
expanding the spectacle, and then spends their leisure time consuming it. Thus, 
“everything that was directly lived has receded into a representation,” as the 
individual’s actions (in the workplace) only contribute to the perpetuation of the 
spectacle which the worker then passively contemplates during non-working 
hours (Debord, 1967, p. 12). Image is privileged over the use-value of a product, 
and the exchange of images becomes the basis of production and the goal of 
work. 
Marx writes of being passing into having, and Debord argues that, in the 
society of the spectacle, having has passed into appearing (16). The social value 
of an object becomes based on its image, as status is derived from the display of 
commodities. The material thus gives way to the image. Debord writes: “The 
spectacle is the moment when the commodity has attained the total occupation of 
social life. The relation to the commodity is not only visible, but one no longer 
sees anything but it: the world one sees is its world” (1967, p. 42). Jameson 
(1991) argues that the postmodern period is marked by the collapse of the 
superstructure and base into one another— all cultural production is also 
commodity (p. xxi). In prior historical stages, including the modern period of 
capitalism, the economic and cultural spheres were separate. The emergence of 
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the society of the spectacle corresponds to the postmodern period of late capitalist 
production.  
In the period of late capitalism— in which all cultural production is 
commodified— all social life is connected to commodity, and society is defined 
by its relation to commodities (e.g. the workforce is a commodity that produces 
commodities for the purpose of earning money to purchase commodities). 
Further, social interaction becomes defined by the identification with and display 
of commodities; what is important is not the use-value of a commodity but its 
image. The image gains ascendancy over the original.  
Interactive Spectacle 
 Best and Kellner (1999) argue that we have entered a new stage of 
spectacle. As noted above, Debord’s conception of spectacle described both the 
cultural and economic mode of production. Media production and consumption 
do not encompass the term spectacle entirely, but they are important elements of 
its early stage as well as its current stage. Previously, the consumption of 
spectacular media was a largely passive affair: the viewer sat and watched 
television or films. Debord’s theory of spectacle assumes this model of media 
consumption. Of course, the new digital media of today is more interactive. This 
new interactivity has been championed by theorists as well as media corporations 
for its supposedly empowering effects on citizens and consumers (Everett, 2003, 
p. 16). While the new, more interactive media, specifically the World Wide Web, 
does offer the possibility for resistance (a topic to which I will return later), it 
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often falls short of delivering on such claims. And in some ways, the interactive 
media of the Web serves to reinforce and intensify the spectacle. 
While the interactivity of digital technology and the Web is often 
championed for its potential for collaboration and community building, increased 
alienation is one of the key characteristics of our spectacular network society. 
Debord writes, “The images detached from every aspect of life merge into a 
common stream in which the unity of life can no longer be recovered” (p. 12). In 
the society of the spectacle, all social interaction is mediated by technology and 
individuals can find “community” only through the constant stream of media 
images, sounds and words upon which all of society gazes. However, this social 
unity is false, as it is formed on the basis of representations that mediate 
experience and interaction, while encouraging participation only in 
individualistic, spectacular consumer culture. Thus, the interactivity of the Web 
most often does not empower the individual: lived experience passes away into 
representation within the artificial environment of cyberspace. The individual 
lives on the screen, interacting through the construction and proliferation of 
images and replacing human dialogue with the monologic discourse of the 
spectacle. Debord writes, “Spectators are linked only by a one-way relationship to 
the very center that maintains their isolation from one another. The spectacle thus 
unites what is separate, but it unites it only in its separateness” (p. 22).  
Political change, therefore, rather than being encouraged and enabled by 
the “interactive” Web and discursive activities such as blogging, is most often 
foreclosed by it. Users enroll themselves in a spectacular discursive space that all 
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but eliminates the possibility for collective action. Direct action is reduced to 
pointing and clicking a mouse, to typing on a keyboard. Blogs, although they can 
potentially encourage community, can be a particularly alienating digital 
discourse. Blogging, even more easily than participation in online social 
networks,  can become monologic performance. Social networking sites are built 
through online connections, however superficial, among people. A blog, however, 
can simply be a site in which the individual performs without regard for audience. 
This is seen most clearly in those blogs which function as “cyber-diaries,” online 
journals that chronicle an individual’s daily life. Such blogs can become a forum 
for individualistic expression, offering the façade of interactivity while providing 
a space for writers to fill and perform the subject positions provided to them by 
hegemonic governmental or corporate institutions. 
Further, the Web—and blogs— far from becoming primarily an electronic 
public sphere, and therefore an antidote to alienation, have contributed greatly to 
destruction of any kind of public sphere. Debord writes, 
At the root of the spectacle lies that oldest of all social divisions of labor, 
the specialization of power. The specialized role played by the spectacle is 
that of a spokesman for all other activities, a sort of diplomatic 
representative of hierarchical society in its own court, and the source of 
the only discourse which that society allows itself to hear. Thus the most 
modern aspect of the spectacle is also at the bottom the most archaic (p. 
19). 
 
Here Debord notes, much as Habermas argues, that the public sphere—rather than 
that space in liberal society in which civic matters were discussed and decided 
upon—now  resembles its archaic origins: the court in which royalty presented 
itself in all its ornamented glory (1989, p. 185).  This sphere is now the forum of 
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public relations in which power presents itself and establishes the discourse by 
which society understands and defines itself. As Hardt and Negri argue, in the 
society of the spectacle, the public sphere evaporates (2000, p. 321). On the one 
hand, it disappears because the spectacle isolates us, separating each individual 
through their attempt to find unity in the consumption of images and interaction 
on the screens of cyberspace.  This type of “interactivity” reinforces the idea that 
politicians are celebrities and lowers political participation to the level of 
participation in activities like sports entertainment. The lack of a space for 
political action, thus, emphasizes the spectacle of politics itself. On the other 
hand, the public sphere evaporates because constant surveillance universalizes the 
public (or to put it another way, privacy disappears).25  
Life on the Screen 
Much of the discussion of the empowering nature of interactive media on 
the Web has focused on the supposed freedom offered by the ability to move 
between (or even create) subject positions. As discussed throughout the previous 
chapters, many in the field of composition and rhetoric have argued that the Web 
encourages and reinforces the conception of the self—seen in poststructuralist as 
well as social epistemic rhetorical thought—as an entity that is both composed 
through discursive practices and embodies multiple subject positions. As we have 
also discussed, Berlin (1996) argued not only for such a conception of the self but 
also suggested that the subject could attain agency by moving among and 
inhabiting various subject positions. Interactive digital technology appears to offer 
                                                 
25 McGrath, in Loving Big Brother, argues that this can be a positive thing: if the one is always in 
public, than all of life is a performance. Conscious performance for the mechanisms of 
surveillance then can be used a tactic of resistance.  
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a means for the kind of subject position exploration advocated by Berlin, thereby 
aiding in the attainment of a central goal of social epistemic rhetoric—the 
empowerment of the individual through discourse production. However, it is clear 
from the previous analysis of online social networks, as well as the analysis of 
personal blogs that follows, that the supposed fluidity of the subject in digital 
spaces by no means guarantees empowerment or agency for the individual. 
Nonetheless, a number of new media theorists do argue that the Web 
offers a means to gain agency through the exploration of virtual identities. Sherry 
Turkle is an early, major proponent of this belief; her book, Life on the Screen, 
provides a study of identity formation on the Web. She argues that identity 
becomes malleable and fragmented in cyberspace because an individual can 
assume various identities within online communities, forums, or MUD’s, as s/he 
or he moves from site to site; individuals can even assume and present varying 
identities (by changing screen names) within a single online forum. Turkle writes, 
“[Participants] become authors not only of the text but of themselves, constructing 
new selves through social interaction” (qtd. by Gurak, 2001, p. 39). Turkle argues 
that the Web allows individuals to move between various subject positions and 
also provides them the means to consciously create or construct subject positions; 
in essence, they empower the individual to construct his/her own identity. Further, 
J. David Bolter (1999) similarly argues that the ability to move between various 
subject positions is the “major freedom our culture can now offer” (p. 245).  
Such claims regarding empowerment and freedom through the exploration 
or construction of subjectivity offered by the interactive media of the Web are 
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problematic. As noted earlier, Foucault (1982) makes clear that the individual 
does not create his or her own subject or choose to move at will between various 
subject positions. The discursive practices of institutions and disciplines create 
subject positions that may be filled “in certain conditions” by any number of 
people. Therefore, contrary to Turkle and Bolter, subjectivity cannot be 
constructed consciously by the individual nor can a subject move freely between 
various subject positions. Instead of offering freedom, interactive spectacular 
media, produced and distributed by institutions in the form of media corporations, 
play a central role in production of subjectivities that fit within the dominant, 
normalized ideological framework.  
Anne Everett (2003) argues that the Ideological Corporate Apparatus 
(ICA) has now displaced the Althusserian Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), as 
huge media conglomerates play a larger role in the reproduction of the dominant 
ideology than even the school, which previously was the most powerful ISA (p. 
13). According to Althusser, capitalist ideology is reproduced and the relations of 
production are maintained by the rhetorical practices of a wide range of societal 
institutions such as the school, family, church, and legal system. These 
institutions are examples of the ideological state apparatus (ISA). Such 
institutions normalize and maintain the status quo, a mode of production based on 
the exploitation of the worker, through ideology rather than violence. Schools, for 
example, teach knowledge and skills in ways that encourage submission to the 
dominant ideology and its practice—a process that can be clearly seen in those 
schools operating on the paradigms of meritocratic and liberal culture literacy.  
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 However, in the period of late capitalism, the school is no longer the most 
powerful ISA. As Everett asserts, the school has been replaced by the 
communications industry as the institution most responsible for the reproduction 
of the current material and social relations. As such, the ideological corporate 
apparatus (ICA) has replaced the ISA. As already huge media conglomerates 
merge,26 their power to influence and manipulate the individual increases. The 
ICA works much like the ISA, although now in a globalized and digital 
environment, enrolling the citizen in the late-capitalist mode of production 
through the management of knowledge and the creation and distribution of 
entertainment and products in ways that construct the subject solely as a 
consumer. The Web, because its content is heavily determined by multinational 
media corporations, most often offers a very limited range of subject positions, 
rather than the ability to move freely among them. As Laura Gurak notes, “[M]ore 
and more of the Internet is being used to make money, gather our personal 
information, protect corporate intellectual property, and encourage us to shop” 
(2001, p. 10). The Internet, because it emerged from the milieu of late capitalism, 
has always been a tool of the ICA: a rhetorical medium used to not only to 
perpetuate the oppressions and inequalities of current mode of production but also 
to limit rather than increase the agency of the citizen.  
Further, the interactivity of the Web encourages the spectacularization of 
life, as it encourages the conception and presentation of identity as image; indeed, 
it enables the user to piece together an online identity composed entirely of 
                                                 
26 The merger of AOL with Time Warner being the preeminent example of this phenomenon. 
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spectacular media images. Individuals construct personal websites, blogs, and 
homepages in online social networks by composing multi-media collages of 
spectacular culture. These sites are constituted by the media images with which 
the individual identifies—they are filled with images of the user and the popular 
spectacular culture (e.g. bands, cartoons, movie stars).27 Even the backgrounds of 
such sites can be composed of popular media images. Images from movies and 
television serve as the online avatars for members of online discussion forums—
many of which focus on discourse about spectacular media (e.g. discussions of 
sports teams and pop stars). Many forums even discuss commodities themselves., 
In this way, individuals present an image of themselves by listing all of their 
cultural tastes in the texts of homepages and blogs, further reinforcing their 
identification with spectacle. 
Spectacular Blogging 
 I define the personal blog genre for the purposes of this paper as weblogs 
created by individuals that concern those individuals’ reflections and opinions and 
that are (at least originally) an unpaid leisure activity—distinct specifically from 
those blogs that originate in the news media or just generally focus on politics. 
Most scholarly and popular and popular discourse concerning blogs has focused 
on political blogs; such blogs have thus been examined for their effect on 
traditional news sources, as well as their supposedly democratizing effect. 
Political blogs, however, only make up only three percent of the overall 
                                                 
27 The new media definitely play an important role in what Adorno and Horkhiemer call the 
“culture industry”: the Web is a site in which a infinite range of mass produced culture can be 
instantly called up with a click of the mouse. However, though the culture is mechanically 
reproduced in the era of the Web, it is no longer broadcast—it is narrowcast. 
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blogosphere; personal blogs account for a great majority of the overall number of 
blogs (Jones and Young, n.d, p. 6). Because they are not attached to media 
corporations, one might assume that personal blogs might be more resistant to 
spectacularization. Further, unlike many Web forums or all online social 
networks, personal blogs are not necessarily obsessed with the culture industry or 
owned by multinational media corporations. Nevertheless, many personal blogs 
can be understood as manifestations of the spectacle.  
 One example is “Dooce” (see Figure 1.), perhaps the most famous 
personal blog.28 Started in 2001 by Heather Armstrong, it gained national fame 
when the writer was fired from her job for posting blog entries about her 
workplace. The blog consists of entries that detail her day-to-day life. There is no 
particular topic or theme, the writer simply describes her life, offers reflections 
upon it, and posts pictures.What makes this blog unique is that the writer supports 
herself, and her husband, entirely on its proceeds—which she gathers from the 
companies that place advertisements on her page. Thus, her blog offers an 
excellent example of the commodification of life within the spectacle. Armstrong 
has turned her life into a public spectacle and draws enough devoted spectators 
that she is able to make a living from it. Armstrong’s chronicle of her personal life 
is so popular that multinational companies advertise on her blog: her daily life is 
juxtaposed with “dazzlingly” spectacular advertising. Further, she, and her blog, 
is well known enough that she has contributed to a print magazine, as the post 
below notes. 
                                                 
28 The information from this paragraph can be found by exploring the profile section of the blog, 
http://www.dooce.com.   
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Figure 1. Dooce. 
Of course, there are examples of personal blogs that are explicitly 
occupied with discussion, analysis and evaluation of popular spectacular culture. 
There are, for example, numerous wide ranging personal blogs focused on sports. 
Here I refer to the personal blogs started by writers that analyze, discuss, and 
opine on professional leagues, specific teams, even specific players. These blogs 
may be directly or indirectly related to the sports franchises themselves. The 
writers of these blogs are not employees of the teams— merely devoted fans who 
spend their time writing on the web about their favorite team. Sometimes such 
blogs are so successful that sports bloggers (specifically in the case of Major 
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League Baseball) have actually been hired by professional teams (Jones and 
Young, p. 9), or in the case of the blog seen below, hired by the sports network 
ESPN. Henry Abbott’s “True Hoop,” (see Figure 2.) was originally a personal 
blog focused on professional basketball. He gained such a wide readership that he 
was hired by ESPN and his blog is now part of the network’s website: 
 
Figure 2. True Hoop 
As one can see, this blog has been fully incorporated into the multinational 
corporate media: note both the ESPN logo, as well as the Hummer advertisement 
that supports the corporate network. It is tempting to view Abbot’s incorporation 
into ESPN as an example of capitalism recouping what had arguably been part of 
the “gift economy” of the Internet; that is, as an appropriation by a multinational 
corporation (ESPN is owned by Disney) of what had been a voluntarily produced 
free service/ forum for basketball fans. 
Instead, it may be more useful to consider such blogs examples of what 
Tiziana Terranova calls “free labor” (2004, p. 88): the labor that individuals 
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voluntarily contribute to the late capitalist digital economy through their 
participation in online activities such as blogging, chatting and message boarding. 
Terranova argues that this free labor is indicative of the subsumption of the digital 
culture and economy under late capitalism: 
Free labor is a desire of labor immanent to late capitalism, and late 
capitalism is the field that both sustains free labor and exhausts it. It 
exhausts it by subtracting selectively but widely the means through which 
that labor can reproduce itself: from the burnout syndromes of Internet 
start-ups to underretribution and exploitation in the cultural economy at 
large. Late capitalism does not appropriate anything: it nurtures, exploits, 
and exhausts its labor force and its cultural and affective production (2004, 
p. 94). 
 
From Terranova’s viewpoint, the free labor of blogging (along with other online 
activities) emerges from and perpetuates late capitalism; in other words digital 
production (cultural and otherwise) does not initially exist outside of capitalism, 
and is then recouped by it. Such production is immanent to late capitalism and 
sustains it. Thus, whether Henry Abbot produces “True Hoop” as a leisure activity 
for himself and fellow basketball fans, or receives a salary from ESPN to do so, 
he is engaged in free labor that constructs and perpetuates the late capitalist mode 
of production. 
Because they derive entertainment value from lively discussions of sports 
(or celebrities, or the fashion industry, or music, etc.), individuals contribute 
willingly and without recompense to the culture industry, volunteering, in 
essence, to contribute their labor to the maintenance and construction of 
multinational media empires through their personal blogs which essentially act as 
advertisements for specific teams and sports more generally. (It should be noted 
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here that not all sports blogs are positive—some are critical of team and league 
management. However, as the adage goes, any publicity is good publicity.) 
This blurring of the lines between work and leisure exemplified by “free 
labor” is another mark of the current ongoing emergence of the control society; it 
is also a mark of the new interactive stage of the spectacle. D.N. Rodowick writes 
that we are in the midst of “a long and brutal historical transformation that already 
has been taking place for some time wherein an industrial and disciplinary society 
yields to a cybernetic society of control and a modernist culture of representation 
is displaced by an increasingly digital and ‘audiovisual’ culture” (2001, p. 205). 
As noted in the previous chapter, the shift from the disciplinary society to the 
control society theorized most explicitly by Deleuze and the society of the 
spectacle described by Debord are not mutually exclusive theories of societal 
development. The Society of the Spectacle was written during and describes an 
early stage of the shift towards digital culture described by Rodowick. The cyber-
technology that enabled the construction of the control society was at a nascent 
stage; the shift from a culture of representation to one in which the image takes 
preeminence over the material was already well under way.  
In the control society, the lines between labor and leisure-time are nearly 
erased. On one hand, work for one’s employer is no longer confined to the 
workplace. For example, Rodowick notes that the Web, along with handheld 
digital devices, allow the workplace access to the worker at all times wherever 
s/he might be (p. 218). Further, the individual enrolls him/herself in these control 
mechanisms, subjecting themselves to constant surveillance, whether through the 
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purchase of GPS guidance systems for automobiles or through the use of a 
discount card at the grocery store that tracks one’s every purchase. 
On the other hand, the interactive, spectacular Web further blurs the lines 
between labor and leisure as it enables individuals to play an active part in 
constructing the spectacle through leisure activities like blogging. Previously, in 
the earlier stage of the spectacle, the individual spent his/he time at work 
constructing the spectacle and then consumed passively at home during leisure 
hours. In the control society, in which the interactive stage of the spectacle has 
emerged, the individual, as a leisure activity, can continue to construct the 
spectacle at home through personal blogs. This active participation increases the 
reach and strength of control over subjects in contemporary society, as 
“interaction” with spectacle increases the individual’s identification with it. 
Citizens of the control society provide free labor to a variety of 
entertainment corporations; it is important to note that the work of bloggers can 
benefit those who provide a form of entertainment as well as those who distribute 
that entertainment. For example, an individual who blogs about basketball or 
baseball benefits individual teams, the sports organization (the NBA or MLB) and 
the media corporations that broadcast games and provide coverage. Bloggers 
benefit the music, television, and film industries in a similar manner. This is, in 
many ways, much less innocuous than the spectacle-construction that occurs at 
work; individuals are unknowingly continuing to build the spectacle through a 
seemingly neutral entertainment activity. However, unlike the promotion of the 
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spectacle that occurs simply when one passively participates, individuals are 
actively but unknowingly creating the spectacle during their “free” time.  
Rhetorics of Resistance in the Blogosphere 
 Despite his description of the spectacle as a seemingly totalizing force, 
Debord does allow for the possibility of resistance. Indeed, we can find spaces of 
divergence and resistance in the blogosphere, just as we have found in online 
social networks. Rhetorics of difference and change can never be entirely 
eliminated from the dynamic network of the Web. Before considering examples 
of subversive or resistant blogging practices, it is useful to first consider Debord’s 
position on the possibility of resistance in the society of the spectacle in contrast 
to the position of Baudrillard, the theorist with whom Debord is most often 
identified. 
Debord’s commitment to the possibility of resistance is the reason his 
theory of spectacle is preferable to Baudrillard’s conception of simulation and 
simulacra, a theory of postmodernity that owes much to Debord’s work but takes 
it to a nihilistic extreme. Baudrillard (1999) writes, “Simulation is no longer that 
of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of 
real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (p. 2).29 According to Baudrillard, the 
sign no longer refers to reality, and referents with existence independent from 
representation exist no longer. They are simulacra, signs without originals. As 
Jameson notes, postmodernity is marked by the shift from a modern culture that 
                                                 
29 Brummett explains with an example: “In simulation the map proceeds, engenders, and 
generates the territory, in the sense that a map of Middle Earth is part of the mechanics of 
generation of the simulation which is Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings. In that sense a simulation is a 
set of signs that creates its own reality but refers to no reality outside itself” (12).  
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represents nature to a culture that only refers to other culture (1991, p. ix). The 
poles of reality and representation “implode” and we are left with representations 
of representations (Fiske qtd. by Brummett, 2003, p.12). 
 While Debord believes that in the society of the spectacle the 
representation has achieved ascendancy over reality (almost to the point that 
reality is completely obscured), he does not believe that the real is no more. Thus, 
unlike Baudrillard, his theory leaves open the possibility of resistance. As Best 
and Kellner write: 
Debord refused to abandon the attempt to interpret and change reality. 
Debord peered into the shadows of a reified unreality, but drew back to 
report and critique what he had seen; there is an implosion of opposites, 
but the separate poles retain their contradictory identity; illusion overtakes 
reality, but reality can be recuperated (p. 12). 
 
Although he recognizes that the spectacle may seem to be a totalizing force that 
completely overcomes and destroys reality, Debord makes clear that image and 
reality are still distinct and that the real still exists. Thus, the spectacle can be 
resisted through works of critical hermeneutics, of which Debord’s book is an 
example (Best and Kellner 1998, p. 12).  
Further, Debord advocates the practice of detournement: the rhetorical 
appropriation of spectacular culture and recontextualizing it so that it becomes 
explicitly oppositional to the spectacle (p. 146). Probably the most obvious 
example of contemporary detournement can be seen in the work of Adbusters (see 
Figure 3), a collective that alters and recontextualizes advertisements (or 
corporate brand icons), resignifying them so that their messages are oppositional 
to those originally intended by the advertisers. Thus, the cultural production of the 
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corporation is appropriated and turned against the corporation, and capitalism 
itself: 
 
Figure 3. Adbusters Spoof Ad.  
Detournement can put the power of resistance in the hands of ordinary people. In 
fact, as I will note in the following chapter, detournement can also be taught in the 
composition classroom as a particularly affective visual rhetorical strategy. 
In the age of interactive spectacle, possibilities for public detournement 
and other types of resistance are made possible through the public nature of the 
Web. Possibly the widest ranging and most important impact of the Web has been  
its democratization of the top-down, hierarchical, corporate media. And more 
specifically, the emergence of the weblog, in comparison to other genres of 
electronic Web-based discourse (such as email, Webpages, or online social 
networks), has had perhaps the most profoundly democratizing effect on the mass 
media. Before considering the effects of blogging on mediated public discourse, it 
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is important to note the ways in which the Web itself has opened up the 
mediascape to wider range of voices, including those resistant to the spectacle. 
Because the Web is more open and not subject to many of the forms of direct 
control to which the traditional media is subject, it can provide a platform from 
which works of critical hermeneutics and detournement can be distributed. For 
example, the full text of Society of the Spectacle is available on two separate 
websites along with a number of other Situationist documents including examples 
of detournement created by the Situationists.30 The Web can also facilitate the 
creation of detournement. Digital technology allows for the quick and easy 
manipulation of images—with access to the Web, a wide range of people can 
appropriate images by downloading them and then resignifying them to create 
oppositional meanings. In fact, with the advent of open source photo editing tools 
like Pixel, this type of resistance has become much easier. And, of course, the 
Web is a space in which a large number of people can then view such artifacts of 
resistance. Several websites that feature detourned images already exist. For 
example, Adbusters has a website which offers a number of examples of 
detourned advertisements. The networked nature of the Web provides the 
possibility that even the attempt to resist through detournement can be seen by 
many. In 2001 emails between Johan Peretti and Nike became widely known to 
the public through circulation on the Internet. The emails concerned Peretti’s 
unsuccessful attempt to customize his personalizable Nike I.D. shoes with the 
word “sweatshop” (McCaughey, 2003 p.10).  
                                                 
30 The Situationists were a collective of artists and thinkers that formed in the late 60’s in France. 
Debord was a central member. 
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Further, the Web provides a space in which the alienating effects of the 
spectacle may be overcome by facilitating the organization of collective 
resistance. The Web has, for example become instrumental in the organizations 
and actions of the labor movement. Union leaders and activists, have used the 
web to create permanent outlets for information pertaining to labor’s struggle for 
social and economic justice. Activists, who have created websites such as 
“LaborNet,” “Cyber-picketline” and “Labourstart,” use the web to provide 
information to members and the public concerning meetings, strikes, boycotts.31 
However, the weblog has had perhaps the most profoundly democratizing 
effect on the media. Theorists of rhetoric and composition have been particularly 
attentive to how the discourse and rhetoric of blogs has transformed the 
mediascape. As Dennis Jerz (2003) notes, “Weblogs are changing the rhetoric of 
hyperlinks, challenging the dominant models of mass communication (in which 
professionals determine what news is worth reporting and what is worth 
ignoring), and exposing hundreds of thousands of non-programmers to the 
experience of publishing online.” Although much of the scholarship on blogs in 
the field has thus far focused on pedagogy, scholarship on rhetorical theory is also 
very useful for defining and analyzing the ways that blogs have fundamentally 
altered media discourse and perhaps generally changed the dominant model of 
mass media. 
                                                 
31 The most famous success has been the mid-nineties cyber-campaign against Bridgestone tires. 
In 1994, Bridgestone illegally fired 2300 striking workers. An Internet campaign was launched 
and the transnational corporation was so overwhelmed with messages that in 1996 it capitulated, 
rehiring all of the fired workers (Herod, 1998, p. 25). 
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Kathleen Welch (2004) argues that the vocabulary of rhetoric needs to be 
applied to blogs because such an application reveals that blogs certainly employ a 
sophistic rhetoric. Richard Lanham’s discussion of the parallels between 
complexity theory and rhetoric, mentioned in Chapter Two, is again helpful. To 
recap, Lanham (1993) argues that sophistic rhetoric can be understood as an open, 
emergent system that challenges the closed and static system of Platonic and 
Aristotelian philosophy. Similarly, the discourse of weblogs can perhaps be 
understood as sophistic rhetoric that challenges the entrenched, static and top-
down discourse of the mainstream media.32 Isocrates, for example, encourages a 
multi-perspectival approach to knowledge, viewing knowledge as dynamic and 
shifting, based on individual experience and the cultural contexts surrounding the 
individual in a specific moment. The rhetoric of blogs is similarly dynamic, 
incorporating multiple perspectives and changing as each new voice is added. 
Further, blogs are formed in response to specific cultural moments, strongly 
connected to culture by the experiences of varying individuals. Finally, blogs 
democratize knowledge and Truth, providing a voice to anyone with the ability to 
manipulate the genre. This can be compared to Isocrates’ argument that truth and 
knowledge are available to and indeed constructed by anyone who can be taught 
rhetoric. (This, of course, is in opposition to Plato’s and Aristotle’s belief in a 
static and absolute Truth that is available only to the philosopher.) In contrast to 
the rhetoric of blogs, the discourse of the mainstream media is centralized, closed, 
and authoritarian. It always corresponds to a Truth: the normalized ideological 
                                                 
32 As Jerz notes, blogs are indeed emergent systems. 
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framework that determines the acceptable range of political opinion. And this 
mainstream media discourse is transmitted downward from an authoritarian and 
an ever-increasingly centralized force—the multinational media corporation. The 
sophistic rhetoric of blogs offers an alternative to the closed, top-down system of 
the mainstream media—an alternative that may perhaps force that system to 
change permanently towards a more democratic and open system of public 
communication.  
Political blogging has perhaps had greatest effect on the mediascape; blogs 
such as the DailyKos and Talking Points Memo have done the most to “level the 
playing field” to allow more voices to have an impact in the political arena. 
Talking Points Memo, started by Josh Marshall, for example originally broke the 
news that the U.S. Justice Department had perhaps illegally fired nine U.S. 
Attorney Generals.33 However, at least in the U.S., although it has allowed greater 
access to the political arena, and provided the opportunity for a wider range of 
voices, political blogging most often operates within the normalized ideologies of 
the country.34 Most political discussion on blogs is framed within the debate 
between the two major political parties, both of which support neoliberal 
capitalism. Political blogging has thus been a limited site for discourse that is 
truly resistant to the hegemonic order; in fact, it  perhaps perpetuates hegemony 
by providing examples of political discourse which can be falsely labeled “far 
                                                 
33 See Paul McLeary (2007). 
34 Personal blogs have also become a space for public intellectual: academics such as Michael 
Berube share thoughts and critique with a wide, non-academic audience, thereby bridging the gap 
between the academic and the public that has widened over the 50 years (Kates 382-385). 
However, like political blogs, most “academic” blogs also operate within the norms of mainstream 
politics. 
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left” by the mainstream old media, which results in the marginalization of truly 
leftist voices to the fringes of acceptable discourse.  
Personal blogs offer the possibility for resistance in the blogosphere not 
yet seen in the realm of political blogging.  This potential is still largely 
unrealized. However, a number of personal blogs exist that demonstrate the ways 
in which this electronic genre could perhaps become an important site for 
resistance to the spectacle. Blogs have begun to be used as tools for worker 
organization and activism. Personal blogs such as those written by Eric Lee, 
founder of the LabourStart website and author of The Labour Movement and the 
Internet, focus on the discussion of the organization and resistant activities of the 
labor movement. Blogs could be a particularly useful means of communication in 
the activist community, whatever the cause, because of the ease in which they can 
be started and maintained. Further, blogs can enable resistance to proceed on the 
Web in a rhizomatic fashion, bypassing the need for centralized sources of 
information and communication.  
“Wal-Mart Sucks” (see Figure 4.) provides a useful example of the 
personal blog as  site of worker resistance. The blog is maintained and moderated 
by Kenneth J. Harvey, a novelist and activist. Harvey contributes little to the blog; 
it consists almost entirely of posts by employees of Wal-Mart, documenting the 
unethical and illegal actions of the company. Most posts concern the experiences 
of hourly workers: for example, the testimony of an employee who was fired for 
attempting to take a week off to care for her dying father, or the testimony of 
another employee who was fired for declining to accept a certificate recognizing 
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him for 10 years of employment. The blog also includes posts by salaried 
managers  
 
Figure 4. Wal-Mart Sucks 
exposing Wal-Mart’s unethical treatment of employees. Although this blog may 
have a limited effect on company or governmental policy, it does provide a public 
space for employees to air their grievances and contribute to the public debates 
over the company and the neoliberal practices that have led to its unparalleled 
growth and power.35 
Personal blogs can also perhaps become sites of resistance through 
detournement. “Byrneunit,” (see Figure 5.) is an example of a blog that 
demonstrates at least the potential for detournement in the blog genre. (However, 
                                                 
35 It should be noted that it is impossible to verify the claims that are posted to this blog. The 
overall effectiveness of the blog is therefore compromised by its questionable ethos. 
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because its content is not politically committed, it cannot be considered an 
example of detournement.) The writers (a married couple) take pictures of their 
television during selected programming (usually culturally-ridiculous 
programming like Beverly Hills 90210) and then display these still shots along 
with commentary.  
 
Figure 5. Byrneunit 
While their comments are ironic and humorous rather than oppositional, the blog 
does force the reader outside the normal relationship to television, providing a 
distance in which the reader is made particularly aware of the artificiality of the 
screen. There are several layers of screens, or mediation, that separate the viewer 
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from the subjects of this blog: the computer screen, the screen of digital camera 
used to capture the television screen, and the television camera used to film the 
actors. Finally, the couple uploads the pictures they’ve taken of their television 
screen into Flickr, an online site for the storage and display of digital photos. 
Byrneunit thus illustrates the Baudrillardian critique of late capitalist society: they 
exemplify his concept of simulation and simulacra: we see several layers of 
representation and mediation, but there exists no original from which these 
representations proceed. Although this blog is not an example of detournement, it 
does perhaps demonstrate the possibility that Debord’s favored form of cultural 
criticism could be performed within the genre of the blogs. Detournement could 
perhaps be created, for example, if the screen shots featured on “Byrneunit” were 
paired with oppositional, rather than simply humorous, commentary. 
 While blogging does hold the potential to become a resistant activity, it is 
important to mention that examples of resistant blogs are still few and far 
between. Though blogs have opened up the mediascape to a wider range of 
voices, most people tend to use the electronic genre for discursive activities that 
either actively perpetuate the hegemonic order, or at the very least operate within 
the norms of the status quo.  
Blog Pedagogy 
As noted in the previous chapter, if resistance and agency is possible in the 
network society it must be fostered through the creation of communities based on 
the concept of multitude. Berlin wrote (1996) of the importance of classroom 
discussion and debate as preparation for participation in democratic society, and 
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supported a conception of community and democracy as a dynamic heterogeneous 
network of individuals. One of the goals of network epistemic rhetoric must be 
the encouragement of such discourse communities in the composition classroom 
in order to help create a democracy of the multitude in the future. This kind of 
rhizomatic community can be fostered by requiring students to practice 
composing weblogs as an electronic genre of writing. 
Much of the work on blogs (the little that has been done) within the field 
of composition and rhetoric has largely focused on how writing teachers can take 
advantage of the changes that Jerz notes and enable students themselves to 
participate in and profit from the democratization of the mediascape. Blogs are 
championed as a way to introduce students to online publishing, providing novice 
writers access to the digital public sphere. Blogs are also used in classrooms to 
encourage and enable collaborative and collective writing. Barclay Barrios’ 
(2005) article, “Blogs: A Primer,” provides an introduction to the genre of blogs, 
offering suggestions about how teachers and researchers can enter the 
blogosphere and how they can enable students to do so as well.    
 Further, both Colin Brooke (2005) and Clancey Ratliff (2006) argue that 
blogs have the potential to build community and enable collaboration in the 
writing classroom. Brooke argues that blogs can help to make a class closer and 
better connected while also helping to de-center it by enabling connections 
beyond the classroom and altering traditional instructor-focused power relations. 
That is, as Brooke puts it, blogs can potentially have both centripetal and 
centrifugal effects in the classroom. They can both pull the class inward, linking 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 126
the class closer together, while also connecting the classroom to the outside. He 
argues that blogs can help foster a sense of community in the classroom while 
highlighting the blog in the classroom context as part of a “small network” (the 
network of other blogs created by students in the class) that links to any number 
of other texts outside of that network. Students can thus participate in the public 
sphere by linking to and posting (or “publishing”) responses to articles, websites, 
news items, etc on their personal blogs.  Further, blogs can help shift focus away 
from the central presence of the instructor and encourage rhizomatic rather than 
hierarchical classroom relations. Students can respond to each other’s writing, 
instead of directing all classroom discourse back towards the instructor. The 
public web of student posts and student responses to those posts emerges and 
evolves on its own. While the instructor may contribute, his/her posts and 
responses are just part of the network— classroom discourse needn’t always flow 
back towards him or her. Although the instructor is an audience for the blog posts 
and the student responses to those posts, s/he is but one potential audience. (Of 
course, it is therefore essential to emphasize to students that what they write can 
be viewed by anyone with access to the web.) It is worth noting that this further 
affirms the previous arguments regarding ability to change power flows inherent 
in the sophistic nature of the Web.  
Ratliff notes that blogs can help foster a “close community ethos in the 
classroom.” She accomplishes this by encouraging students to blog on topics of 
their own choosing and grading only on participation. Students can learn about 
each other and share ideas and opinions by reading and commenting upon each 
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other’s blogs. Additionally, students can become closer on a personal level as they 
share ideas and opinions together through the informal genre of the blog. Ratliff 
suggests that a central focus on the instructor can be further lessened by the 
institution of a grading policy based only on participation. Further, the discursive 
space of the blog can provide opportunities to “speak” for students who might be 
silenced in the face-to-face classroom, helping to ensure that each member of the 
discourse network has a distinct voice. Although blogging as part of a 
composition course admittedly does not create the “achieved utopia” that Faigley 
(1992) suggested the networked classroom might be, it does provide the 
possibility for otherwise marginalized students to come to voice. The centrifugal 
and centripetal effect blogging has on the small network of the classroom creates 
a discursive community that can be understood as a multitude: de-centered and 
heterogeneous but coherent.  
Though the blogging assignments I have developed are less open-ended 
and more formal than the assignments suggested by Ratliff, I have found that 
student blogging can produce critical and engaging writing as well as a classroom 
“multitude.” Blogging plays a major role in a course I have developed that 
focuses on issues of globalization and new media, which I will detail further in 
the final chapter. The course involves a strong emphasis on the production of 
digital texts, including blogs. Students are required to create, among other digital 
texts, “News Blogs.” As part of a unit on corporate media and digital technology, 
students read, watch, listen to, and then critique a variety of news sources, looking 
specifically for bias, filters, and commercial sensibilities prevalent throughout the 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 128
multinational news mediascape. To create their News Blogs, students first find 
and link to news stories (or clips from television or radio news). They then post 
detailed responses to each story, commenting on both content and the 
aforementioned factors. Students are provided an assignment sheet that prompts 
them to consider a range of specific questions: 
? What is your reaction to the news piece?  
? Did you already know about the issue? If so, did the piece provide you 
with any new information? Did it leave any important information out? 
Did it change your thinking about the issue or other issues? Why or 
why not? 
 
? Do you detect a political bias in the news piece? Some news sources 
are explicit about their political bias. How does this come out in the 
piece? Other news sources are not explicit about a political bias but 
have one nonetheless. Try to identify it based on how the information 
is presented in the piece.  
 
? Some questions to consider when identifying bias: 
? Whose point of view does the news piece emphasize? 
? What assumptions does the story seem to be based upon? 
? Does the story seem to leave any information out? 
? Does the news piece contain any commentary or opinion? 
If so, are the assertions made backed up with evidence? 
 
? Does the news piece use images? If so, describe them and explain how 
they affect your reaction to the piece. Are images used to support a 
specific point of view on the issue?36 
 
Students are asked not only to locate and post news items on a specific 
issue but also to critically engage with both the topic and the presentation of the 
topic. Students are also asked to compare the ways that various news sources deal 
                                                 
36 The original assignment sheet, for paper-based “News Logs,” was developed (2004) in 
collaboration with Charlie Potter and Regina Martin. 
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with a single issue; this helps students identify political biases and the rhetorical 
strategies used to frame a story in a particular light. It can also help students to 
recognize the biases in the most seemingly “neutral” types of resources (i.e. 
corporate national newspapers and network television news programs). In other 
words, I have found that students, no matter their political affiliation, can 
generally detect bias in sources that are overwhelmingly politically left or right 
(i.e. Fox News or The Nation) but are less adept at looking for bias in publications 
like USA Today. This thorough comparison of different types of sources, I found, 
helps students recognize the ways in which news that professes neutrality is often 
quite biased or slanted. 
Student participation in this blogging assignment can also help create a 
classroom multitude: a simultaneously close knit yet de-centered community that 
preserves and values difference. Having taught this assignment both as a 
traditional journaling exercise, and as a blogging assignment, I believe that the 
News Blogs can inspire more student discussion, and allow for the expression of a 
wider range of opinions. Through commenting on each other’s posts students can 
develop an online rapport that not possible in face-to-face discussions held over 
traditional “news journals.” The ability, provided by blogs, for everyone in the 
class to read the news stories posted by students as well as student comments on 
those stories can create a common basis for discussion and political debate. 
Further, students may be more willing, in an online environment, to state and 
argue for unpopular opinions on current news stories and issues. 
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Conclusion 
Despite a few example of exceptions in the classroom and beyond, one 
can clearly see that the World Wide Web is not a utopian space for democracy 
and free information. In many cases, the Web intensifies the spectacle, 
contributing to the growth and development of the contemporary mode of 
production and culture based primarily on the reproduction and exchange of 
images. It also can work to further intensify the alienation felt so strongly 
throughout contemporary society: individuals spend their leisure time at separate 
computer screens actively developing the spectacle, and the possibility for 
collective resistance becomes ever dimmer. But as Debord makes clear, the 
spectacle is not totalizing; and—as seen in this chapter and the last—the Web, 
because it is an emergent network, can also never be totalized. The weblog has the 
potential to greatly increase the number of voices to be heard on topics large and 
small, grave and trivial. While the blog has provided a means for individuals to 
voluntarily provide “free labor” that contributes to the growth and power of the 
spectacle, it has also provided the means for individuals and organizations to 
challenge the hegemony of the corporate, top-down media. And although blogs 
have perhaps increased the alienation of many by offering the means for 
engagement in individualistic performance, they may also help to foster 
connection and empower the multitude, by allowing wider access to the public 
sphere and offering a virtual space in which rhizomatic communities can grow. 
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Chapter Five: 
Global Culture, Global Campus 
In this concluding chapter, I will, much like Berlin (1996) in Rhetorics, 
Poetics, and Cultures, attempt to apply my mostly theoretical development of 
“network epistemic rhetoric” to the classroom. I will argue that a cultural studies 
approach to composition instruction advocated by Berlin and others has become 
increasingly important in the emerging network society, but I will emphasize that 
such an approach must be explicitly grounded in a student-centered approach to 
learning.  A cultural studies approach to composition is necessary for students 
growing and learning in our network society because it allows for the critique and 
production of multi-modal and multi-genre texts while maintaining a focus on the 
forces of subjectivity, ideology, and power that have become especially dynamic 
in the current historical moment.     
The pedagogical model outlined by Berlin (1996) is one of the most 
prominent models of cultural studies oriented composition and focuses on 
teaching students to become aware of and critique cultural codes. Over time, of 
course, the use of cultural studies in the composition classroom has been critiqued 
by a number of scholars in the field.37 I will briefly examine a critique of cultural 
studies in the composition classroom which is particularly salient in our hyper-
mediated world: the critique of cultural studies from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
                                                 
37 Nedra Reynolds in “Interrupting Our Way to Agency”  argues that both the original theorists of 
cultural studies, such as Hall, as well as those who advocate its use in the composition classroom, 
do not give adequate attention to issues of gender, and in fact ignore the contributions of women 
to cultural studies. From another perspective, Susan Miller criticizes cultural studies for placing 
too much emphasis on reading and analyzing texts, and not enough emphasis on the production of 
texts (207-210). 
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which has been leveled most vehemently by Victor Vitanza (1991) and most 
elaborately by Marshall Alcorn (2002). Both Vitanza and Alcorn argue that 
cultural studies is ineffectual in the composition classroom because theorists who 
advocate such an approach assume the existence of an autonomous free subject in 
the classroom that is contradicted by these theorists own postmodern theorization 
of the subject. Further, they both argue that advocates of cultural studies ignore 
the role played by irrational desire or emotional attachment in the subject’s 
identification with ideology. Thus, they argue, purely rational critique of ways 
that dominant ideologies determine the framework with which we view the world 
will never result in a changed subject who will be motivated to take part in social 
action. One of the chief targets of criticism from both Vitanza and Alcorn is 
Berlin’s social epistemic rhetoric, as both a theoretical and pedagogical model. 
They both argue, basically, that Berlin assumes the rational critique of cultural 
texts will transform the student subject—that if students are simply exposed to the 
ways that discourse normalizes the current, oppressive system of power, then they 
will become active agents of resistance to that hegemonic order. I will consider 
this critique in greater detail and note that, while it is flawed because of its 
misreading of Berlin, it is nonetheless relevant to the challenge of teaching 
rhetoric and composition in a network culture in which, as Terranova (2004) 
argues, persuasion is largely accomplished through spectacle and affect rather 
than reasoned argument. I will then argue that critical pedagogy offers the means 
to effectively address the role of emotion in ideological critique and that, if we 
wish to transform the student subject in our emerging network society, such an 
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approach should be combined with a cultural studies pedagogy that maintains a 
commitment to critical technological literacy. Additionally, I will provide a 
detailed narrative account of my own cultural studies course focused on 
globalization as an example of a pedagogy that maintains a student-centered 
approach to learning and a strong focus on technology. I will conclude with a 
summary of the major conclusions that I have reached over the course of 
developing this project. And so, in this final chapter, I will consider some of the 
challenges the field faces as we try to create a network epistemic rhetoric that not 
only addresses the theoretical questions of the day, but can also be successfully 
brought to bear in the classroom.                        
Models of Cultural Studies in Composition    
 Beyond being defined as the interdisciplinary study of culture—described 
not as high art, but, as Raymond Williams (1983) argues, “a whole way of life” 
that must be studied in relation to material production—cultural studies has been 
for some time the basis for various strains of pedagogy in the field of composition 
and rhetoric (6). In the late eighties, scholars in the field, influenced by the work 
of cultural studies theorists such as Williams and Stuart Hall and postmodern 
theory more generally, began to advocate the application of the theories of 
cultural studies to the composition classroom. It is important to note that these 
scholars were not only influenced by cultural studies theorists but also by theorists 
of critical pedagogy, such as Paulo Freire, Myles Horton and Ira Shor. Joe 
Marshall Hardin (2001) notes that Freire was the primary influence on a number 
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of central figures in the application of cultural studies to composition (p. 45).38 
Theorists such as Lester Faigley, Henry Giroux, and, of course, Berlin, used 
cultural studies to examine the ways in which the composition classroom serves to 
reproduce dominant economic and cultural ideologies and the ways in which the 
composition classroom might become a site of resistance.                                        
 Before continuing I must first address the question of what definition of 
cultural studies this chapter will be using. Hardin (2001) establishes three major 
models of reproduction upon which cultural studies pedagogies are based: the 
“economic-reproduction model,” the “cultural-reproduction model” and the 
“hegemonic-state model.” The economic-reproduction model is based largely on 
the work of Althusser (1971) who argues that Ideological State Apparatuses such 
as the institutional structures of the school, church, and family reproduce the 
relations of production of the dominant economic ideology—capitalism (p. 1489). 
The cultural-reproduction model is based on the work of Bourdieu and argues that 
the school, along with other cultural institutions, reproduces hierarchical class 
structure by promoting the tastes of the elite as the cultural norm (Hardin, 2001, p. 
41). The hegemonic-state reproduction model is derived from the work of 
Gramsci, whereby the consent of the oppressed is obtained through discursive and 
institutional practices that identify the values of the elite with those of the lower 
classes (Hardin, 2001, p. 41).               
This chapter will operate upon the basis of a cultural studies pedagogy that 
relies on the first model of economic-reproduction. Berlin—and Alcorn who 
                                                 
38 It can be plausibly argued in fact that many of those who advocated the pedagogical use of 
cultural studies were attempting to find a way to bring the theories of Freire, whose work is 
focused on the education of the South American poor, to North American universities. 
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makes Berlin a central target of his critique of cultural studies and composition— 
proceed from Althusser’s understanding of ideology as the “‘conceptual 
framework’ through which humans have agreed to interpret and make meaning of 
their experiences” (Alcorn, 2002, 40). Generally, therefore, cultural studies 
pedagogy seeks to enable students to examine and critique cultural texts in order 
to understand the ways in which the dominant ideology serves to structure their 
understanding of experience and their own selves, thereby learning that texts 
reflect ideological and cultural conflicts and are the sites of such conflicts 
(Faigley, 1992, 72). The goal of this critique is the conscious understanding of the 
process by which one is subjected to dominant powers and the eventual active 
resistance to that subjugation. Ideological critique is accomplished through the 
examination and analysis of cultural codes that serve to privilege and reproduce 
the dominant ideology.  
The Psychoanalytic Critique of Cultural Studies 
 Vitanza (1991) states that, while there is no third group of theorists in 
composition, there might exist a “molecular agglomerate” that forms a fifth 
column in opposition to both of (what he considers to be) the two major schools 
of thought in the field: a group that is comprised of cognitivists, expressivists, and 
current-traditionalists on the one hand, and those who favor social-epistemic 
rhetoric on the other, or, as he also labels the two groups, the foundationalists and 
the anti-foundationalists (p. 142). Thus, Vitanza’s critique of social-epistemic is 
also a critique of cultural studies in composition. He fully rejects the 
foundationalists, agreeing with the critique forwarded by advocates of social 
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epistemic rhetoric: that the foundationalist approach perpetuates a pedagogy 
based on capitalism and consumerism and that such is an inappropriate base upon 
which to construct composition pedagogy. However, while he agrees with the 
aims of social-epistemic rhetoric—that is, to create a rhetoric and pedagogy that 
does not operate on the assumption that the current mode of production is good 
and normal (as a pedagogy based on this assumption leads to the perpetuation of 
that assumption in the student)—he believes that it, too, is flawed. Vitanza claims 
that the proponents of social-epistemic rhetoric are not “suspicious enough” as 
they continue to place faith in rational thought, and hold onto Enlightenment 
myths of liberation. Vitanza cites Lyotard (1984), arguing that the supporters of 
social-epistemic rhetoric fail to recognize that, as Lyotard writes, “reason and 
power are one and the same thing” (Lyotard qtd by Vitanza, 1991,142). Reason is 
inherently oppressive as it cuts off and forecloses any acknowledgement of the 
role played by desire, and therefore any emancipatory pedagogy based on it is 
doomed to fail.                                               
Vitanza offers Berlin and Henry Giroux as examples of two anti-
foundationalists who have a strong penchant for rationalism. He writes, “Both 
speak of the contradictions in society and the curriculum, which must be laid bare 
so that students can ‘resist’” (p. 142). In both cases, students gain awareness of 
these contradictions through rational critique. This, of course, is problematic 
because, as Vitanza correctly notes, Berlin and Giroux are anti-foundationalists 
and base their pedagogical theories on poststructuralist epistemology: it is 
discourse that constructs the subject (who is unstable, fragmented and comprised 
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of numerous subject positions), as well social and material conditions (Giroux 
1992, Berlin 1996). The subject is therefore not a reasonable being of the 
Enlightenment, who is in complete control of either his/her language or actions. In 
other words, the rational understanding of a contradiction in society doesn’t 
necessarily translate to the desire for active resistance.     
This critique is particularly salient in a society in which discourse is 
overwhelmingly spectacular and persuasion is most often accomplished with 
affect, or pathos, rather than reason. Terranova’s (2004) work on network culture, 
like Vitanza’s and Alcorn’s, forces us to reconsider one of the most dearly held 
beliefs in the field of composition and rhetoric—that rational discourse is the key 
to a civil, just society, and essential to political change. Terranova’s assertion that 
(rational) meaning is subordinated to affect in informational cultures 
problematizes this assumption. If information is defined as that which stands out 
from noise, only that which is simple, easily identifiable, and replicable will get 
through to a wide range and number of people in a network culture overloaded 
with electronic noise. Rational, logical argument is often far too complicated to 
get through all the noise—feelings however, are a different story. In the digital 
age, whether in the context of a classroom or the arena of national politics, it may 
be far easier to convince a group of people to feel a certain way, than to persuade 
them all to agree to with a specific argument.  
The use of pathetic appeals to persuade individuals or “the masses” to 
believe or act a certain way has been the concern of rhetoricians since classical 
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times.39 Emotional appeals can indeed be dangerous, as they are often used by the 
powerful to override or obscure that which is rationally in the best interest of the 
people. Thomas Frank (2003), for example, argues that the success of the 
Republican Party in recent years has been largely due to their campaigning on 
emotional (and religious) issues such as abortion and gay marriage, which lead 
uneducated and poor citizens to ignore the economic policies of the Party and 
vote against their own economic interests. The emotional issue trumps the 
economic policy that requires rational understanding. The powerful have used 
similar rhetorical tactics throughout the course of history. 
The question becomes: what makes the current historical moment any 
different? I believe that it isn’t a difference in kind, but of degree. Just as Jameson 
(1991) argues that the postmodern period is an acceleration and intensification of 
the conditions of the modern period, the current historical moment from which the 
network society is emerging can be viewed as an intensification of the 
postmodern culture and economy. As such, the commodification of culture is 
accelerated (as independent or subcultural art is recouped by the corporation as 
quickly as it appears), while forms of mediation are multiplied and spread 
throughout all aspects of experience. Electronic noise saturates experience, and 
drowns out meaning—rational expression and understanding— on a scale never 
seen before. A space apart from this noise, or from commodified culture which 
perpetuates hegemony, becomes less and less a possibility. Thus, the subject or 
                                                 
39 See Aristotle’s (1991) On Rhetoric. 
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group is shaped and controlled by affective rhetorics that encompass nearly all 
experience.  
As Terranova writes, political success in the network culture “boils down 
to…the capacity to synthesize not so much a common position (from which to 
win the masses over) but a common passion giving rise to a distributed movement 
able to displace the limits and terms within which the political constitution of the 
future is played out” (p. 156, emphasis mine). This assertion certainly complicates 
cultural studies-oriented composition pedagogy which depends on what Braun 
might call the “democratic hope” that students will critique rationally and respond 
with some kind of consensus-based action to texts that perpetuate hegemonic 
cultural values. Terranova’s work also lends support to the critiques of Vitanza 
and Alcorn, and makes clear that any kind of cultural studies pedagogy cannot 
rely upon the assumption that rational understanding alone can transform human 
subjectivity and promote social change. Her insights point to the great need for 
research into as well as theoretical and pedagogical responses to the shift towards 
affect in the persuasive discourse of the network culture, and the importance of 
addressing the role of emotion in the classroom. In other words, we must enable 
students to critique and produce affect-driven arguments, but in order to persuade 
them that such critical and creative work is important, we must engage them 
emotionally in the classroom.         
 Despite the psychoanalytic critique, I argue that the cultural studies 
pedagogy of Berlin is still essential to the education of our students in 
composition and rhetoric in the digital age. For one thing, the critiques of Vitanza 
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and Alcorn are flawed by their assumption that the pedagogy described by Berlin 
will be carried out in a traditional, teacher-centered classroom. If this were the 
case, then indeed, Berlin would be relying on the rational understanding of 
injustice to motivate a transformation of the student subject. Indeed, there are 
times when Berlin does seem to assume a rational student subject. However, it is 
clear from a closer reading of his work that he intended his classroom to be a site 
of critical pedagogy and “affective learning,” in which students were transformed 
not just by rational awareness, but by emotional engagement in the process of 
learning. The pedagogy of network epistemic rhetoric must make this 
commitment to critical pedagogy, and therefore the importance of both the 
rational and affective engagement of the student subject, more explicit. But 
cultural studies still must play a central role in this pedagogy, as it opens the 
possibility for the humanities, and particularly those engaged in the study of 
rhetoric (whether student or teacher), to move beyond the critique and production 
of traditional, print texts; it opens the way for us to engage with and create a wide 
range of multi-modal texts: digital, visual and audio. Much as cultural studies 
pushed traditional English studies beyond a narrow focus on a canon of texts 
deemed worthy examples of literary art, cultural studies can provide a theoretical 
framework for rhetorical studies to engage with a range of multi-modal artifacts. 
 What is needed is a cultural studies pedagogy, informed by critical 
pedagogy’s focus on emotion and holistic learning, that maintains a focus on 
critical technological literacy and teaches students to both critique and produce 
arguments based on affect. This pedagogy should not only affectively engage 
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students, it should enable them to understand how they are persuaded by appeals 
to pathos, and employ those appeals themselves—in both print and digital genres. 
A Dialogic Option: Critical Pedagogy and Affective Learning    
In Vitanza’s and Alcorn’s descriptions of cultural studies pedagogy, both 
seem to assume that such courses will follow a traditional, teacher-centered 
approach to pedagogy. Vitanza makes no mention of the influence of critical 
pedagogy on the development of social epistemic rhetoric. And Alcorn, for 
example, writes, “[C]ultural studies often assumes that if we teach politically 
correct knowledge, we can generate politically correct practice and make political 
decisions to help those that suffer” (p. 5).  Alcorn writes of cultural studies 
pedagogy as though it operates under the assumption that students can be 
changed, and thereby be motivated to change the world, if they are simply given 
the correct knowledge. Further, he writes, “Cultural studies most often addresses 
desire as if it were something that can be mobilized and corrected by the sheer 
demand of knowledge and/or authority” (p. 5). Alcorn’s description points to an 
element that lacks emphasis in many descriptions of cultural studies pedagogy: 
the connection between dialogue and affect.      
 While Berlin does discuss the central importance of active classroom 
debate to cultural studies pedagogy, he perhaps fails to note explicitly enough the 
affect of such interaction on the emotion of students, and, as I will discuss below 
in relation to critical pedagogy, it is the positive emotion that this kind of 
decentered classroom, focused on mutual critical inquiry, can create that opens 
the student to transformation (Giroux 1992, Berlin “Poststructuralism” 1992). 
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Berlin does note that Ira Shor, probably the leading American theorist of critical 
pedagogy, provides the best and most comprehensive model of a social epistemic 
pedagogy. His own model curriculum, in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures (1996), 
however, does not place great emphasis on the use of the student-centered 
strategies of critical pedagogy. In order to be effective in the emerging network 
culture however, the pedagogy of social epistemic rhetoric must engage explicitly 
with the role of affect in persuasion—both in the classroom and in public 
discourse. That is, if a teacher wishes to persuade his/her students that it is 
important to critically engage with cultural and political texts, those students must 
be emotionally engaged in the classroom. And further, in order to critique 
rhetorical texts in the network society, students must be able to understand how 
affect is used as the primary persuasive device in this historical moment. Such a 
pedagogy would respond to critiques of Vitanza and Alcorn, as well as prepare 
students to confront and create persuasive texts in the network society.   
Alcorn fails to acknowledge that Berlin’s cultural studies pedagogy does 
in fact recognize the importance of student-centered learning. (Although it is true 
that Berlin may not have emphasized this enough.) The cultural studies pedagogy 
that Alcorn describes above appears to operate on what Freire (1970) calls the 
banking model of learning (which I will address below shortly).  In the classroom 
Alcorn describes above, the teacher has the politically correct knowledge (about, 
for example, the ways that certain ideologies oppress and construct people) and he 
or she gives it to, or deposits it in the student. Knowledge, in this case, is an 
objective substance that can be transferred from one mind to another. Alcorn 
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makes clear that he believes that cultural studies pedagogy necessarily operates on 
such a model of education when he contrasts cultural studies with the work of 
mourning, describing such work as “not the kind of information that we can 
memorize and employ” (p. 29). Alcorn argues that a student will not be motivated 
to change him/herself simply because they were provided with the “correct” 
information or knowledge. I’m fairly sure that any practitioner of cultural studies 
who employs critical pedagogy would whole-heartedly agree!    
As noted above, many practitioners of cultural studies in the composition 
classroom were largely influenced by Paulo Freire (1970), whose work is focused 
chiefly on developing a response to the inadequacies of the banking model of 
education (p. 45).  Freire is generally acknowledged as the preeminent source of 
“critical pedagogy,” which takes as it purpose the liberation of the individual from 
oppression of the dominant class. It accomplishes this objective through the 
decentering of the classroom and the empowerment of the student (1970, p. 75). 
Further, Freire, like the cultural studies pedagogies he inspired, advocated the 
critique of cultural codes to enable students to overcome subjugation to dominant 
ideologies (pp. 104-106). He argues that this can never be accomplished by 
following the banking model of education by which knowledge is considered a 
static, objective substance that must be deposited in the bank of the student’s 
mind, memorized and then applied (p. 72). Instead, teacher and students must 
construct knowledge dialogically: students participate actively in all learning, 
taking part in not only critical inquiry, but also the construction of the curriculum 
itself (pp. 75, 80). Students gain critical awareness not, as Alcorn suggests of 
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cultural studies pedagogy, because they are give politically correct knowledge or 
coerced into belief by the authority of the teacher, but through what Friere (1970) 
calls problem-posing: the process of mutual inquiry. The student subject is not 
changed, as Alcorn believes cultural studies attempts, by replacing one ideology 
with another, but through inquiry that leads the student to become critically aware 
of the ideological forces that shape him or her. Thus, the question, raised by 
members of the field as well as various right-wing figures, of whether the 
classroom is the appropriate place for ideological critique becomes moot, for in 
the context of critical pedagogy such critique is not a matter of changing the 
student so that he or she agrees with the teacher, but enabling the student to 
become critically aware of the impact of various ideological discourses on his or 
her life.40 Further, only a classroom that is non-hierarchical, decentered, can truly 
enable students to gain what Freire calls critical consciousness, as the school is 
one the foremost ideological state apparatuses: it reproduces and normalizes the 
hierarchical structure of capitalist ideology, and makes it all the more difficult for 
the student to perceive the formative power of that ideology. In order to raise 
consciousness, the practices of the institution must be changed.   
Ira Shor (1992), an advocate of critical pedagogical theory and practice, 
addresses the role of affect in the classroom more specifically than Freire, linking 
the practice of mutual inquiry to the successful engagement of student emotion. 
Shor argues that the participation of students and the de-centering of the 
                                                 
40 This question has been raised by Elizabeth Ellsworth in “Why Doesn’t this Feel Empowering” 
as well as by figures such as David Horowitz in his attacks on the academic left. 
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classroom are essential to engaging both the intellect and emotion of the student. 
Shor writes:    
The difference between empowering and traditional pedagogy has to do  
with the positive and negative feelings students can develop for the 
learning process. In traditional classrooms, negative emotions are 
provoked in students by teacher-centered politics. Unilateral teacher 
authority in a passive curriculum arouses in many students a variety of 
negative emotions (p. 23). 
 
Shor makes clear that a tradition authoritative pedagogy will indeed fail to 
encourage students to gain critical awareness; in fact, he argues that this is 
because such pedagogies provoke negative emotions in students, causing them, 
when a teacher-centered course focuses on politics, to hold all the more dearly to 
their own political attachments.    
For the critique of ideology in the composition classroom to lead to the 
consciousness-raising of the student, for it to change the subject, the class must be 
participatory, dialogic and decentered. For Shor argues that it is only in such 
classrooms that learning can affect the students. He writes, “[A]n empowering 
educator seeks a positive relationship between feeling and thought. He or she 
begins this search by offering a participatory curriculum. In a participatory class 
where authority is mutual, some of the positive affects that support student 
learning include cooperativeness…attentiveness, openness, and concern about 
society” (p. 24). This is not to say that all is sunshine and roses in such a 
classroom-- Shor acknowledges that the participatory classroom can lead to 
resistance and conflict (p. 24). But when authority is shared in a cooperative 
classroom, Shor makes it clear that students are more likely to be open to change, 
making it possible that in the process of ideological critique they will attach 
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positive feelings to the new critical awareness they are gaining. Shor illustrates 
the fact that students in a decentered classroom can successfully deal with the 
emotionally charged ideological critique, giving an example of his own version of 
cultural studies that combines his cooperative approach to learning with critical 
inquiry into the ideological codes normalized by the news media (p. 28).  
 I will now turn to my own example of a cultural studies curriculum for the 
composition classroom that is strongly influenced by Shor’s approach in that it 
combines a student-centered approach intended to engage students intellectually 
and emotionally, with a focus on the critique and production of cultural discourse. 
The curriculum moves beyond Shor’s and Berlin’s in that it also includes an 
emphasis on digital texts and that it specifically encourages students to critique, as 
well as employ, affect as a rhetorical strategy in electronic texts.    
Global Culture, Global Campus       
This chapter will now focus on the objectives, strategies, and curriculum 
of a first-year writing course that addresses issues of corporate and global41 
cultures within and surrounding the university. The curriculum, which was 
originally developed in collaboration with two other instructors, and has been 
                                                 
41 Little has been yet written on globalization in the field of composition and rhetoric. Several 
books and articles touch on the issue of globalization, but few deal with its use as a topic in the 
composition classroom. Most of the work done in the field on globalization has been thus far 
focused on technology. Global Literacies and the World Wide Web is a useful edited collection of 
essays on digital literacy from a range of international perspectives. In “The Political Economy of 
Computers and Composition: 'Democracy Hope' in the Era of Globalization,” cited in previous 
chapters, M.J. Braun argues for increased attention in computers and composition to the central 
role played by multinational capital in any kind technological literacy education. Hawisher and 
Selfe, in “Globalization and Agency: Designing and Redesigning the Literacies of Cyberspace,” 
discuss agency on the Web in our globalizing world. However, June Johnson’s Global Issues, 
Local Arguments is one of the few works in the field that moves the issue of globalization beyond 
discussions of technology, and into the composition classroom. Though a textbook/ reader, the 
book is a useful resource for scholars and teachers interested in addressing globalization in either 
research or in the classroom.  
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taught several times by several instructors, has received an overwhelmingly 
positive response from students and instructors. What I present here has been 
heavily revised and refined (chiefly to add a much greater emphasis on 
technology) since its original development. I present it as an example of the 
pedagogy of network epistemic rhetoric, as it attempts to apply, in the classroom, 
the various theoretical conclusions reached over the course of this book. Further, 
the pedagogical suggestions made in earlier chapters (regarding social networking 
sites and blogs) can be incorporated into the overall course plan. The curriculum 
draws on the cultural studies pedagogy of Berlin as well as Friere’s critical 
pedagogy, but it also maintains a strong emphasis on digital and visual rhetoric. 
Students are encouraged to follow Berlin’s model of textual critique, and to focus 
on analysis of digital texts. However, its emphasis on technology as a topic as 
well as its focus on the critique and production of digital texts does not proceed 
from Berlin’s assumption that technology itself is inherently democratic—in fact, 
students are specifically encouraged to consider the role played by capital in IT. 
Technology is still used in the classroom to encourage community—though not a 
community based on consensus: applications such as blogs are used to decenter 
the classroom and encourage the students to work together as a multitude.  
 In order to respond to the critiques of Vitanza and Alcorn and engage 
students both intellectually and emotionally, the course situates academic writing 
within a global, “real-world,” local context: students examine the global impacts 
of their own roles as consumers of/in the university. Moving outward from their 
experiences in this subject position, students examine a variety of global issues, 
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such as the impacts of American consumer culture on global cultures, and the 
increasing corporate influence on the academic and intellectual culture of the 
university. Throughout the semester, students work collaboratively to research 
and analyze their own university’s resources, policies, and contracts with 
corporations and foreign governments in order to develop an advanced 
understanding of the place of the university within the global community. I have 
found that the course’s strong focus on the individual personal experience of the 
student as a member of a college community (connected to the global economy) 
encourages a strong emotional engagement from the student: the average student 
may not be interested in the abstract issue of, say, the corporatization of higher 
education, but many students do care that prices are high at their college 
bookstore because it is run by Barnes and Noble, or that they can only buy Coke 
(or Pepsi) products on campus because their university has signed an exclusive 
contract with the corporation. Also, in order to create what Ira Shor calls an 
“affective learning” environment, I further encourage the development of 
classroom community based the model of multitude through means other than 
technology, decentralizing power in the classroom by sharing curricular decisions 
and organizational responsibilities with students. Further, emotional investment in 
the course is encouraged through class-wide involvement in a student-organized 
public conference at which student work is exhibited.     
 Finally, the course topic of globalization, in part because it is inherently 
tied to technological issues, allows much opportunity for students to engage with 
technology as a topic; the course design itself also require students to critique and 
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create multi-modal affect-driven rhetorics. In preparation for their final essays and 
the conference, students evaluate websites (among texts from other electronic 
sources, such as library databases), digitally produce posters and fliers, and create 
a range of other digital texts, from short films to PowerPoint presentations. 
Course Overview      
Each unit of the course is based on the exploration of argumentative 
strategies and research techniques. Units of the curriculum include “Globalization 
and You,” in which students write causal arguments that examine the effects of 
increased corporate power on American culture, economy and/ or themselves 
individually. Students can also write causal arguments that examine the effects 
that individual consumers can have on the corporation. Further, students can also 
examine the effect of U.S. corporate culture on a specific traditional culture, or 
vice-versa.42 In “Advertising, the News and the Multinational Media” students 
examine the increasing convergence of global media corporations and critically 
analyze the effects of corporate media (both new and traditional) on American 
culture. For this unit students have, for example, examined the corporate purchase 
of social networking sites such as MySpace and performed rhetorical analyses of 
the ways that consumer culture within the university is encouraged by 
representations of college life in entertainment and advertising. In the unit “The 
Global Campus,” students write ethical or evaluative arguments based on their 
research into connections between their university and the global economy. At the 
end of the semester, students organize and host an academic conference where the 
                                                 
42 This unit opens with a viewing of Life and Debt a documentary about the effects of the global 
economy on the culture of Jamaica.  
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 150
visual, digital, and written arguments developed over the course of the semester 
are presented to the university community. At the conference, students also 
present papers and participate in question and answer sessions. Thus, as I explore 
in greater detail below, the course follows Paulo Freire’s insistence on starting 
from the student’s own experience, draws upon James Berlin’s model of cultural 
critique, and reflects the importance, noted by Joe Marshall Hardin, of validating 
student texts and providing a means for those texts to enter public discourse. 
 This course, in my experience, opens up lines of communication between 
students of varying ideological backgrounds and engages them in a discussion of 
their relationship to the larger global culture surrounding them. Further, students 
are energized by the “real-world” aspects of the topics and often report that the 
course changes the way they think about writing, arguing, and even shopping!  
Strategies and Objectives 
The following assignments, which I will examine in detail, reflect my 
commitment to critical pedagogy, as well as a cultural studies approach to 
composition. I feel that critical pedagogy has the power to transform student 
writing because it requires students to identify topics, skills, and structures that 
they want to highlight and/or improve upon in their work. Every time I teach the 
course, each unit’s specific major assignments are created in conjunction with my 
classes; together, students and teacher identified critical inquiry questions and 
created a rubric for assessment. Student-centered pedagogy is central to this 
course and the assignment sequence emphasizes student experience throughout. 
The first unit, “Defining Globalization,” asks students to first consider what they 
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already know about globalization, and then formulate critical inquiry questions 
about what they would like to learn about it. The students then read a number of 
popular and scholarly articles that examine the characteristics of globalization. 
The major writing assignment for the unit asks students to create a definitional 
argument in which they attempt to persuade readers what exactly globalization is, 
or isn’t. The second unit, “Globalization and You,” starts from their individual 
experience as consumers and asks them to relate that experience to the global 
community. For this unit’s major writing assignment, students create a causal 
argument that examines the effect of the global economy, or a specific 
corporation (many students write about Wal-Mart, for example), on the individual 
consumer and/ or local culture. For the third unit, “Advertising, the News, and the 
Multinational Media” students examine the multi-modal spaces with which they 
are most familiar, as they consider film and video texts, and critique the online 
social networks to which they belong. Further, they examine the trend towards 
multinational media consolidation and critique news articles and programs. For 
the major writing assignment, students choose from a range of possible 
argumentative strategies and compose essays that examine issues and texts related 
to technology and the media: students have written on topics ranging from media 
consolidation to on-line file sharing. The final unit, “The Global Campus,” is a 
culmination of the course. Students research their own university’s relationship to 
a multinational corporation, or global business trend, thereby connecting there 
personal experience as a college student to the global economy and culture. I will 
now present a detailed overview of two of the course’s units: the two units that I 
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feel best exemplify the pedagogy of network epistemic rhetoric, in that they both 
reflect a commitment to critical technological literacy, critical pedagogy and 
cultural studies. 
Advertising, the News and the Multinational New Media 
This unit focuses on global media and technology. Students engage with a 
variety of issues, and perform a wide range of tasks for this unit: 
• Students examine digital representations of college, and consider 
the ways in which college is marketed as product and they are 
constructed as consumers by college advertising. 
 
• Students learn about multinational corporate media consolidation, 
and create “News Blogs” in which they compile and critique news 
stories about globalization. 
 
• Students analyze and compose arguments about the digital spaces 
where they are most active, such as blogs, social networking sites 
(like Facebook and MySpace), or even online forums devoted to 
popular entertainment.  
 
The Web offers instant access to an astounding range of cultural artifacts 
and discourse environments that can be used as material for the critique of 
cultural codes. Students use the Web to find and decode electronic discourse that 
constructs the college experience as an economic transaction in which they are the 
consumers. These electronic discourses, students find, range from college 
homepages with slogans like “Affordable Success” to a university athletics site 
with an online Nike apparel store.  
Students also critique university websites that construct college in terms of 
race, gender, and socio-economic status. The students specifically note 
homepages that featured brilliant images of gothic architecture, exquisitely 
manicured lawns, and fashionably dressed students, right beside information on 
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the university’s ranking in US News and World Report and the number of 
attending merit scholars. A campus bookstore is another rich subject for critique. 
Students therein examine the online services of the corporation running the 
bookstore, services that streamline the buying process, discourage bargain-
hunting, and offer product suggestions. From examining this wide range of 
discursive examples, students learn how electronic discourse is shaping their roles 
as consumers within the university.  
By examining representations of college in the new media, and analyzing 
their role as a member of a college campus in relation to such representations, 
students can become more aware of the ways that they are shaped by the media 
and advertising. Students can then move from analyzing the media from their 
personal perspective as a college student, to an examination of the current state of 
the global corporate media. Students read articles arguing for and against media 
consolidation, and consult a special issue on the media from The Nation, which 
contains a chart detailing the holdings of, and relationships between, the five 
major media corporations. They then create “News Blogs,” mentioned in Chapter 
Four, in which they link to and critique news stories focused on globalization. 
Their blogs aim not simply to discuss the issues brought up by the articles, but to 
critique the news article itself. Students ask: Is the article biased? Is it well-
researched and in-depth? Does it contribute to the reader’s critical understanding 
of the issue at hand? Students are required to respond to their classmates’ blogs, 
creating networked, rhizomatic discussion. As noted in the previous chapter, these 
blogs serve to decentralize the classroom conversation, providing a means for 
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student dialogue that does not cohere around a central point of view (such as the 
teacher’s).  
The Global Campus 
This is the most important unit of the course. In many ways it is the 
culmination of the work the students have done up to this point; the two previous 
units can be viewed as preparation for this unit. The unit’s learning objectives are 
as follows: 
• Students will be able to conduct extensive research on a business 
practice of their university that is in some way connected to the 
global economy. Student will be able to use effectively a variety of 
research methods: using library resources, performing interviews, 
creating surveys, etc. This research should be conducted in groups 
and individually. 
 
• Students will produce in groups and present visual and written 
arguments at an on-campus conference on globalization. 
 
• Students will organize this conference themselves.     
As with the previous units, this unit encourages students to work from their own 
experience and connect that experience to the global community. Personal 
experience and local knowledge are even more important in this unit. I have found 
that this unit is particularly successful because it meets students where they are 
and enables them to examine and offer opinions on the world with which they are 
most familiar: the university campus. The unit encourages students to examine 
their role as members and consumers in the local college community, and relate 
that experience to the global economy and culture. Further, the on-campus 
conference enables students to share all of their hard work with others. The 
conference validates student-created texts, as it demonstrates to everyone 
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involved that students can, and should, have a voice in the community, and that 
students have the ability to make a valuable contribution to the discourse of the 
university. 
The unit has three major assignments: 
• An argumentative research essay that evaluates a business 
relationship held by their university with a multinational 
corporation or a business practice in which their university is 
engaged that is in some way connected to the global economy. 
Students can choose to argue whether this relationship or practice 
is ethical, or whether it is “good” for the students/ university. 
 
• A visual argument, created in groups, to be presented at the 
globalization conference. This argument can be a traditional poster, 
or a multi-media project. 
 
• An advocacy flier, created by each individual student. This flier 
should ideally be created with digital technology, and should focus 
on some aspect of globalization. The flier should be focus on a 
“proposal argument,” and be passed out at the conference. 
 
 
Again, as in the previous units, students are asked to compose argumentative 
essays; in this case, they create either an evaluative or ethical argument. In both 
cases, students establish criteria for what they believe constitutes a beneficial or 
ethical business relationship or practice and then apply those criteria to a business 
relationship or practice held by their university. However, this unit departs from 
those that came before in the amount of research required. Students are asked to 
consult a range of resources and also engage in hands-on research practices for 
both their individual essays as well as their group visual project. For the group 
project, students are placed in research groups and asked to focus on a particular 
college service or business practice, such as the bookstore, foodservices, sports, 
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and fundraising. Students consult scholarly articles for background on issues such 
as outsourcing by colleges, the corporatization of the university, and anti-
sweatshop activism on college campuses. They consult databases available 
through the college library, such as Hoovers, for information on corporations 
affiliated with their university. Students also engage with various related websites, 
from corporate watchdog sites to sites devoted to advocating either free trade or 
fair trade. Blogs are again a useful digital genre in this unit. Student research 
groups can be required, or given the option, to create research blogs. Research 
blogs can be used as an online space in which to post links to resources; in this 
way individual students can share with their group, and comment on, the research 
material they have found.  
Students can also engage a range of more hands-on research techniques. 
Students have interviewed managers at the campus bookstore regarding its 
contract with Barnes and Noble, as well as a number of university employees to 
gain information on contracts the college holds with companies such as Nike and 
Coca-Cola. They have interviewed workers at the bookstore and foodservices in 
regards to their treatment by the companies to which those services have been 
outsourced. Students have even conducted surveys on beverage preferences on 
campus to inform their research on the college’s exclusive contract with Coke. 
 I have found that students create excellent written and visual arguments on 
a variety of issues important to them and their college community as a whole. 
Students have created written and visual arguments on their university’s contracts 
with Nike, Barnes and Noble, Starbucks, and Sysco, to name a few. A range of 
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topics and political perspectives are always present each time the course has been 
taught. One student wrote a paper criticizing the university president’s 
relationship to the oil industry, and then contributed to a visual argument that, for 
the most part, supported that relationship. Students have created scathing written 
and visual arguments criticizing the university’s involvement with companies 
such as Nike and Coke, while other students have written well-supported 
arguments in favor of those business relationships. Students have also engaged 
with a variety of digital technologies, creating argumentative websites, digitally 
produced advocacy fliers and posters, and using video to create an anti-Nike 
commercial, as well as an investigative report on the campus bookstore. One 
group of students even made anti-Nike T-shirts! 
The course’s emphasis on digital and visual affect-driven rhetorics has 
indeed been in strong evidence at each Globalization Conference that has resulted 
from this course. Both the group produced posters and the individually-created 
advocacy fliers have demonstrated student engagement with and production of 
pathos-laden electronic discourse. A number of students hit upon a particularly 
affective strategy for visual and digital argumentation: detournement, the 
subversive process of the re-signification of dominant cultural codes.43 The 
images and texts of corporate advertising are turned against themselves or 
detourned in order to make a statement of resistance. Many of the students have 
used digital technology to find and re-signfy corporate images—for example 
brand logos, sponsored athletes, and celebrity spokespeople—by altering them or 
                                                 
43 See Debord, 1967. 
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placing them in contexts that undermine the corporate message. One group of 
students created a poster that juxtaposed images of Nike athletes and Nike 
products with images of sweatshop factories and workers to argue that the 
university’s contract with Nike is unethical. (The web provides access, 
incidentally, to images of sweatshops that would have been difficult to attain 
otherwise.) One student found an already re-signified, anti-corporate, Starbucks 
logo on the web and combined it with an image of impoverished coffee bean 
farmers, for an advocacy flyer that argues Starbuck’s fair-trade campaign does not 
help the majority of the corporation’s coffee suppliers. In these examples, digital 
technology offers material for cultural critique as well as the opportunity to 
manipulate and combine images and texts to re-signify the codes of the dominant 
culture.  
The Web offers students (and of course, other citizens) the means to 
engage in signifying practices that run counter to the hegemonic culture, so some 
students may produce texts and subjectivities that re-signify or resist dominant 
cultural codes. Many examples of subversive signifying practices exist on the 
Web, from the “culture jamming” of Adbusters, to the more direct use of online 
networks to organize political action as seen, for example, in online forums 
dedicated to the organization of labor. Clearly, digital technology can help 
students and citizens realize the democratic goals of social epistemic rhetoric. 
Conclusions 
 
Although the various instructors who have taught this curriculum have 
gained a number of insights, I have drawn two major conclusions from the 
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experience of teaching this course. First, I have found that globalization is an 
ideal topic for those who wish to engage their composition students with issues of 
culture and politics. We obliviously live in a particularly polarized historical 
moment in which questions regarding American culture and politics are most 
often framed as binary, clear-cut choices: Blue state or red state? Pro-life or pro-
choice? Gay rights or family values? Military strength or the triumph of terror? 
Are you with us or against us? The topic of globalization has a way of 
transcending these hot button, two-dimensional issues.  To begin with, students 
are often relatively unfamiliar with the issues surrounding globalization and are 
therefore less likely to begin the course with preconceived notions as to the 
“correct” position in regards to a given issue. If one begins a class discussion on 
the question of abortion, obviously, everyone in the room knows already where he 
or she stands, and is extremely unlikely to diverge even slightly from that 
position. A class discussion on the merits of, say, free-trade, or even sweatshops, 
isn’t anywhere near so clear-cut. In my experience, students generally identify as 
either a Republican or Democrat (usually based on their parent’s identification) 
and their political opinions generally follow their party’s line. The issues 
surrounding globalization cannot so easily be placed into one of two possible 
world-views. Having taught this course at a very “red” state university, I found 
that students often came to conclusions that were in opposition to their professed 
“conservative” viewpoint. For example, students who explicitly identified with 
the pro-business policies of the Republican Party, after research, came out 
strongly against the mega-retailer Wal-Mart. Some came to criticize Wal-Mart 
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after studying the effects it has had on the economy and culture of small rural 
towns (from which many of the students came), others became critical of Wal-
Mart after learning the central role it has played in the decline of American 
manufacturing. This is but one example: students engaged in surprising ways with 
a number of issues, creating anti-sweatshop fliers, arguing against media 
conglomeration, and even criticizing the free-trade policies of the U.S. If this 
curriculum was taught in a “bluer” state I have no doubt that students there would 
also come to unexpected conclusions regarding the politics and culture of 
globalization. 
 Second, I found that the Globalization Conference was successful in many 
regards. Most importantly, the students did great work. It was clear that the public 
nature of the conference motivated students to create quality work. The chance to 
display their own personal work publicly indeed led to a level of commitment as 
well as intellectual and emotional investment from students I have rarely observed 
in a composition classroom. Many groups, and individual students, went above 
and beyond the requirements, taking extra time to produce digital movies and 
websites, rather than just make a standard conference poster. The students cared: 
not just about their own work, but about the success of the conference. They all 
took the conference very seriously—the work they displayed was, with few 
exceptions, of the highest quality. Students also did an excellent job helping to 
organize the conference as well—for the most part. One of the few 
disappointments of the course was the amount of student input on the 
organizational level—I, and the other teachers involved, found that we had to step 
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in and take care of more of the logistical details than originally planned. In order 
for the conference to be fully student-organized I believe it should have been 
explicitly labeled a service-learning class. Overall, all of the conferences that have 
resulted from my (or other instructors) teaching this curriculum have been rousing 
successes.  
 I believe that the success I have experienced teaching this curriculum 
points to need for a pedagogy that reflects the theoretical framework of network 
epistemic rhetoric.  This pedagogy still should rely on the most important 
elements of Berlin’s social epistemic rhetoric. There must remain a strong 
emphasis on the critique of cultural codes and ideology. And the texts which are 
critiqued should always be historicized: they are placed in historical, economic 
and cultural contexts, and any critique is based upon the assumption that texts 
cannot exist apart, or autonomously, from the perspective of either the author or 
the reader. The cultural studies approach to composition advocated by Berlin is 
also taken insofar as students are required to engage with and produce a wide 
range of text types: students, for example, work with visual, digital and print 
rhetorics, among others. The pedagogy of network epistemic rhetoric should also 
maintain Berlin’s commitment to student-centered learning. Social epistemic 
rhetoric’s emphasis on historicization helps ensure that textual meaning will never 
be understood as operating in a vacuum outside of the perspective of the 
individual reader. 
 While network epistemic rhetoric never departs completely from social 
epistemic rhetoric, there are a number of areas in which the theoretical and 
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pedagogical paradigm I am suggesting differs from Berlin’s paradigm. This 
revision should not be seen as a critique of Berlin’s work, but an extension of it, 
into a new historical moment. The differences I suggest are usually a matter of 
new emphases, and based on a much greater body of computers and composition 
scholarship. There are cases, however, in which I believe that we must revise 
some of Berlin’s epistemological assumptions. 
 I’m arguing, of course, for a heavier emphasis on the critique and 
production of technology. In the classroom, this means more attention to a wide 
range of electronic media and genres, as well as more practice creating digital 
texts—whether those texts are visual, web-based, video, audio, or all of the above. 
But I’m also arguing for an understanding of technology that does differ from 
Berlin’s. While Berlin fostered “democracy hope” and operated on the 
assumption that technology is somehow inherently democratic and egalitarian, I 
argue, following Terranova (and as evidenced in my analyses of online social 
networking and blogging), that, while potential spaces for resistance and 
democracy do exist within digital networks, technology is primarily capitalistic. 
Therefore, far from naturally encouraging equality and providing the means for 
empowerment, I believe that, in most cases, technology reproduces the 
inequalities of the capitalist market, while playing a major role in the production 
of biopower and the perpetuation of a control society. Therefore, my emphasis on 
the careful critique of ideological codes found in electronic texts and practices is 
particularly strong. While I do believe, like Berlin, that we must find and 
encourage discursive practices in digital spaces that encourage community, 
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democracy and agency, I also believe that our first priority must be to understand, 
and teach students to understand, the ways in which technology perpetuates the 
current, oppressive, mode of production.  Thus, in the course outlined above, I ask 
students not only to produce digital texts such as blogs and websites, I require that 
students examine the economic and cultural contexts that surround the various 
media that saturate their daily lives as well as examine how those media 
perpetuate particular values and power structures. 
 Network epistemic rhetoric also maintains Berlin’s commitment to the 
empowerment of students. However, it remains skeptical of the ability of 
technology to facilitate that empowerment through the exploration and 
construction of multiple subject positions in electronic spaces. As noted earlier, 
Berlin argues (1994) that agency can be gained through the movement between, 
and exploration of, varying, even contradictory subject positions. It would seem to 
follow that the emergence of web-based— as well as virtual reality—technology 
has provided the perfect means for individuals to gain this kind of agency. After 
all, as seen above, scholars from Bolter to Turkle have celebrated the freedom to 
be gained from the exploration of virtual selves. However, as I hope I have 
demonstrated in my analyses of networking sites and personal blogs, rather than 
providing the means to gain agency, the digital spaces that ostensibly allow for 
the creation of varying subject positions most often encourage the creation of 
identities that conform to and perpetuate dominant cultural values and corporate 
agendas. Moreover, these sites of supposed freedom are also sites of surveillance 
by both governmental as well as corporate entities. Therefore, network epistemic 
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rhetoric does not proceed, at least as far the digital world is concerned, from 
Berlin’s understanding of the relationship between agency and subjectivity. 
Online subject exploration is viewed primarily as a site of subjugation rather than 
emancipation. 
 While Berlin notes the importance of critical pedagogy and a student-
centered approach to learning, I believe that critical pedagogy should be even 
more strongly emphasized as a central aspect of the pedagogy of network 
epistemic rhetoric. It is not only essential that composition curricula attend to the 
interests and perspectives of specific groups of students, but that steps are taken to 
transform the classroom from a traditional, teacher-centered space. By creating a 
classroom in which students are invested not just in following a curriculum, but in 
collaboratively developing it, we can avoid Vitanza’s and Alcorn’s critique that 
Berlin relies too heavily on the rational understanding of students in his attempt to 
encourage awareness and subject transformation. As the scholars and practioners 
of critical pedagogy make clear, any attempt to enable students to become 
critically aware must engage students both intellectually and emotionally, and this 
just can’t be done in a teacher-centered, monologic classroom. 
 Further, if the classroom is reorganized around the concept of multitude—
that is, if it coheres as decentralized, rhizomatic network—we can perhaps begin 
to move beyond an understanding of democracy (in the classroom and beyond) as 
consensus-based, an understanding which tends to follow from the assumption 
that individuals are rational, autonomous beings. As demonstrated above, 
networked technology can be very helpful in the development of a classroom 
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community based on multitude. Electronic spaces such as blogs and even 
classroom management discussion boards can help create a discourse community 
that isn’t focused on the central figure of the teacher, in which dialogue and 
collaboration can happen while individual and minority positions are voiced and 
preserved. Ideally the classroom should be a site of democratic discussion based 
not on majority rule, or decision by consensus, but on heteroglossia—a dynamic, 
ever evolving discourse community that remains connected while every 
individual voice can be clearly heard. 
 In our emerging network society, as meaning is drowned out by rhetorics 
of spectacle and affect, and groups are more and more often motivated by a 
“common passion” rather than a common understanding, it becomes ever more 
important that we develop an conception of community and democracy that 
maintains enough coherence and commonality to make collective action possible, 
but which ensures that the marginalized will never become victims of the terror of 
totalization. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 166
References 
 
Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. (1993). The culture industry: Enlightenment as 
mass deception. In Dialectic of enlightenment: Philosophical fragments. 
(J. Cumming, Trans.). New York: Continuum. 
 
Althusser, L. (1971). Lenin and philosophy and other essays. London: New Left 
Books. 
 
Aristotle. (1991). On rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse. (G. Kennedy, Trans.). 
New York: Oxford University. 
 
Arrington, M. (2005). 85% of college students use Facebook. TechCrunch.  
Retrieved on July 15, 2005 from http://www.techcrunch.com.  
 
Bakhtin, M. (1984). Problems of Dostoyevsky’s poetics. (C. Emerson, Trans.). 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
 
--. (1986). Speech genres and other late essays. (V.W. Mcgee, Trans.) Austin: 
University of Texas. 
 
Barthes, R. (1972). Mythologies. (A. Lavers, Trans.). New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Bartholomae, D. (1985). Inventing the university. In M. Rose (Ed.), When a 
writer can’t write. New York: Guilford. 
 
Baudrillard, Jean. (1994). Simulation and Simulacra. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan. 
 
Berlin, J. (1987).  Rhetoric and reality: Writing instruction in American colleges, 
1900-1985. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University. 
 
---. (1988). Rhetoric and ideology in the writing classroom. College English, 50, 
477-494. 
 
---. (1990). The teacher as researcher: Democracy, dialogue, and power. In D. 
Daiker and M. Morenberg (Eds.), The Writing teacher as researcher: 
Essays in the theory and practice of class-based research (pp. 3-14). 
Portsmouth: Heinemann. 
 
---. (1992). Poststructuralism, cultural studies, and the composition classroom.  
Rhetoric Review, 11, 16-33. 
 
---. (1996). Rhetorics, poetics, and culture: Refiguring college English studies. 
Urbana: NCTE. 
 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 167
Bizzell, P. (1982). Cognition, convention, and certainty: What we need to know 
about writing. Pre/Text, 3, 213-243. 
 
Blair, K. & Takayoshi, P. (Eds.). (1999). Feminist cyberscapes: Mapping 
gendered academic spaces. Stamford: Ablex. 
 
Blakesley, D. & Rickert T. (2004). An interview with Mark C. Taylor. Journal of  
Advanced Composition, 24 (4), 805-819. 
 
Bolter, J. & Grusin, R. (1999). Remediation: Understanding new media. 
Cambridge: MIT. 
 
Bosson, J. K. (2006). Interpersonal chemistry through negativity: Bonding by 
sharing negative attitudes about others. Personal Relationships, 13, 135-
150. 
 
Brandt, D. (1990). Literacy as involvement: the acts of writers, readers, and texts.  
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University. 
 
Braun, M. J. (2001). The political economy of computers and composition: 
'Democracy hope' in the era of globalization. Journal of Advanced 
Composition, 21 (1), 2001, 160. 
 
Brooke, Collin. (2005). Weblogs as deictic systems: centripetal, centrifugal, and 
small-world blogging. Computers and Composition Online. Retrieved on 
July 12 2007 from http://www.bgsu.edu/cconline/brooke/brooke.htm. 
 
Bruffee, K. (1985). Collaborative learning and the “conversation of mankind.”  
CE, 46, 635-652. 
 
Brummett, B. (2003). The world and how we describe it: Rhetorics of reality, 
representation, simulation. Westport: Praeger. 
 
Burke, K. (1969). A rhetoric of motives. Berkeley: University of California. 
 
Caldwell, J. and Everett, A. (Eds.). (2003). New media: Theories and practices of 
digitextuality. New York: Routledge. 
 
Copeland, L. (2005, December 28). Click clique: Facebook’s online college 
community. The Washington Post. Retrieved October 12, 2005 from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
 
Crowley S. (1998). Composition in the university: Historical and polemical 
essays. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University. 
 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 168
Debord, G. (1967). Society of the spectacle. (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). New  
York: Zone Books. 
 
Deleuze, G. (1990). Negotiations. New York: Columbia. 
 
Dyer-Witherford, N. (1999). Cyber-Marx: Cycles and circuits of struggle in high 
technology capitalism. Urbana: University of Illinois. 
 
Elbow, P. (1973). Writing without teachers. New York: Oxford University. 
 
Emig, J. (1971). The composing process of twelfth graders. Urbana: NCTE. 
 
Everett, A. (2003). Digitextuality and click-theory: Theses on convergence media 
in the digital age. In New Media. New York: Routledge. 
 
Faigley, L. (1992). Fragments of rationality: Postmodernity and the subject of  
 composition.  Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh. 
 
Flower, L & Hayes, J. (1981). A cognitive process theory of writing. CCC, 32, 
365-87. 
 
Foucault, M. (1982). The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on 
language. New York: Pantheon.  
 
---. (1977). Discipline and punish. New York: Pantheon. 
 
---. (1978). The history of sexuality: An introduction. New York: Vintage. 
 
---. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-
1977. New York: Pantheon. 
 
Foss, S. & Griffin, C. (1995). Beyond persuasion: A proposal for an invitational 
rhetoric. Communication Monographs, 62, 2-18. 
 
Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. (M. Bergman, Trans.). New York: 
Continuum. 
 
Frank, T. (2004). What’s the matter with Kansas? New York: Metropolitan 
Books. 
 
Giroux, H. (1988). Schooling and the struggle for public life: Critical pedagogy 
for the modern age. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
 
Gurak, L. (1997). Persuasion and privacy in cyberspace: The online protests over 
Lotus MarketPlace and the Clipper Chip. New Haven: Yale University. 
 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 169
---. (2001). Cyberliteracy. New Haven: Yale University. 
 
Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere.  
Cambridge: MIT. 
 
Hardin, J. (2001). Opening spaces: Critical pedagogy and resistance theory in 
composition. Albany: SUNY. 
 
Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University.  
 
---. (2004). Multitude. New York: Penguin. 
 
Harris, J. (1996). A teaching subject: Composition since 1966. New York: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Hawisher, G. & Sullivan, P. Women on the networks: Searching for e-spaces of 
their own. In S. Jarratt. & L. Worsham (Eds.), Feminism and composition 
studies (pp.). New York, MLA Press, 1998. 
 
Hawisher, G. and Selfe, C. The rhetoric of technology and the electronic writing 
class. CCC, 42, 55-65. 
 
Herod, A. (1998). Of blocs, flows and networks. In A. Herod, G. O Tuathail & 
S.M. Roberts (Eds.), An unruly world? Globalization, governance, and 
geography. London: Routledge. 
 
Herzberg, B. (1991). Michel Foucault’s rhetorical theory. In Harkin and Schlib 
(Eds.), Contending with words: Composition and rhetoric in a postmodern 
age (pp. 69-81). New York: MLA. 
 
Howard, T. (1997). The rhetoric of electronic communities.  Norwood: Ablex.  
 
Isocrates. (1929). Antidosis. (G. Norlin, Trans.) London: Loeb Classical Library.  
 
Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism. 
 Durham: Duke. 
 
Johnson, J. (2006). Global issues, local arguments. New York: Longman. 
 
Jones, S. & Young, J. (2007). Blogs, baseball and resistance. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
Kates, S (2005). Emerging technologies and  the public intellectual. Literature  
 Interpretation Theory, 16, 381-388. 
 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 170
Kellner, D. (2004). Media spectacle and the crisis of democracy: Terrorism, war, 
and election battles. New York: Routledge. 
 
Kellner, D. and Best, S. (1999). Debord and the postmodern turn: New stages of 
the spectacle. Substance, 90, 129-156.  
 
Kent, T. (Ed.). (1999). Post-process theory: Beyond the writing-process 
paradigm. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University. 
 
Komito, L. (1998). The net as foraging society: Flexible communities. 
Information Society, 14 (2), 97-106. 
 
Lanham, R. (1993). The electronic word: Democracy, technology, and the  
 arts. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
 
---. (1994). The implications of electronic information for the sociology of 
knowledge. Leonardo, 27 (2), 155-163. 
 
Lunsford, A & Ede L. (1990). Singular text, plural authors. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University. 
 
Lyotard, J. (1984). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. 
(Bennington and Massumi, Trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.  
 
McCaughey, M. & Ayers, M. (2003). Cyberactivism: Online activism in theory 
and practice. New York: Routledge. 
 
McDonald. “Finding Friends with Facebook.” Wired.  03 Jul. 2005. 12 Oct. 2005 
<wired.com>. 
 
McGrath, J. (2004). Loving big brother: performance, privacy, and surveillance 
space. New York: Routledge. 
 
McLeary, P. (2007, March 15). How talking points memo beat the big boys on the 
U.S. attorney story. Columbia Journalism Review.  
 
Nakamura, L. (2002). Cybertypes: Race, ethnicity, and identity on the Internet. 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Orr, D. (1990). The liberal arts, the campus, and the biosphere. Harvard 
Educational Review. 
 
Porter, J. (1992). Audience and rhetoric. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
 
Rao, M. (2005). Facing up to facebook racism. Campus Progress. Retrieved 
October 10th, 2006 from http:// www.campusprogress.org. 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 171
Rice, J. (2004). Writing about cool: Hypertext and cultural studies in the 
composition classroom. New York: Pearson Longman. 
 
Rodowick, D. N. (2001) Reading the figural, or, philosophy after the new media. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Russell, D. (1999) Activity theory and process approaches: Writing (power) in 
school and society. In Kent (Ed.) Post-process theory: Beyond the writing 
process paradigm. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University. 
 
Scott-Joynt, J. (2005, July 7). What MySpace means to Murdoch. BBC News. 
Retrieved October 12, 2005 from http://www.bbc.com. 
 
Selber, S. (2004). Multiliteracies for a digital age. Carbondale: Southern Illinois. 
 
Selfe, C. (1999) Technology and literacy in the twenty-first century: The perils of 
not paying attention. Carbondale: Southern Illinois.  
 
Strogatz, S. (2003). Sync. New York: Penguin Press. 
 
Taylor, M. (2001). The moment of complexity: Emerging network culture. 
Chicago: University of Chicago. 
 
Terranova, T. (2004). The network culture: politics for the information age. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan. 
 
Turkle, S. (1995). Life on the screen: Identity in the age of the Internet. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Twohey, M. (2005, September 19). Do you Facebook? Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel Retrieved October 12, 2005 from http://www.jsonline.com. 
 
Ulmer, G. (2003). Internet invention: From literacy to electracy. New York: 
Longman. 
 
Vitanza, V. (1991). Three countertheses: Or, a critical in(ter)vention into 
composition theories and pedagogies. In P. Harkin and J Schlib (Eds.). 
Contending with words: Composition in a postmodern age. New York: 
MLA. 
 
Warnick, B. (2001). Critical literacy in a digital era: Technology, rhetoric, and 
the public interest. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
 
Welch, K. (1999). Electric rhetoric. Cambridge: MIT. 
 
Network Epistemic Rhetoric 
 172
Williams, A. (2005, August 28). Do you MySpace? New York Times. Retrieved 
October 12, 2005 from http://www.nytimes.com. 
 
Williams, R. (1983). Keywords. Oxford: Oxford University. 
 
Wise, J. M. (2003). Community, affect, and the virtual: The politics of 
cyberspace. In B. Kolko (Ed.) Virtual Publics. New York: Columbia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
